State of Arizona v. Anthony Benard Primous, 394 P.3d 646

Phoenix officers went to an apartment complex in a high-crime neighborhood searching for a suspect believed to carry and sell weapons.
Officers approached four men outside; one man ran when additional officers arrived and was chased; Primous remained seated, holding an infant, cooperative, and gave no signs of furtive conduct.
Officers announced they would pat down the men; one man handed an officer a baggie of marijuana before the frisk.
During the pat-down of Primous, officers felt and seized a separate baggie of marijuana from his pocket. Primous was charged with misdemeanor possession.
The trial court denied Primous’s suppression motion, finding the totality of circumstances (companion’s flight, high-crime area, reason for police presence, number of people vs. officers, surveillance cameras) gave rise to reasonable suspicion for a frisk; the court of appeals affirmed.
The Arizona Supreme Court granted review and reversed, holding the frisk lacked the constitutionally required individualized reasonable suspicion and suppressing the seized evidence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether officers had reasonable, particularized suspicion to frisk Primous for weapons	The frisk was justified by the totality of circumstances: companion’s flight, high-crime area, reason for police presence, disparity in numbers, and cameras	Primous argued he gave no individualized suspicion: he was seated, cooperative, holding an infant, and never acted furtive or threatening	Court held no individualized reasonable suspicion existed; frisk unlawful and evidence suppressed
Whether illegally seized marijuana should be excluded despite officer safety concerns	State argued exclusion would have little deterrent effect on officer safety-driven frisks	Primous argued suppression is necessary to deter unreasonable, non‑particularized frisks	Court held suppression appropriate to deter unconstitutional, generalized frisks and protect Fourth Amendment rights

State v. Serna, 235 Ariz. 270 (Ariz. 2014) (an officer may frisk only where there is both reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and a reasonable belief the person is armed and dangerous)
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (mere proximity to suspected criminals does not give rise to probable cause or justify a frisk)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (police may stop and frisk based on reasonable belief crime is afoot and suspect may be armed)
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (presence in a high-crime area is a contextual consideration but not sufficient alone; unprovoked flight can contribute to reasonable suspicion)
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) (reasonable suspicion requires a particularized, objective basis)
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (exclusionary rule targets recurring or systemic negligence)
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009) (two-part Terry analysis for frisks of vehicle passengers)
State v. Primous, 239 Ariz. 394 (App. 2016) (court of appeals decision affirming trial court’s denial of suppression; vacated by Arizona Supreme Court)