State of Iowa v. Kevin Duane Fisher II, 2016 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 42

On April 11, 2013 Kevin Fisher was found with a partially used marijuana joint and charged with first-offense possession of a controlled substance (serious misdemeanor).
Fisher signed a written guilty plea on June 17, 2013 specifying two days jail and a $315 fine; the plea form did not state license revocation or the exact surcharge-inclusive fine amount.
The district court accepted the plea and entered judgment, which imposed mandatory surcharges and stated the Department of Transportation would impose any suspensions or revocations under Iowa Code chapter 321J/901.5(10).
Fisher appealed; the court of appeals affirmed, treating license suspension as a collateral consequence and surcharges as non-punitive, and found plea-preservation requirements satisfied.
The Iowa Supreme Court granted further review to consider (1) whether Fisher’s failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment barred appellate review, (2) whether mandatory 180-day license revocation is a direct consequence that must be disclosed before a guilty plea, and (3) whether chapter 911 surcharges are punitive and must be disclosed.

Issue	Fisher's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether Fisher is precluded from appealing for failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment	The written plea did not adequately inform him that failing to file a motion would waive appeal rights	The written plea and counsel’s certification sufficiently informed Fisher of the motion-in-arrest-of-judgment requirement	The plea did not substantially comply with rule 2.8(2)(d); Fisher is not precluded from direct appeal
Whether mandatory 180-day driver's license revocation is a direct consequence requiring disclosure before plea	License revocation is mandatory, immediate, punitive, and part of the sentence and thus must be disclosed	License revocation is collateral (not punishment) and need not be disclosed	Revocation for drug-possession convictions is a direct, punitive, mandatory consequence and must be disclosed before accepting a plea; plea was involuntary on this ground
Whether chapter 911 surcharges are punitive consequences that must be disclosed with fines	Surcharges are mandatory additional penalties effectively increasing the mandatory minimum fine and must be disclosed	Surcharges are like court costs/fees (non-punitive) and need not be disclosed	Surcharges are punitive "additional penalty" amounts and must be disclosed as part of the mandatory minimum/maximum fines (court vacated plea; remanded)

State v. Meron, 675 N.W.2d 537 (Iowa 2004) (written plea may suffice to satisfy rule 2.8(2)(d) only if it conveys required information)
State v. Worley, 297 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1980) (trial court must comply with rule 2.8(2)(d) or defendant should not suffer waiver)
State v. Oldham, 515 N.W.2d 44 (Iowa 1994) (colloquy and written application considered together may satisfy motion-in-arrest-of-judgment notice)
State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128 (Iowa 2006) (substantial compliance standard for plea advisements)
State v. Carney, 584 N.W.2d 907 (Iowa 1998) (distinguishing direct vs. collateral consequences; held OWI license revocation collateral)
Hills v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 534 N.W.2d 640 (Iowa 1995) (license revocation for drug possession is punitive; ex post facto concern)
Dressler v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 542 N.W.2d 563 (Iowa 1996) (license revocation as separate proceeding constituted double jeopardy before statutory change)
State v. Barnes, 652 N.W.2d 466 (Iowa 2002) (written plea that clearly notifies defendant of motion-in-arrest requirement can preclude appeal)
Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128 (7th Cir. 2014) (labels do not control; a fee called a fee can function as a fine)