State of Iowa v. Dalon Lamont Johnson
16-0976
| Iowa Ct. App. | Jun 21, 2017Background
- Dalon Johnson pled guilty to serious assault (serious misdemeanor) and third-degree theft (aggravated misdemeanor) via written pleas that recommended 30 days’ jail on each count to be served concurrently.
- His written pleas acknowledged the court was not bound by plea recommendations; Johnson waived the 15‑day delay and asked for immediate sentencing.
- The court accepted the pleas and sentenced Johnson in a paper proceeding three days after the pleas were filed; the record does not show Johnson was personally present at sentencing.
- Johnson appealed, arguing his rights to personal presence and allocution at sentencing were violated and requested resentencing.
- The State moved to dismiss the appeal as moot because Johnson had fully discharged his 30‑day sentences; the Iowa Supreme Court allowed briefing on mootness and the appeal was transferred to the Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals concluded Johnson’s appeal was moot and declined to apply the collateral‑consequences exception, dismissing the appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Johnson waived right to be present at sentencing and allocution | State: mootness dispositive; did not dispute waiver on merits | Johnson: he did not waive personal presence or allocution because plea forms lacked express waivers | Court: plea forms lacked express waiver, so no waiver, but issue moot because sentence discharged |
| Whether discharge of sentence renders appeal challenging sentencing procedures moot | State: yes, discharge makes the appeal moot | Johnson: collateral‑consequences exception applies (could have obtained deferred judgment; federal sentencing point consequences) | Court: discharge renders the claim moot; collateral‑consequences exception not satisfied |
| Whether speculative possibility of different outcome (deferred judgment) saves appeal from mootness | State: speculative; no record showing deferred judgment was requested or available | Johnson: had he been present he might have obtained deferred judgment | Court: speculation insufficient; no PSI, no request, no recommendation—collateral‑consequences exception not met |
| Whether potential future federal sentencing consequences overcome mootness | State: too attenuated/speculative | Johnson: criminal history points could be affected in future federal case | Court: too remote and speculative to invoke collateral‑consequences exception |
Key Cases Cited
- Toomer v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 340 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1983) (definition of mootness)
- Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (U.S. 1982) (discharge of sentence generally renders sentence-only challenges moot)
- In re B.B., 826 N.W.2d 425 (Iowa 2013) (collateral‑consequences exception applied when judgment causes continuing adverse consequences)
- Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (U.S. 1968) (discussing collateral‑consequences doctrine)
- In re M.T., 625 N.W.2d 702 (Iowa 2001) (general rule dismissing moot appeals)