State of Florida v. Bessman Okafor, 306 So.3d 930

Background

In 2015 a jury convicted Bessman Okafor of first‑degree murder and the trial court imposed death based on an 11–1 jury recommendation.
On direct appeal the Florida Supreme Court vacated Okafor’s death sentence in 2017 under Hurst v. State and remanded for a new penalty phase.
The appellate mandate issued, making the vacatur final; no mandate recall was sought within the 120‑day statutory/rule period.
In 2020 this Court decided State v. Poole, retreating from parts of Hurst; under Poole Okafor would have been constitutionally eligible for death.
The State moved the trial court to reinstate the original death sentence; the trial court denied the motion, citing its obligation to follow the existing appellate mandate.
The State petitioned this Court (all writs and prohibition) seeking reinstatement of the death sentence or an order prohibiting resentencing; the Court denied relief and required resentencing.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Okafor's Argument	Held
May the Court use its all‑writs power to reinstate a sentence vacated by a final mandate after the 120‑day recall period?	All writs power can preserve or vindicate jurisdiction and thus permit reinstatement.	All‑writs is not an independent jurisdictional basis; mandate finality controls and recall period bars reopening.	No; mandate made the vacatur final and statutory/rule 120‑day limits preclude recalling it via all writs.
Does Poole (an intervening decision) allow revisiting the final vacatur under law‑of‑the‑case or injustice exceptions?	Poole removed Hurst’s constitutional basis, so exceptions permit reinstating the sentence to avoid manifest injustice.	Exceptions to law‑of‑the‑case govern legal questions, not the reopening of a final appellate judgment.	No; intervening change in law does not authorize undoing a final judgment once the mandate has issued.
Can the trial court ignore the mandate and reinstate the original death sentence?	The trial court should apply Poole to avoid constitutional error.	Trial court lacks authority to alter or evade the appellate mandate.	Trial court acted correctly in denying reinstatement; it must conduct the new penalty phase.
Is a writ of prohibition proper to prevent resentencing or to compel reinstatement?	Prohibition should issue to prevent the trial court from re‑imposing a sentence the State contends is constitutional.	Prohibition is unwarranted because the trial court has jurisdiction and must follow the mandate to resentence.	Denied; prohibition inappropriate because the trial court has jurisdiction to resentencing and cannot reinstate the vacated sentence.

Key Cases Cited

Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) (announced unanimity rule later partially receded)
State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020) (receded from Hurst except unanimity for finding statutory aggravators)
Okafor v. State, 225 So. 3d 768 (Fla. 2017) (vacated Okafor’s death sentence under Hurst and remanded)
O.P. Corp. v. Village of N. Palm Beach, 302 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1974) (mandate makes appellate judgment final)
Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011) (vacated sentence leaves no prior sentence in force)
United States v. Mobley, 833 F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2016) (vacated sentence is a nullity until a new sentence is imposed)
Teffeteller v. State, 495 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1986) (prior vacated sentence is a nullity)
State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1997) (distinguishes revisiting legal rules from reinstating final judgments)
Mandico v. Taos Construction, Inc., 605 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1992) (prohibition prevents acting outside jurisdiction)
Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 328 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1975) (trial court cannot alter or evade an appellate mandate)