State of Arizona v. Julio Pedroza-Perez, 240 Ariz. 114

In June 2013 Pedroza-Perez was arrested in Arizona with several bales of marijuana; co-smugglers escaped. He was charged with importation, transportation for sale, and possession of paraphernalia.
He notified the court he intended to assert a duress defense, stating armed smugglers forced him to carry the drugs, and submitted a sworn affidavit previewing his anticipated testimony.
The State moved in limine; the trial court ruled the defense could not mention duress or anticipated duress testimony in opening statement because Pedroza-Perez might decline to testify. If he testified, duress could be argued in closing.
Defense complied and withheld duress in opening; Pedroza-Perez ultimately testified consistent with his affidavit, counsel argued duress in closing, and the jury was instructed on duress. Jury convicted on transportation and paraphernalia, acquitted on importation.
The court of appeals affirmed; the State conceded to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in limiting the opening statement but argued harmlessness. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for harmless-error review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial court properly barred defendant from mentioning duress and anticipated testimony in opening statement	Limiting opening was permissible because defendant could later elect not to testify, leaving no evidence to support the opening claim	Preclusion was error; defendant had given advance notice and affidavit creating a good-faith basis to preview evidence in opening	Court held preclusion was erroneous; defendant entitled to present predicted evidence in opening when there is a good-faith basis
Standard for what may be included in opening statements	Opening must exclude statements that will not or cannot be supported by proof	Defense: opening may include predictions of evidence if proponent has good-faith basis and expects admissibility	Court: opening statements may reference specific anticipated evidence if a good-faith basis exists; court can require proffer but not a stricter standard
Whether the error was structural (requiring automatic reversal)	State urged harmless-error review	Defendant argued error was structural and required reversal	Court held error was non-structural and subject to harmless-error review
Remedy and next step	State asked Court to find error harmless	Defendant sought reversal	Court vacated court of appeals decision and remanded so the court of appeals can assess harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt

United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976) (opening statements should not include allegations unsupported by anticipated evidence)
State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549 (1993) (prosecutor’s unsupported assertions in opening improper when no anticipated evidence)
State v. Burruell, 98 Ariz. 37 (1965) (purpose and scope of opening statement described)
State v. Bowie, 119 Ariz. 336 (1978) (party may reference anticipated testimony in opening if there is a good-faith basis)
State v. Prewitt, 104 Ariz. 326 (1969) (standard of review for opening-statement rulings)
State v. Manuel, 229 Ariz. 1 (2011) (jurors instructed that opening statements are not evidence; presumption jurors follow instructions)
State v. Gallardo, 225 Ariz. 560 (2010) (same principle on jury instructions curing potential prejudice)
State v. Valverde, 220 Ariz. 582 (2009) (harmless-error standard for non-structural errors)
State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534 (2003) (definition of structural error and its effect on trial framework)
State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561 (2006) (structural error discussion)
State v. Whitaker, 112 Ariz. 537 (1975) (defendant’s absolute right to testify or not)
Rutledge v. State, 41 Ariz. 48 (1932) (failure to produce evidence promised in opening generally prejudices only the promisor)