455 F.Supp.3d 1034
D. Colo.2020Background
- Colorado applied for and historically received Byrne JAG formula grants; DOJ conditioned FY2018 award (~$2.8M) on acceptance of new immigration-related conditions, which Colorado objected to and refused to certify.
- FY2018 challenged conditions included: 48-hour advance notice of scheduled releases to DHS (Notice); federal access to detention facilities for immigration interrogation (Access); certification of compliance with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644 (Compliance); prohibition on disclosures that would “harbor” aliens (Harboring); a questionnaire about local policies; and additional certifications tied to other immigration statutes.
- Colorado sued seeking declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief, alleging DOJ exceeded statutory authority (separation of powers), violated the Spending Clause and the Tenth Amendment, and acted unlawfully under the APA.
- The court found no statutory basis in the Byrne JAG statute or the OJP duties provision for DOJ to impose the challenged immigration-related conditions and rejected DOJ’s broader readings of reporting/"applicable laws" clauses.
- Holding: the conditions are ultra vires and unlawful under separation of powers and the APA, violate Spending Clause requirements (insufficiently related and ambiguous), and the court granted Colorado summary judgment, permanent injunctive relief, and a writ of mandamus directing disbursement absent the unlawful conditions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DOJ had statutory authority to impose FY2018 immigration-related Byrne JAG conditions (separation of powers/ultra vires) | DOJ lacks statutory authority; conditions exceed Congress’s delegation for Byrne JAG and OJP | Statutes (34 U.S.C. §§10153, 10102 and general "applicable Federal laws") authorize reporting, coordination, and special conditions | DOJ lacks authority; conditions are ultra vires and violate separation of powers |
| Whether the conditions violate the Spending Clause (relatedness & unambiguity) | Conditions are unrelated to Byrne JAG’s purpose and were not unambiguously authorized by Congress | Conditions relate to public safety/criminal-aliens and are sufficiently clear for grantees to choose | Conditions fail Spending Clause tests: insufficiently related to Byrne JAG purposes and not unambiguously authorized |
| Whether 8 U.S.C. §§1373 and 1644 violate the Tenth Amendment (anticommandeering) as applied to states/localities | Sections commandeer state/local governments by dictating policies and shifting costs, infringing state sovereignty | Statutes merely preempt local interference and are permissible information-sharing requirements | Court expressed concerns those statutes raise anticommandeering problems but declined to rule them unconstitutional because DOJ lacked authority to impose them here |
| Whether DOJ action violates the APA (arbitrary, capricious, beyond authority, conflict with other statutes) | DOJ acted beyond statutory authority; conditions conflict with limits on federal control over local criminal justice | DOJ acted within delegated administrative authority and program rules | Agency actions are ultra vires under the APA; set aside for exceeding statutory authority |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2020) (interpreting Byrne JAG reporting and "applicable laws" language and rejecting DOJ’s broad conditioning authority)
- City of Philadelphia v. Attorney General of the U.S., 916 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2019) (concluding Byrne JAG statutory text does not support DOJ’s expansive condition authority)
- State of New York v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 951 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2020) (contrasting view: found statutory authority to impose some notice/access conditions)
- City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018) (affirming doubt about DOJ’s authority to impose notice/access conditions)
- Oregon v. Trump, 406 F. Supp. 3d 940 (D. Or. 2019) (held DOJ lacked authority; addressed Tenth Amendment concerns)
- City & County of San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (held harboring/questionnaire conditions ultra vires and separation-of-powers violations)
- Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (executive action must stem from Congress or the Constitution)
- Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) (anticommandeering principles and limits on federal direction of states)
- South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (Spending Clause limits: relatedness and unambiguous notice to states)