State of Iowa v. Lavelle Lonelle McKinley
2015 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 28
| Iowa | 2015Background
- Lavelle McKinley was charged with first-degree murder; the district court appointed two Des Moines public defenders, Jennifer Larson and Heather Lauber.
- Other attorneys in the same public defender office had earlier (and unrelatedly) represented three State witnesses (Cheyenne Rouse, Heather Hickman, Wayne Manuel); Larson and Lauber had not represented those witnesses and said they had no access to those files.
- Larson and Lauber asked the court to rule whether a conflict existed; the court held a hearing, appointed counsel for the three witnesses, and heard that the witnesses would not waive confidentiality or consent to Larson and Lauber’s representation.
- The district court disqualified the entire Des Moines adult public defender’s office, concluding an actual conflict and risk to McKinley’s Sixth Amendment right; the juvenile public defender was appointed instead.
- The Iowa Supreme Court granted interlocutory review, analyzed ethical rules and precedent, and reversed, holding no actual conflict or serious potential for conflict justified disqualification on the record before it.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prior, unrelated representations by other office attorneys create an actual conflict or serious potential for conflict that requires disqualification | State: disqualification necessary to avoid reversible error and protect finality; risk that conflict could impair defense | McKinley: continuity with appointed counsel should prevail; Larson and Lauber have no knowledge of prior confidences and have screening measures | Reversed: no actual conflict or serious potential for conflict shown; disqualification was not justified on this record |
| Whether Rule 32:1.9 (successive representation) barred Larson/Lauber absent witness consent | State/witnesses: prior representations are substantially related because prior convictions may be used for impeachment, so consent required | Defense: past matters unrelated and concluded long before; no confidential info would be used; public-record convictions are not confidential | Held: "substantially related" not satisfied; prior matters unrelated, so rule 32:1.9 does not bar representation |
| Whether Rule 32:1.7 (concurrent/material limitation) required disqualification or imputation within office | State: colleagues’ prior representation materially limits defense counsel; office-wide disqualification necessary | Defense: no temporal or attorney overlap; Larson/Lauber personally lack knowledge and adopted screening; no material limitation likely | Held: no material limitation demonstrated; rule 32:1.7 did not compel disqualification on these facts |
| Whether conflicts of one public defender automatically impute to entire public defender office | State: the district court treated office as disqualified; some amici/witnesses urged non-waiver enforcement | Defense/McKinley: continuance of appointed counsel and screening should suffice; public defender status distinguishes office from private firm | Held: Court declined to decide imputation question here because no conflict existed; left issue for a case where it is dispositive |
Key Cases Cited
- Pippins v. State, 661 N.W.2d 544 (Iowa 2003) (conflict analysis requires independent evaluation; prior assertion of conflict not dispositive)
- State v. Smith, 761 N.W.2d 63 (Iowa 2009) (imputation and screening can avoid disqualification where counsel lacked knowledge of confidential information)
- State v. Smitherman, 733 N.W.2d 341 (Iowa 2007) (Sixth Amendment conflict standard and requirement of inquiry; prejudice analysis)
- State v. Watson, 620 N.W.2d 233 (Iowa 2000) (defining actual conflict as situation conducive to divided loyalties)
- Mickens v. Taylor, 585 U.S. 162 (2002) (actual conflict under Sixth Amendment defined as one that adversely affects counsel’s performance)
- United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (right to counsel of choice distinctions for appointed counsel)
- Nichol v. State, 309 N.W.2d 468 (Iowa 1981) (prior, unrelated representation of a witness does not create a remote or substantial conflict)
- United States v. Flynn, 87 F.3d 996 (8th Cir. 1996) (credit defense counsel’s representations about conflicts; prior representation of a witness alone does not guarantee relief)