State of Florida v. Dean Alden Shelley, 176 So. 3d 914

Dean Shelley responded to a Craigslist ad posted by an undercover officer posing as a mother seeking sexual activity with her fictitious ten-year-old daughter.
Shelley communicated electronically and arranged to meet for sexual activity; he was arrested upon arrival.
The State charged Shelley under § 847.0135(3)(b) (use of computer to solicit a parent to consent to child sexual activity) and § 847.0135(4)(b) (traveling to meet a minor after such solicitation), using the same underlying conduct for both counts.
Shelley moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, arguing solicitation is a lesser-included offense of traveling after solicitation; the trial court denied the motion, he pleaded guilty reserving the issue, and received concurrent sentences.
The Second District vacated the solicitation conviction, holding the Legislature did not explicitly authorize separate convictions and the solicitation elements are subsumed by the traveling offense; it certified conflict with the First District decision in Murphy.
The Florida Supreme Court approved the Second District, holding no explicit legislative intent to permit dual convictions and that Blockburger/§ 775.021(4) shows the offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Legislature explicitly intended to allow separate convictions under § 847.0135(3)(b) (solicitation) and § 847.0135(4)(b) (traveling after solicitation) for the same conduct, or whether such dual convictions violate double jeopardy	Shelley: Dual convictions violate double jeopardy because solicitation is a lesser-included offense subsumed by traveling after solicitation	State: Legislature implicitly expressed intent by creating separate statutory offenses and punishing them as different degrees of felonies; other statutory language permits separate charges	Court held: No explicit legislative intent exists; solicitation’s elements are entirely subsumed by traveling after solicitation under Blockburger/§ 775.021(4), so dual convictions based on the same conduct violate double jeopardy.

Valdes v. State, 3 So. 3d 1067 (Fla. 2009) (double jeopardy requires legislative intent to authorize multiple punishments)
Gordon v. State, 780 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 2001) (legislative intent governs constitutionality of multiple convictions)
Gaber v. State, 684 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1996) (absent explicit intent, use Blockburger/§ 775.021(4) to test same-elements)
M.P. v. State, 682 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1996) (explaining Blockburger same-elements test and recognizing explicit legislative intent can permit multiple punishments)
Paul v. State, 934 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 2006) (refusing to find explicit legislative intent to allow dual convictions where statute merely defines separate offenses)
Pizzo v. State, 945 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 2006) (reviewing double jeopardy issues de novo; example of lesser offense subsumption analysis)
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (same-elements test for determining whether offenses are the same for double jeopardy)