State of Arizona v. Martin Raul Soto-Fong
250 Ariz. 1
| Ariz. | 2020Background
- Consolidated appeal by three petitioners (Wade Clay, Mark Kasic, Martin Raul Soto-Fong) who were juveniles at least for some offenses and received multiple consecutive sentences that in aggregate amount to de facto life terms.
- Clay (17 at offense) convicted of murder and attempted murder; received life with parole eligibility after 25 years plus consecutive term-of-years sentences; now parole-eligible.
- Kasic committed multiple arsons (some when 17, some as adult); jury imposed enhanced concurrent and consecutive terms totaling nearly 140 years.
- Soto-Fong was convicted of multiple murders and related robberies; sentenced to three consecutive life terms without parole for 25 years, effectively 109 years before release eligibility.
- Petitioners argued their aggregated consecutive term-of-years sentences, which exceed juvenile life expectancy, violate the Eighth Amendment under Graham, Miller, and Montgomery and sought resentencing; cases raise statewide constitutional question about de facto juvenile life terms.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits aggregated consecutive term-of-years sentences that effectively deny juveniles a realistic chance of release | Graham/Miller/Montgomery forbid de facto life terms produced by consecutive sentences for multiple crimes | The Supreme Court cases address parole‑ineligible life for a single conviction; aggregated consecutive sentences are not governed by those holdings | The court held the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit de facto juvenile life sentences produced by consecutive term‑of‑years sentences and Graham/Miller/Montgomery do not apply |
| Whether dicta in Graham, Miller, Montgomery requires extending those rulings to aggregated sentences | Petitioners rely on dicta suggesting juveniles must have hope/opportunity for release | Dicta is not binding; holdings govern; extension would be judicial policymaking | The court refused to rely on dicta to expand federal holdings to inapplicable sentencing structures |
| Whether the Arizona Constitution provides broader protection than the Eighth Amendment for juveniles facing de facto life terms | Petitioners: Arizona Constitution affords greater protection to juveniles, barring de facto life sentences | State: Arizona’s Article 2 §15 mirrors the Eighth Amendment and provides no broader bar | Court held Arizona Constitution does not offer broader protection here and follows federal precedent when provisions are identical |
| Whether Graham/Miller/Montgomery constitute a significant change in law under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g) warranting relief | Petitioners: these cases change law to bar de facto juvenile life terms and justify relief | State: These cases do not alter law as applied to consecutive aggregated sentences | Court held they do not represent a significant change in law under Rule 32.1(g); affirmed lower courts’ rulings |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (held parole‑ineligible life for juvenile nonhomicide offenders unconstitutional; requirement of a realistic opportunity for release)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (held mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional and required individualized consideration of youth)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (held Miller substantive and retroactive; stated life without parole barred for all but the rare juvenile offender who is permanently incorrigible)
- Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upheld lengthy term‑of‑years sentence under proportionality analysis; supports limiting stacking-based Eighth Amendment claims)
- State v. Berger, 212 Ariz. 473 (2006) (Arizona precedent: Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis focuses on each specific sentence, not aggregate consecutive totals)