State of Georgia v. International Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 299 Ga. 392

Background

The International Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan applied (May 2012) to Georgia DOT’s Adopt‑A‑Highway program to adopt a one‑mile stretch of SR‑515; DOT denied the application.
Commissioner’s written denial cited (1) safety/unsuitability of the specific controlled‑access, 65 mph route and (2) public‑safety and public‑concern impacts from erecting a sign recognizing an organization with the KKK’s violent history (viewpoint/public‑safety rationale).
IK Klan sued in Fulton Superior Court seeking mandamus, declaratory judgment, and injunction to force DOT to approve the application, alleging Georgia constitutional free‑speech violations (complaint did not invoke the U.S. First Amendment).
Trial court dismissed the mandamus claim but denied DOT’s sovereign‑immunity defense for injunctive/declaratory relief, found viewpoint discrimination under the Georgia Constitution, entered declaratory judgment and injunction barring denials based on group history of civil disturbance, and granted IK Klan partial summary judgment.
DOT appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia; Supreme Court sua sponte examined appellate jurisdiction and concluded the appeal should have been brought by application for discretionary review because the superior court decision reviewed a “decision” of a state administrative agency, and DOT had not filed an application — thus dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Must appeals from superior‑court judgments reviewing administrative agency action be filed by application for discretionary review under OCGA §5‑6‑35(a)(1)?	Appeals challenging an unconstitutional restriction need not follow §5‑6‑35(a)(1); appeal of right via notice is permissible.	§5‑6‑35(a)(1) requires application for discretionary review when a superior court reviews a state administrative agency decision; DOT filed notice of appeal instead of application.	Held: §5‑6‑35(a)(1) applied; DOT should have filed an application. Appeal dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Was DOT’s denial of the Adopt‑A‑Highway application a “decision” of a state administrative agency for §5‑6‑35(a)(1)?	Denial was administrative but not a formal adjudicative ‘‘decision’’ because no formal adjudicative procedures govern Adopt‑A‑Highway applications.	The denial was an adjudicative determination: it applied existing standards to a particular applicant and site, and the Commissioner himself issued the denial.	Held: The denial was an adjudicative "decision" of the agency for §5‑6‑35(a)(1).
Does “decision” require formal adjudicative procedures (e.g., hearings) to trigger §5‑6‑35(a)(1)?	Yes — the term should refer only to formal adjudications.	No — substance controls; adjudicative character, not formality, matters; precedents (Tri‑State, Selke) support this.	Held: Formal procedures are not required; adjudicative character is dispositive.
Did the superior court’s proceedings constitute a review of an administrative decision for §5‑6‑35(a)(1) even though the case sought declaratory/injunctive relief rather than APA review?	Proceedings were for injunction/declaratory relief (not APA), so §5‑6‑35(a)(1) should not apply.	Substance controls: the superior court adjudicated the denial’s validity and thus reviewed the agency decision.	Held: The superior‑court proceedings amounted to review of the agency’s decision; §5‑6‑35(a)(1) applies.

Key Cases Cited

Rayle v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770 (2016) (interlocutory denials of sovereign immunity are not immediately appealable without interlocutory certification)
Ga. Dept. of Natural Resources v. Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, 294 Ga. 593 (2014) (discussing sovereign immunity in agency review context)
Tri‑State Bldg. & Supply, Inc. v. Reid, 251 Ga. 38 (1983) (agency issuance of subpoena treated as an administrative "decision" for §5‑6‑35(a)(1))
Selke v. Carson, 295 Ga. 628 (2014) (county director’s refusal to forward appeals characterized as administrative department decision requiring application)
Ferguson v. Composite State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 275 Ga. 255 (2002) (purpose of §5‑6‑35 to reduce appellate caseload by requiring applications when two tribunals have adjudicated)
Bentley v. Chastain, 242 Ga. 348 (1978) (distinguishing legislative vs. adjudicative administrative action)