State of Delaware v. Clinton Harris
1507013159
| Del. Ct. Com. Pl. | Apr 20, 2017Background
- Defendant Clinton Harris, COO of Practice Without Pressure (PWP), was charged by information with one count of Sexual Harassment and eight counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact (third degree) based on alleged sexual conduct with two employees, principally Kerricia Scholl, between 2008–2014; trial was a bench trial.
- Key factual dispute: Scholl testified to multiple sexual encounters she characterized as nonconsensual and described dissociative coping; Harris admitted many sexual encounters but insisted they were consensual and characterized some as role‑play.
- No physical evidence or contemporaneous recordings; much of the case depended on witness credibility and interpretation of words/conduct (e.g., whether Scholl said or effectively communicated "no").
- Statutory theories: the State prosecuted either (a) contact "without consent" or (b) contact the defendant "knew was offensive to the victim." The court previously held charging in the disjunctive was permissible.
- The Court found mixed credibility: generally credited Scholl more than other State witnesses but had doubts (especially absent expert testimony about dissociation); found Bufano and Jastrebski unreliable; found Harris of limited credibility but admitted many encounters.
- Holding: Court acquitted Harris of all counts (Counts I, III–IX), finding the State failed to prove offensiveness knowledge or adequate manifestations of lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt for most incidents; only the basement incident arguably met the statute, but credibility and reasonable doubt persisted.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Harris's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Charging in the disjunctive (offensive vs. without consent) | State may proceed on either or both theories; need not elect pretrial | Defense sought election/particularization | Court held charging disjunctively is permissible; both theories considered at trial (but notice to defendant must be adequate). |
| 2. Proof under "offensive" theory (defendant knew contact would be offensive) | State: need only prove contact was offensive or without consent; knowledge can be inferred from circumstances | Harris: conduct was consensual or not objectively offensive given prior sexual banter and ongoing relationship | Court: State failed to prove Harris knew contact was offensive — reasonable doubts existed given prior sexual conduct and Scholl's apparent participation. |
| 3. Proof under "without consent" (manifestation requirement) | State: Scholl's testimony establishes lack of consent given words, conduct, and coercive context | Harris: many encounters were consensual; where words/acts occurred they did not reasonably notify Harris of nonconsent | Court: "Without consent" requires words or conduct that reasonably put defendant on notice; State failed to prove adequate manifestations of nonconsent for most incidents (except possibly basement incident), so not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. |
| 4. Sufficiency of evidence and witness credibility | State: victim testimony and detective corroboration support convictions | Harris: attacks credibility and emphasizes inconsistencies, lack of expert testimony on dissociation, and uncontroverted admissions of consensual encounters | Held: credibility of witnesses left reasonable doubt; State did not overcome inconsistencies or fill gaps (no expert on dissociation), so all counts dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Zugehoer v. State, 980 A.2d 1007 (Del. 2009) (permitting alternative theories in a single indictment and addressing unanimity/merger issues)
- Johnson v. State, 929 A.2d 784 (Del. 2007) (discussing resistance and evidentiary sufficiency in sexual‑assault contexts)
- Commonwealth v. Mumma, 414 A.2d 1026 (Pa. 1980) (consideration of defendant's knowledge of offensiveness inferred from circumstances)
- State v. Birkman, 621 N.E.2d 1266 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (conviction under offensiveness theory despite evidence of sexual banter)
- New Jersey v. Garron, 827 A.2d 243 (N.J. 2003) (discussion of interpreting consent and manifestations of consent/nonconsent)
- People v. Denbo, 868 N.E.2d 347 (Ill. App. 2007) (withdrawal of consent requires objective communication sufficient to notify defendant)