BESSMAN OKAFOR, Appellant, vs. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
No. SC15-2136
Supreme Court of Florida
[June 8, 2017]
Bessman Okafor appeals his conviction for the September 10, 2012, first-degree murder of Alex Zaldivar and his resultant sentence of death. We have jurisdiction. See
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
The testimony presented at trial demonstrated that Brienna Campos, Remington Campos, Brandon Campos, and Alex Zaldivar resided at a home owned
Bernard and Okafor were arrested and the stolen items were returned. Bernard was jailed awaiting trial, but Okafor was fitted with an ankle monitor and
On August 24, 2012, Okafor sent a text message to someone named “Dorey” asking “did you get that?” to which Dorey responded “it‘s here with a full clip.” Okafor also told Dorey that his lawyer had informed him that all the witnesses were planning to show up. On September 9, 2012, Okafor exchanged text messages with a friend, Antoine McLaren. Okafor texted that he was worried about his case and asked McLaren to procure a hoodie and gloves because he was worried about returning to jail. Okafor texted “I can‘t let them show up.” McLaren declined to procure the items.
On September 10, 2012, at approximately 3:45 a.m., Okafor called Sherria Gordon and told her to get ready because he was coming to pick her and her children1 up. Okafor picked Sherria up from her home in Takeethia‘s white Malibu and dropped the children off to continue sleeping at Takeethia‘s house. Okafor‘s ankle monitor corroborated this evidence, showing him away from his home from 3:49:27 to 4:08:28 a.m. Sherria and Okafor drove to Nesly Ciceron‘s
Okafor handed Emmanuel‘s phone to Nesly and asked him to remain at a described location and to call if he heard police approaching. Okafor likewise instructed Sherria to wait at a location and to call if she heard police approaching. Okafor, Donnell, and Emmanuel drove the Impala to the Camposes’ neighborhood. They were filmed by three surveillance cameras located at a house on the corner near the crime scene. The footage showed a white Impala passing by one of the cameras at 5:07 a.m. The video recording contained audio of four gunshots, with the first occurring at 5:21 a.m. followed by three consecutive shots. The cameras then showed the Impala heading in the opposite direction at 5:24 a.m.
One of the assailants did all the talking. He asked “where are the other two?” presumably referring to Brandon and William who were present at the May 9 home invasion. He also asked “who is the naked guy?” referring to Remington who had not been present for the May 9 home invasion. He asked about the drugs and money and Brienna said “you‘re going to be disappointed just like you were before.” Both Brienna and Remington testified that he said “someone is going to get shot tonight.” Brienna testified that she thought the statement was just made to scare them. Brienna and Remington both testified that they heard the sound of rubber gloves snapping into place before hearing the first shot. Brienna testified
Video surveillance captured the white Impala leaving the neighborhood around the same time. Sherria testified that Okafor called her and told her to return to the abandoned house. When she arrived, the other two cars were there. Nesly testified that he left his location before he was instructed but nevertheless returned to the abandoned house to await the others’ return. He testified that he was the first car to arrive back, followed by the Impala, followed by Sherria in the Malibu. Nesly testified that Godfrey was driving the Impala on the return trip and that Okafor got out of the Impala and into the car with Nesly who then drove Okafor home. Sherria testified that Godfrey got into the car with her and she drove him down the street until he indicated where to let him out. She then returned to
Okafor‘s jury trial commenced on August 10, 2015. At the end of the trial, the jury convicted him of one count of first-degree premeditated murder, two counts of attempted first-degree murder, and one count of armed burglary of a dwelling with explosives or a dangerous weapon. The penalty phase commenced on August 27, 2015.
At the penalty phase, the State presented testimony from Brienna Campos, Remington Campos, Denise Zaldivar, Richard Zaldivar, Kyoko Zaldivar, and Rafael Saldivar. Okafor presented testimony from Trenton James, Catalina Ruffin Sinclair, Trevor Sinclair, Marcia Pete, Dr. Edward Taylor, and Dr. Stephen Gold. The jury voted eleven to one to sentence Okafor to death. The Spencer3 hearing occurred on October 13, 2015, where the State presented testimony from Kyoko,
First, Okafor argues that the trial court erred in striking Juror 105 for cause based on his allegedly equivocal responses to whether he would be able to impose the death penalty after determining it was the appropriate punishment. We conclude that there was no error.
A trial court has great discretion when deciding whether to grant or deny a challenge for cause based on juror competency. Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836, 844 (Fla. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 917 (2003). This is because trial courts have a unique vantage point in their observation of jurors’ voir dire responses. Therefore, this Court gives deference to a trial court‘s determination of a
The record demonstrates that Juror 105 never clearly stated that he could follow the law. Even when directed to assume that he had determined that the death penalty was appropriate in this case, Juror 105 stated he was unsure that he could vote to recommend it. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing Juror 105 for cause.
Next, Okafor argues that the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce evidence of high capacity .22 and .223 caliber magazines recovered from
In order to be admissible, evidence must be relevant. That is, the evidence must “tend [] to prove or disprove a material fact.”
§ 90.401, Fla. Stat. (2012) . While relevant evidence is generally admissible, such evidence “is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”§§ 90.402-403, Fla. Stat. (2012) . “A trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence and such a determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” Jorgenson v. State, 714 So. 2d 423, 427 (Fla. 1998) (citing Heath v. State, 648 So. 2d 660, 664 (Fla. 1994)).
Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 177 (Fla. 2016), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-8570 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2017).
The evidence here was not relevant. Despite the State‘s argument, the magazines did not tend to establish the identity of the assailant carrying the AK-47 because an AK-47 does not fire .22 caliber or .223 caliber rounds. Accordingly, the discovery of high capacity magazines of those calibers did not corroborate Remington‘s testimony that one of the assailants carried an AK-47, nor did it establish that Wallace was that assailant. See Huhn v. State, 511 So. 2d 583, 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (finding a gun not relevant when there was nothing unlawful about owning the gun itself and nothing connecting that particular gun to the
Next, even though not challenged by Okafor, we have an independent duty to review the evidence to determine whether there is competent, substantial evidence to sustain the conviction in this case. We conclude that the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support this conviction. The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that on May 9, 2012, Bessman Okafor and Bernard entered the Camposes’ home while armed and took money and electronics. After their arrest, trial was scheduled to begin on September 11, 2012.
The day before trial, Brienna, Remington, and Alex were asleep in their home. Brienna awoke to the sound of her dog barking and was pulled out of bed by a tall, lanky man carrying a pistol. Remington awoke to the sound of both his siblings’ dogs barking and was pulled out of bed by a short, heavy-set man with short dreads carrying a Glock. Remington also saw a tall, lanky man with long dreads carrying an AK-47.
Testimony demonstrated that Okafor arranged for Sherria and Nesly to serve as lookouts. Okafor, Wallace, and Godfrey were filmed by the neighbor‘s surveillance camera arriving at the crime scene. Text messages, cellular data, and Okafor‘s ankle monitor all demonstrate that he coordinated the crime and was at the crime scene during the time the murder took place.
While neither Brienna nor Remington testified that they saw a man who fit Okafor‘s description, and were only able to describe Wallace and Godfrey, they both testified that one of the assailants asked questions that would only make sense if he had been present at the May 9 incident. Specifically, they testified that the unidentified assailant asked “where are the other two” presumably referring to Brandon and William who were present at the May 9 incident but not at the September 10 incident. He also asked “who is the naked guy?” presumably
The jury could reasonably conclude that Okafor planned, coordinated, and executed the murder and attempted murders in this case. Accordingly, we find competent, substantial evidence in the record to affirm Okafor‘s conviction for the first-degree murder of Alex Zaldivar.
Lastly, Okafor argues that because the jury did not unanimously find the facts necessary to sentence him to death and did not unanimously recommend the death sentence, Florida‘s capital sentencing scheme and his death sentence are unconstitutional in light of the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and this Court‘s decision in Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-998 (U.S. May 22, 2017). We agree. See Franklin v. State, 209 So. 3d 1241, 1248 (Fla. 2016) (citing Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 41). We explained in Hurst “that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Hurst v. Florida requires that all the critical findings necessary before the trial court may consider imposing a sentence of death must be found unanimously by the jury.” Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 44. We also held, “based on Florida‘s requirement for unanimity in jury
In Hurst, this Court determined that Hurst v. Florida error is capable of harmless error review and set forth the following test:
The harmless error test, as set forth in Chapman[v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)] and progeny, places the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.
Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 68 (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986)). We stated that a sentencing error is only harmless “if there is no reasonable probability that the error contributed to the sentence.” Id. (citing Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9, 20 (Fla. 2000)). To find the error harmless in this case, we would be required to speculate why one juror was “persuaded that death was not the appropriate penalty.” Id. at 69. We therefore find that the Hurst error in this case is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and Okafor is entitled to a new penalty phase. See id.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. LAWSON, J., concurs specially with an opinion. CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur as to the conviction and dissent as to the sentence.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.
LAWSON, J., concurring specially.
I fully concur in the majority‘s decision to affirm Okafor‘s conviction. I have also elected to concur in the majority‘s decision to vacate Okafor‘s death sentence now that the United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-998, 2017 WL 635999 (U.S. May 22, 2017). Although I continue to view this Court‘s decision in Hurst as misguided for the reasons expressed in Justice Canady‘s Hurst dissent, see Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 77-83 (Canady, J., dissenting), the Supreme Court‘s denial of certiorari renders Hurst final, solidifying it as this Court‘s precedent.
While I recognize that I am not necessarily bound by our precedent and could continue to dissent and express my disagreement, my duty is to faithfully apply Florida law to the issues raised by those litigants whose sole state court
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Valarie Linnen, Atlantic Beach, Florida, for Appellant
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