60 N.E.3d 1121
Ind. Ct. App.2016Background
- Yvonne S. Morgan, a registered nurse at a Wayne County clinic affiliated with DORN/LLC, was alleged to have delivered pre-signed Suboxone prescriptions and assisted in dispensing prescriptions issued outside the usual course of professional medical practice. Undercover buys occurred on April 16, May 14, and June 11, 2014.
- DEA surveillance documented large numbers of patients visiting the clinic during limited open hours and many prescriptions issued by Dr. Ronald Vierk. Investigators observed Morgan delivering prescriptions and interacting with undercover officers who received Suboxone without ID checks or examinations.
- The State charged Morgan (Sept. 2014; amended Sept. 2015) with two counts of Class B conspiracy to commit dealing in a Schedule III controlled substance, one count of Class C corrupt business influence (RICO-style enterprise), and three counts of Class B aiding dealing in a Schedule III controlled substance.
- Morgan moved to dismiss arguing (1) the allegations, as a matter of law, could not establish the required mens rea because she was not a physician and therefore could not know what fell outside the usual course of professional medical practice, and (2) the statutes were void for vagueness as applied to her. The trial court granted dismissal.
- The State appealed; the Court of Appeals reviewed whether dismissal was an abuse of discretion and whether the statutes were void for vagueness as applied to Morgan.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Morgan) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether facts alleged, taken as true, could constitute crimes | Alleged acts (delivering pre-signed/invalid prescriptions, aiding physician) suffice to permit jury to find mens rea and criminal liability | As a non-physician, Morgan could not know whether conduct fell outside usual medical practice, so facts cannot establish requisite mens rea | Reversed: dismissal abused discretion; whether conduct was outside usual practice is a factual question for jury, non-physician status does not preclude liability |
| Whether statutes are void for vagueness as applied | Statutes give fair notice; prosecution must prove knowledge that prescriptions were invalid | Statutes vague because non-physicians cannot know what constitutes the usual course of professional medical practice | Reversed: statutes not unconstitutionally vague as applied; ordinary persons can understand that knowingly agreeing with or assisting distribution of invalid prescriptions is prohibited |
| Whether trial court may resolve mens rea on pretrial motion to dismiss | State: mens rea and disputed factual issues are for jury; motion to dismiss inappropriate | Morgan: court properly resolved impossibility of proving mens rea before trial | Reversed: motion to dismiss improperly used to resolve factual mens rea issue |
| Appropriate remedy | Reinstate charges and proceed to trial | Dismissal of all counts | Remanded with instructions to reinstate charges |
Key Cases Cited
- Alarcon v. State, 573 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (invalid prescriptions outside professional practice can be treated as dealing)
- Brown v. State, 868 N.E.2d 464 (Ind. 2007) (void-for-vagueness standards; notice and risk of arbitrary enforcement)
- Baumgartner v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (presumption of constitutionality and vagueness analysis)
- Zitlaw v. State, 880 N.E.2d 724 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (standard of review for dismissal as abuse of discretion)
- Bilbrey v. State, 743 N.E.2d 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (facts alleged in information taken as true on motion to dismiss)
- Isaacs v. State, 794 N.E.2d 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (limitations of raising factual disputes/defenses via dismissal motion)
- Houston v. State, 898 N.E.2d 358 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (vagueness assessment limited to case facts and circumstances)