State of Arizona v. Shawnte Shuree Jones, 334 P.3d 191

Child died from blunt force head trauma; medical examiner ruled homicide based on multiple head contusions inconsistent with an accidental fall.
Shawnte Jones was charged with: Count 1 (failure to provide nourishment/medical attention — convicted of reckless child abuse), Count 2 (child abuse for inflicting head injuries), and Count 3 (first-degree murder); she waived jury trial.
Trial court sentenced: 3.5 years (Count 1, concurrent), life with release possible after 25 years (Count 3), and a consecutive 17-year term (Count 2).
Court of Appeals affirmed convictions but ordered Count 2 made concurrent, relying on A.R.S. § 13-116 (requiring concurrency when convictions stem from a single act).
Arizona Supreme Court granted review to resolve the conflict between § 13-116 and § 13-705(M) (which mandates consecutive sentences for many dangerous crimes against children) and affirmed the trial court, holding § 13-705(M) governs.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Jones)	Held
Whether § 13-705(M) or § 13-116 controls when multiple convictions arise from a single act	§ 13-705(M) is a more recent, specific statute requiring consecutive sentences for dangerous crimes against children and thus governs	§ 13-116 mandates concurrent sentences when convictions arise from a single act and therefore controls	§ 13-705(M) controls; consecutive sentencing under § 13-705(M) is proper
Whether prior appellate precedent (Arnoldi) requires treating § 13-116 as paramount	N/A (State argued Arnoldi was wrongly decided)	Relied on Arnoldi to argue § 13-116 is paramount and bars consecutive sentences here	Arnoldi was overruled as wrongly decided; its reliance on Noble was misplaced
Whether legislative acquiescence supports Arnoldi’s construction	N/A	Court of Appeals invoked legislative acquiescence to uphold Arnoldi	Legislative acquiescence doctrine inapplicable because Arnoldi is not a decision of a court of last resort
Whether consecutive sentences under § 13-705(M) violate double jeopardy	Consecutive sentences permissible when statutes define different offenses	Argued consecutive sentencing violates double jeopardy	No double jeopardy violation; murder and child abuse require different elements, so multiple punishments allowed

UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Craig, 200 Ariz. 327 (more recent, specific statute governs when two statutes conflict)
State v. Arnoldi, 176 Ariz. 236 (App. 1993) (appellate decision holding § 13-116 paramount; overruled here)
State v. Noble, 152 Ariz. 284 (court clarified Noble did not decide issues about single-act concurrency because convictions there arose from separate acts)
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (double jeopardy protects against multiple punishments for the same offense)
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (different offenses test based on whether each requires proof of an element the other does not)
State v. Lopez, 174 Ariz. 131 (child abuse is not a lesser-included offense of murder; offenses do not merge)