State of Iowa v. John David Green, 2017 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 64

John David Green was located in Florida and voluntarily accompanied Iowa law enforcement to a police station for a recorded, noncustodial interview; he was told he was not under arrest and was free to leave.
An Iowa county attorney observed the interview from another room and intermittently directed officers’ questions during breaks.
Green confessed in the interview to suffocating Mark Foster (Koster) with a baseball bat and later was arrested after an arrest warrant issued; he was charged with first-degree murder.
Green moved to suppress the confession, arguing his article I, section 10 (Iowa Constitution) right to counsel had attached pre-charge because prosecutorial involvement made the interview functionally accusatory; the district court denied suppression.
At trial, the court instructed the jury that malice aforethought could be inferred from the use of a dangerous weapon; Green objected, arguing he did not bring the bat to the encounter and acted in self-defense.
The jury convicted Green of second-degree murder; Green appealed claiming (1) precharge right-to-counsel violation and (2) improper malice-inference jury instruction. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, rejecting both claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether article I, §10 right to counsel attached during Green’s voluntary, prearrest interview because prosecutorial participation made it a prosecution	Green: prosecutorial involvement converted investigation into a prosecution and thus the right attached pre-charge	State: no charges, no arrest, interview was noncustodial and investigatory; prosecutor acted as investigator, not accusator	No — right to counsel under article I, §10 did not attach before prosecution/charge; prosecutor’s investigatory role insufficient
Whether jury could be instructed that malice aforethought may be inferred from use of a dangerous weapon	Green: inference improper because he did not bring the bat to the encounter and claimed self-defense	State: use of a deadly weapon in the manner presented supports an inference of intent/malice	Yes — jury may infer malice from use of a dangerous weapon; instruction accurate and supported by evidence

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right to counsel essential to fair trial)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda protections for custodial interrogation)
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (pretrial interrogation and counsel issues)
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191 (2008) (Sixth Amendment prosecution commencement principles)
State v. Johnson, 318 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 1982) (right to counsel attaches after complaint/arrest; prosecutorial involvement relevant)
State v. Jackson, 380 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1986) (criminal prosecution begins once complaint and arrest occur for Sixth Amendment purposes)
State v. Young, 863 N.W.2d 249 (Iowa 2015) (discussing the "cases" language in article I, §10 and broader state protections)
State v. Ambrose, 861 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 2015) (approving malice inference instructions in certain deadly-weapon contexts)
State v. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 2003) (malice aforethought and inference from dangerous-weapon use)