State of Iowa v. Derrick Earl Johnson, 950 N.W.2d 232

In August 2017 Johnson ran temporary stop signs in a pickup, T‑boning a minivan; the minivan rolled and a six‑month‑old passenger died from blunt head trauma.
The infant was not secured in a child‑restraint system and was being held on the lap of an eight‑year‑old.
Police observed alcohol odor and red, watery eyes; Johnson admitted drinking earlier and performed poorly on field sobriety tests; he declined a preliminary breath test.
Blood drawn about 2+ hours after the crash showed BAC 0.069 and cocaine; toxicologist extrapolated BAC at impact to 0.090–0.122 and opined cocaine was ingested within three hours of the crash.
Crash video and reconstruction evidence showed high approach speed and no evasive action; reconstruction estimated ~29 mph at impact.
A jury convicted Johnson of homicide by intoxicated operation (Iowa Code § 707.6A(1)); he appealed the denial of a requested lesser‑included reckless‑driving homicide instruction, exclusion of evidence about the child restraint, and a $10 DARE surcharge.

Issue	State's Argument	Johnson's Argument	Held
Whether homicide by reckless driving (707.6A(2)(a)) is a lesser included offense of homicide by intoxicated operation (707.6A(1))	The elements do not align; "operating" (as statutorily used) need not include "driving," so the impossibility test fails	Reckless driving is a lesser included offense because both crimes require unintentionally causing death and evidence supports reckless driving rather than intoxication	Not a lesser included offense; instruction properly refused because "driving" is an element of reckless‑homicide not required by intoxicated‑operation offense
Whether the court erred excluding evidence that the infant was unrestrained (to challenge causation)	Evidence of victim's failure to use restraint is inadmissible as contributory negligence and not a superseding cause; Hubka controls	Evidence should be admitted to show the infant might have survived if properly restrained, undermining causation	Exclusion affirmed; victim’s lack of restraint is not a defense to intoxicated‑operation homicide and exclusion was not an abuse of discretion
Whether the $10 DARE surcharge was lawful	Surcharge authorized because the conviction arises out of a violation of chapter 321J (intoxication), shown by jury special interrogatories	Surcharge improper because 707.6A(1) is not itself listed	Surcharge lawful; conviction arises from a chapter 321J violation as found by special interrogatory

State v. Massick, 511 N.W.2d 384 (Iowa 1994) (distinguishes "operate" and "drive" and holds reckless driving is not a lesser included offense of operating while intoxicated)
State v. Miller, 841 N.W.2d 583 (Iowa 2014) (sets forth the "impossibility test" for lesser included offenses)
State v. Hubka, 480 N.W.2d 867 (Iowa 1992) (holds victim’s failure to wear restraints not a superseding cause in intoxicated‑driving homicide)
State v. Adams, 810 N.W.2d 365 (Iowa 2012) (discusses causal connection required under § 707.6A(1))
Krogmann v. State, 914 N.W.2d 293 (Iowa 2018) (instructs courts to compare statutory elements, not case facts, when deciding lesser‑included questions)
State v. Tyler, 873 N.W.2d 741 (Iowa 2016) (recognizes multiple contributing causes and overdetermination do not absolve liability)
State v. Coffin, 504 N.W.2d 893 (Iowa 1993) (explains lesser included offense doctrine)
State v. Heard, 934 N.W.2d 433 (Iowa 2019) (standard of abuse of discretion for evidentiary rulings)