State of Arizona v. Gilbert Martinez, 230 Ariz. 208

Martinez convicted of first-degree burglary, four counts of aggravated assault, four counts of kidnapping, theft, and felony murder in a single case arising from a 2006 home invasion in Sun City.
Mistrial in the penalty phase, followed by a second jury that imposed a death sentence; non-capital sentences also imposed for related charges.
State sought death penalty based on two aggravators: prior serious-offense conviction (F)(2) and murder for pecuniary gain (F)(5).
Trial court severed charges by occurrence; multiple trials were held, with one burglary acquitted (Krustenstjernas).
On appeal, Martinez challenges prosecutorial conduct, evidentiary rulings, admission of prior offenses as aggravation, and procedural aspects of the second penalty phase; Arizona Supreme Court affirms convictions and sentences.
Second penalty phase jurors were instructed that the sentencing decision was theirs and not dependent on the prior jury.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admission of nineteen prior offenses under (F)(2)	Martinez argues prejudice from using many prior convictions.	Martinez contends extensive prior evidence was unduly prejudicial.	No abuse of discretion; evidence highly probative to aggravator and mitigation weight.
Prosecutorial misconduct during penalty phase	Martinez claims pervasive misconduct biased the jury.	Minor improper conduct; not reversible error.	No reversible error; conduct not shown to prejudice the verdict; strong admonitions urged.
Confrontation issues with accomplice's statements in penalty phase	Martinez asserts Crawford violation from admitting accomplice statements via detective.	Confrontation clause not violated for sentencing rebuttal; impeachment allowed.	No confrontation violation; cross-examination and impeachment not improperly curtailed.
Second penalty phase and Caldwell concern	Use of a second jury for sentencing violated Caldwell if the first jury was misled.	No Caldwell violation when second jury is properly instructed.	No Caldwell violation; instructions preserved juror independence in sentencing.
Admission of bag contents and other rebuttal evidence in penalty phase	Evidence of ammunition and other items was irrelevant and prejudicial.	Some items relevant to mitigation/credibility; others harmless.	Some items excluded as irrelevant; overall admission deemed harmless in context.

State v. Moore, 222 Ariz. 1, 213 P.3d 150 (2009) (prejudice standard for striking jurors; need prejudice shown)
State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 115 P.3d 601 (2005) (fundamental error review for unobjected evidentiary issues)
State v. Tucker, 215 Ariz. 298, 46 P.3d 1119 (2007) (aggravating (F)(2) evidence; probative value vs prejudice)
State v. Prince, 226 Ariz. 516, 250 P.3d 1145 (2011) (mitigation evidence relevance in penalty phase)
State v. McGill, 213 Ariz. 147, 140 P.3d 930 (2006) (Confrontation in sentencing; hearsay rebuttal)
State v. Chappell, 225 Ariz. 229, 236 P.3d 1176 (2010) (discusses confrontation and mitigation in sentencing)
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (prohibition on resting death sentence on a sentencer misled about role)
Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994) (individualized sentencing standard in death penalty cases)
Tennessee v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238 (1993) (weight of multiple prior convictions in aggravation)
State v. Pandeli, 215 Ariz. 514, 161 P.3d 557 (2007) (relevance/prejudice standards in penalty phase)