State of Iowa v. Allan Robert Sievers, 23-0413

Allan Sievers was convicted in Iowa of two counts of sexual abuse (second degree) against a child, Leo (pseudonym), based primarily on Leo’s testimony about abuse allegedly occurring when Leo was a child living in Sievers’s home.
At trial, hearsay testimony was admitted from Nikki, a friend of Leo, about Leo’s past disclosure of the abuse; Leo had earlier testified that he first disclosed to Malcolm, not Nikki.
The district court admitted Nikki’s testimony under the newly enacted “outcry witness” statute (Iowa Code § 622.31B), reasoning that multiple initial disclosures could qualify and the statute applied at trial even though the alleged conduct predated its enactment.
Sievers objected that (1) Nikki’s testimony was not about the first disclosure, so should not qualify under the statute, and (2) applying the statute retrospectively was improper, along with several other evidentiary and procedural challenges at trial.
The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed, among other things, whether the statute’s hearsay exception applies only to the first disclosure (as defendant argued) or to more than one (as the State argued). The majority held Nikki’s testimony was admitted in error, reversed the conviction, and ordered a new trial; the dissent would have affirmed the verdict.

Issue	Sievers’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Was Nikki’s hearsay testimony properly admitted as “an initial disclosure” under § 622.31B?	Statute allows only the first disclosure; Nikki heard later.	Statute allows admission of more than one early disclosure; 'an initial' is not limited to 'the first.'	Improper; only first disclosure qualifies—statute means the first in time.
Does § 622.31B apply retroactively to pre-enactment statements?	No, because it is a substantive change, not just a rule of evidence.	Yes, applies prospectively to trials after enactment.	Statute applies prospectively to trials, not retroactively to conduct.
Was the error in admitting Nikki’s testimony harmless?	No, her testimony was prejudicial, shaping jury’s resolution of timing and perpetrator.	Yes, it was cumulative; victim and others testified to details.	Prejudicial; not harmless—testimony helped resolve critical timing issue.
Challenges to other evidentiary rulings and cross-examination scope.	Multiple errors, including scope and prejudice from friend’s prison attire.	No abuse of discretion, errors (if any) were harmless/cumulative.	Not reached—case reversed on erroneous hearsay admission.

State v. Brown, 996 N.W.2d 691 (Iowa 2023) (standard for sufficiency of evidence review)
State v. Trane, 934 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 2019) (victim’s testimony alone can be substantial evidence, but prejudicial evidentiary error can require reversal)
State v. Thornton, 498 N.W.2d 670 (Iowa 1993) (jury may believe/disbelieve testimony as it sees fit)
State v. Schooley, 13 N.W.3d 608 (Iowa 2024) (reasonable jury may use testimony to rule out alternate suspects)
State v. Holmes, 325 N.W.2d 114 (Iowa 1982) (scope of cross-examination)
State v. Elliot, 806 N.W.2d 660 (Iowa 2011) (standard for when erroneous admission of evidence is prejudicial)
State v. Goodson, 958 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 2021) (probative value/prejudice balancing under Rule 5.404(b))