State v. GuzmanState v. Guzman
We granted and consolidated these writ applications to consider the effect of a trial court‘s failure to comply with certain requirements for taking a guilty plea found in Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 556.1. After reviewing the records and the applicable law, we find that the failure to inform a defendant of the mandatory minimum sentence provided by law and of the penalties for subsequent offenses is subject to the harmless error rule. In State v. Guzman, we find that the error was harmless and reverse the court of appeal‘s ruling. In State v. Stiles, because defendant Stiles did not raise this error as an assignment of error in the court of appeal, we find that the court of appeal erred in considering this issue in its error patent review. However, we affirm the court of appeal‘s ruling affirming Stiles’ convictions and sentences.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 6, 1998, Fernando J. Guzman was charged with Operating a Motor Vehicle While Intoxicated Second Offense (DWI), based on a prior October 30, 1997
In the consolidated case, defendant Jerry Lynn Stiles was charged with two counts of aggravated incest with his minor daughter, in violation of
In response, defendant Stiles moved for rehearing and for the first time complained about the trial court‘s failure to advise him of the mandatory minimum penalty. A three-two majority of the Second Circuit granted rehearing en banc and a divided court affirmed defendant‘s convictions and sentences. State v. Stiles, 31,854-KA (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/27/99), 733 So.2d 612 (on rehearing). We granted defendant‘s writ to consider whether the failure of the trial court to advise him of the mandatory minimum sentence for aggravated incest is subject to error patent review and, if so, whether this error requires that his sentences be vacated. State v. Stiles, 99-K-1753 (La.12/17/99), 751 So.2d 865.
DISCUSSION
In 1997, the legislature enacted
Art. 556.1. Plea of guilty or nolo contendere in a criminal case; duty of court
A. In any criminal case, the court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, without first addressing the defendant personally in open court and
informing him of, and determining that he understands, all of the following: (1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law.
(2) If the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has the right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding against him and, if financially unable to employ counsel, one will be appointed to represent him.
(3) That he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already been made, and that he has the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial has the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself.
(4) That if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will not be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere he waives the right to a trial.
B. In any criminal case, the court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally in open court and determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement, and that all constitutional and legal rights are knowingly and intelligently waived.
C. The court shall also inquire as to whether the defendant‘s willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results from prior discussions between the district attorney and the defendant or his attorney. If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties, the court, on the record, shall require the disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea is offered.
D. A verbatim record shall be made of the proceedings at which the defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.
E. In any case where a subsequent offense carries an enhanced penalty, the court shall inform the defendant of the penalties for subsequent offenses.
In each of the consolidated cases, the trial judges failed to inform the defendants of the applicable mandatory minimum sentences as required by
Applicability of La.C.Cr.P. art. 556.1 to misdemeanor cases
In State v. Guzman, despite the “in any criminal case” language in
Notwithstanding the State‘s arguments concerning the changes made to the code article‘s title,
Availability of error patent review of La.C.Cr.P. art. 556.1 violations
In State v. Stiles, defendant Stiles appealed his conviction and sentence assigning as error only that his sentence was excessive. The Second Circuit noted as part of its error patent review that the trial court failed to comply with
Article 920 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “the following matters and no others shall be considered on appeal: (1) An error designated in the assignment of errors; and (2) An error that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence.”
Applicability of the harmless error test to La.C.Cr.P. art. 556.1 violations
There would not be harmless error under division (h) where, for example ... there had been absolutely no inquiry by the judge into defendant‘s understanding of the nature of the charge and the harmless error claim of the government rests upon nothing more than the assertion that it may be “assumed” defendant possessed such understanding merely because he expressed a desire to plead guilty.
The Comments following
First, unlike requirements (1)-(4) contained in
Second, Louisiana‘s Code of Criminal Procedure contains its own harmless error provision. Article 921 provides that “[a] judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court because of any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights of the accused.”
There is no reason to find that the legislature did not intend for this article to apply to the trial judge‘s failure to inform defendant Guzman of the mandatory minimum sentences or the enhanced penalties for subsequent offenses. This Court has never extended the core Boykin constitutional requirements to include advice with respect to sentencing. State v. Nuccio, 454 So.2d 93, 104 (La.1984) (holding that the scope of Boykin has not been expanded to include advising the defendant of the possible consequences of his actions or that his conviction may be used as a basis for the filing of a future multiple offender bill). In fact, this Court has recently specifically held that such advice is not part of this Court‘s core Boykin constitutional requirements. State v. Anderson, 98-2977 (La.3/19/99), 732 So.2d 517. In State v. Anderson, the appellate court vacated the defendant‘s sentence for third offense DWI because in taking the defendant‘s prior plea to second offense DWI, the trial judge failed to inform the defendant of the sentencing range for that offense. State v. Anderson, 30,901 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/29/98), 720 So.2d 355. This Court reversed, and reinstated the defendant‘s conviction and sentence for third offense DWI holding as follows:
The transcript of defendant‘s January, 1995 guilty plea colloquy accompanying his conviction for first offense DWI shows minimal but adequate compliance with this Court‘s decision in State v. Jones, 404 So.2d 1192 (La.1981). The defendant was represented by counsel and nothing in the contemporaneous records of the guilty plea undercuts the presumption that counsel explained the nature of the charge in sufficient detail that the defendant had notice of what his plea asked him to admit. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644-46, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2257, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976). Advice with respect to the defendant‘s sentencing exposure may facilitate the taking of a voluntary guilty plea, see State ex rel. LaFleur v. Donnelly, 416 So.2d 82, 84 (La.1982);
La.C.Cr.P. art. 556.1(A)(1) (1997 La. Acts 1061), but it has never formed part of this Court‘s core Boykin requirements for the entry of a presumptively valid guilty plea in any case. See State v. Nuccio, 454 So.2d 93, 104 (La.1984); State v. Baum, 95-0384 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/4/95), 663 So.2d 285, 288, writ denied, 95-2685 (La.2/9/96), 667 So.2d 528.
State v. Anderson, supra at 517 (emphasis added). Thus, violations of
Third, the comments to
The United States Fifth Circuit, which previously had held that any total failure of a trial court to address a Rule 11 “core”6 concern mandated that the plea be set aside, has recently instituted a “straight-forward approach of universal
To determine whether a Rule 11 error is harmless (i.e., whether the error affects substantial rights), we focus on whether the defendant‘s knowledge and comprehension of the full and correct information would have been likely to [affect his] willingness to plead guilty. Stated another way, we “examine the facts and circumstances of the ... case to see if the district court‘s flawed compliance with ... Rule 11 ... may reasonably be viewed as having been a material factor affecting [defendant]‘s decision to plead guilty.”
Johnson, supra at 302 (citing United States v. Bachynsky, supra at 1360). As in the consolidated cases sub judice, in Johnson, the district court failed to advise the defendant of the mandatory minimum statutory penalty of one year, but the Fifth Circuit held that such error was harmless given that the defendant had accepted a plea bargain and agreed to plead guilty knowing that the plea was certain to produce a sentence of not less than 21 years. Id. at 303. The court emphasized, however, that the determination of harmless error was a fact sensitive inquiry and that what might be harmless error in one case may not be in another case.7 Id. at 303, n. 31.
Other federal circuits follow a similar approach in applying a harmless error analysis to Rule 11 violations. See United States v. Gigot, 147 F.3d 1193, 1197-98 (10th Cir.1998) (adopting Johnson); United States v. Richardson, 121 F.3d 1051, 1058-59 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a harmless error analysis focuses on “whether the defendant‘s knowledge and comprehension of the full and correct information would have been likely to affect his willingness to plead guilty“) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v. McCarthy, 97 F.3d 1562, 1575 (8th Cir.1996) (adopting Seventh Circuit approach); United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400, 402 (4th Cir.1995) (adopting Fifth and Seventh Circuit approaches); United States v. Dewalt, 92 F.3d 1209, 1214 (D.C.Cir.1996) (holding that “a district court‘s failure to comply with Rule 11(c)(1) is harmless if the record reveals either that the defendant had actual notice of the information that the district judge failed to convey or that the information would not have been important to the defendant.“)
We adopt the harmless error test enunciated in Johnson in this case involving
In the Guzman case, the transcript from the plea proceeding indicates that Guzman was represented by counsel, advised of his three Boykin rights, informed of the nature of the offense of which he was charged and that the maximum penalty for the offense was 6 months in jail, a $500 fine or both, represented that he had not been forced, threatened or coerced in any way to render his guilty plea, and understood the nature of the proceedings. The trial judge accepted his guilty plea, finding that there was a factual basis for it. Guzman was then sentenced to a fine of $500 or 50 days in jail, plus a 120 day suspended sentence, fines, DWI School, and community service. Absent from the transcript is any mention by the judge of the mandatory minimum sentence for first offense DWI, or that the conviction could be used to enhance the penalty for subsequent offenses. Guzman argues that he would not have pled guilty had he been informed of the mandatory minimum sentence for first offense DWI and that the conviction could be used to enhance the penalty for subsequent offenses. Just as we rejected that argument in Anderson, we reject it here. It is unreasonable to believe that had Guzman known that the minimum sentence to which he would be exposed was 10 days in jail, which could be and was suspended, that he would not have pled guilty. Further, Guzman was actually only sentenced to a $500 fine or 50 days in jail, with an additional 120 day sentence which was suspended. Thus, Guzman received no mandatory jail time. Likewise, in the absence of any particularized basis for this argument, we do not accept the contention that had Guzman known that a subsequent offense carried a more severe penalty than a first offense DWI, he would not have pled guilty to the first offense DWI. Such knowledge may have, and should have, affected his decision to drive while intoxicated a second time, but it clearly would not have been a material factor in his decision to plead guilty to the first offense. Further, as stated above, the trial judge was not even required by
Defendant Stiles complains that the 40-year sentence the trial court imposed is excessive, pointing out his remorse for his actions and the absence of a previous criminal history as mitigation. Although we did not grant defendant Stiles’ writ to address the length of his sentence, because we did not limit the writ grant to the issues presented regarding
A sentence which falls within the statutory limits may be excessive under certain circumstances. State v. Brown, 94-1290 (La.1/17/95), 648 So.2d 872, 877. To constitute an excessive sentence, this Court must find that the penalty is so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no reasonable contribution to acceptable penal goals and therefore, is nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. Id. The trial judge has broad discretion, and a reviewing court may not set sentences aside absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Cann, 471 So.2d 701, 703 (La.1985). Given the egregiousness of the offense, the vulnerability of the victim, and the benefits defendant received under his favorable plea bargain, we hold that the defendant failed to demonstrate that the trial judge abused his discretion by imposing consecutive, maximum terms totaling 40 years at hard labor.
CONCLUSION
The requirements of
DECREE
For the reasons stated herein, in State v. Guzman, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeal granting defendant‘s motion to quash, reinstate the judgment of the trial court denying defendant‘s motion to quash, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. In State v. Stiles, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeal affirming defendant‘s convictions and sentences.
STATE OF LOUISIANA V. GUZMAN, NO. 99-KK-1528:
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
STATE OF LOUISIANA V. STILES, NO. 99-K-1753:
AFFIRMED.
CALOGERO, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in part, and assigns reasons.
LEMMON, J., concurs and will assign reasons.
KIMBALL, J., concurs in part and dissents in part for reasons assigned by CALOGERO, C.J.
CALOGERO, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I am in agreement with the disposition of defendant Stiles‘s case and the court‘s determination that the trial court‘s failure to comply with
Guzman moved to quash the bill of information because the State charged him with second offense DWI. The prior conviction resulted from Guzman‘s having pled guilty to first offense DWI in 1997. However, Guzman now asserts that he would not have pled guilty then if he had been informed that the resulting conviction could be used, as the State now attempts to do, to enhance the penalty for subsequent offenses.1
I disagree with the majority‘s conclusion that “[knowledge as to subsequent penalty enhancement] clearly would not have been a material factor in [Guzman‘s] decision to plead guilty to the first offense.” Slip op. at 1166. While not necessarily true in every case, I find it total conjecture and speculation in Guzman‘s case to conclude that he would have pled guilty to first offense DWI, even if he had known about possible penalty enhancement for subsequent offenses. In fact, his very contention in seeking to quash the bill of information charging him as a second offender is that he would not have pled guilty had he known about the potential for subsequent penalty enhancement. Therefore, I cannot agree that the trial court‘s failure to comply with 556.1, when Guzman pled guilty to the first offense, was harmless error.
Furthermore, I disagree with the majority‘s assertion that 556.1 E does not necessarily require the trial court to inform defendant of possible penalty enhancement prior to accepting a plea of guilty. Slip op. at 1163. Admittedly, the legislature should have been more careful when drafting 556.1 E so as to expressly state, as was done with the other sections of 556.1, that the trial court comply with 556.1 E before accepting a guilty plea. However, the majority‘s construction, of what was most likely a drafters’ oversight, ignores the obvious purpose of article 556.1. Article 556.1 was enacted to ensure that guilty pleas are made with full knowledge and understanding of the consequences that follow. In order to enter a guilty plea with full knowledge and understanding of its consequences, defendant naturally must be informed of such before entering the plea. Informing defendant about the possibility of penalty enhancement after he pleads guilty does not serve the purpose of the statute.