State of Iowa v. Asada Shakur Moore, 16-0834

Early morning stop (Apr. 25, 2015) by Officer Wilcutt during a saturation patrol; he observed a car he suspected speeding and a license plate frame partially covering the county name.
Officer stopped Moore, discovered she was barred from driving (she had a restricted permit limited to work travel), and arrested her; charged with driving while barred as an habitual offender.
Moore moved to suppress the stop arguing lack of probable cause and pretext; district court denied the motion after crediting the officer’s testimony.
At trial Moore requested the judge’s recusal, asserting prior contact because she had been a caregiver at a facility where the judge’s wife was a patient; the judge denied recusal and later sentenced Moore after a jury convicted her.
Moore also pleaded guilty to an unrelated assault on an officer; sentencing occurred before this appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Validity of traffic stop (probable cause)	Officer had probable cause because he observed a plate-frame violation	Moore argued the county name was only partially covered and officer could read/relay plate information, so no probable cause; claimed stop was pretextual to investigate OWI	Stop valid: partial covering of the county name violates §321.37(3); probable cause existed; pretext does not invalidate a stop
Judicial recusal before trial	Judge argued no actual contact or bias; denied recusal	Moore argued a reasonable person could question impartiality given prior contact with judge’s wife at care facility	Denial not an abuse of discretion; objective test not satisfied
Ineffective assistance for not renewing recusal at sentencing	State: counsel had no duty to renew meritless recusal motion	Moore argued counsel was ineffective for failing to raise recusal again at sentencing	No ineffective assistance: initial recusal motion lacked merit so counsel reasonably did not renew it
Sufficiency of evidence that DOT mailed notice (driving-while-barred)	State produced DOT witness and bulk-mail records showing Moore’s notice listed among items mailed	Moore argued there was insufficient proof she received or that DOT mailed her specific notice	Evidence sufficient: Post Office report and matching sanction number provided substantial evidence that DOT mailed the notice (jury was instructed on mailing)

State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001) (standard for appellate review of suppression rulings)
State v. Howard, 509 N.W.2d 764 (Iowa 1993) (totality of circumstances and deference to district court credibility findings)
State v. Predka, 555 N.W.2d 202 (Iowa 1996) (officer’s motivation does not invalidate stop; probable cause controls)
State v. Harrison, 846 N.W.2d 362 (Iowa 2014) (license-plate “all numerals and letters” includes county name)
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1996) (pretextual stops permissible under Fourth Amendment)
State v. Millsap, 704 N.W.2d 426 (Iowa 2005) (recusal standard and due process considerations)
State v. Taggart, 430 N.W.2d 423 (Iowa 1988) (effect of a jury instruction and marshaling on appellate review)
State v. Leckington, 713 N.W.2d 208 (Iowa 2006) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence)