721 F.3d 796
7th Cir.2013Background
- Illinois enacted a subsidized power facility program in 1987 under 220 ILCS 5/8-403.1; facilities must reimburse subsidies after repaying capital costs or indebtedness.
- The 2006 amendment added triggers for repayment beyond repayment of costs, including cessation of operation or end of contract term.
- RTC designated three facilities as Qualified Facilities; ComEd signed ten-year PPAs and state funded tax credits to utilities, to be reimbursed by facilities after costs are repaid.
- RTC faced bankruptcy; Chiplease acquired RTC assets and assumed liability for the tax credits ComEd claimed.
- Bankruptcy court and district court held the 2006 amendment applies prospectively under Illinois Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4); Chiplease liable only for credits taken after June 6, 2006.
- Illinois sought to retroactively apply amended subsection (d) to require repayment for credits claimed before the amendment; court rejected retroactivity and affirmed district court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2006 amendment has retroactive effect | Illinois argues amendments apply to pre-enactment events. | Chiplease argues amendment applies prospectively. | Amendment is not retroactive; prospective interpretation required. |
| How to determine temporal reach under Illinois law | Illinois claims the amendment’s reach can be retroactive due to new repayment grounds. | Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4) requires prospective construction absent clear retroactivity. | Temporal reach determined prospectively; no clear retroactive language. |
| Effect of added triggers in subsection (d) on retroactivity | New triggers allow past events to impose repayment obligations. | Triggers apply only to events after amendment; do not retroactively impose obligations. | New triggers do not create retroactive obligations for prior events. |
| Whether the amendment’s phase-out purpose implies retroactivity | Phase-out signals retroactive effect to recover subsidies. | Phase-out has prospective effect; pre-2006 subsidies remain unaffected unless trigger occurred post-amendment. | Phase-out does not establish retroactive application; prospective only. |
Key Cases Cited
- Caveney v. Bower, 797 N.E.2d 596 (Ill. 2003) (temporal reach determined by Statute on Statutes unless clearly retroactive)
- Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (temporal reach governs retroactivity analysis)
- Diocese of Dallas, 917 N.E.2d 475 (Ill. 2009) (statute applies retroactivity where expressly stated)
- Lazenby v. Mark’s Const., Inc., 923 N.E.2d 735 (Ill. 2010) (retroactivity clearly expressed when statute refers to pre-enactment actions)
- Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 860 N.E.2d 246 (Ill. 2006) (intrinsically retroactive statutes noted in specific context)