State of Arizona v. Darren Lee Winegardner, 413 P.3d 683

Darren Winegardner was convicted of sexual conduct with a minor after the State called the victim L.B. to testify; Winegardner sought to impeach L.B. with a 2015 misdemeanor shoplifting conviction.
At trial Winegardner offered no particulars about the shoplifting conviction; the trial court excluded the impeachment evidence as more prejudicial than probative and the jury convicted Winegardner.
On appeal Winegardner argued the exclusion violated Arizona Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2) because shoplifting is a crime demonstrating a "dishonest act" or "false statement." The court of appeals rejected per se admissibility.
The Arizona Supreme Court granted review to resolve whether a shoplifting conviction is automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2), which mandates admission of convictions involving dishonest acts or false statements.
The Court analyzed Rule 609(a)(2) in light of Malloy and the federal rule’s legislative history and concluded the phrase "dishonest act or false statement" must be narrowly construed to crimes involving deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification.
The Court held shoplifting (A.R.S. § 13-1805(A)) is not per se a 609(a)(2) crime because some statutory subsections (e.g., simple removal without payment or mere concealment) do not necessarily require proof of deceit; admission requires the proponent to show the conviction depended on dishonesty or a false statement.

Issue	Winegardner's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether a shoplifting conviction is per se admissible under Ariz. R. Evid. 609(a)(2)	Shoplifting is a dishonest act and thus automatically admissible	Not per se; some statutory variants do not involve dishonesty so exclusion was proper absent detail	Not per se admissible; only admissible if court can readily determine the conviction required proving or admitting a dishonest act or false statement
What showing is required to admit a conviction under Rule 609(a)(2)	No showing required if offense is inherently dishonest (shoplifting per se)	Proponent must identify which statutory subsection or factual basis shows deceit	Proponent bears burden to show, outside jury, that the conviction rested on deceit/false statement; limited factual showing allowed, but no extensive "trial within a trial"
How to interpret "dishonest act or false statement" in Rule 609(a)(2)	Plain meaning supports broad reading (shoplifting dishonest)	Rule should be narrowly construed to crimes involving deceit/untruthfulness	Narrow construction adopted: term covers crimes involving deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification (Malloy line)
Whether exclusion of the specific impeachment evidence was an abuse of discretion	Admission required; exclusion was error	Exclusion proper because no record showing the shoplifting involved dishonesty	No abuse of discretion: Winegardner produced no evidence that the conviction established a dishonest act or false statement, so exclusion affirmed

State v. Malloy, 131 Ariz. 125 (construes "dishonesty or false statement" narrowly for Rule 609(a)(2))
United States v. Ortega, 561 F.2d 803 (explains conference committee intent limiting Rule 609(a)(2) to crimes involving deceit or falsification)
United States v. Amaechi, 991 F.2d 374 (refuses to treat shoplifting as per se a crime of dishonesty under Rule 609(a)(2))
United States v. Dorsey, 591 F.2d 922 (permits admission where factual basis shows offense involved deceit despite statute’s breadth)