State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tully, 142 A.3d 1079

Background

On July 2, 2012, Mark Tully (56) approached three girls at a park; one victim (Doe) was 14 and another was 8. Tully grabbed Doe’s breast and fondled the eight‑year‑old’s buttocks. Tully was intoxicated and later pled nolo contendere to related criminal charges.
Doe sued Tully in a civil action alleging, ultimately as amended, negligence based on his intoxication and resulting injuries; Tully sought defense/coverage under a State Farm homeowners policy that excludes coverage for injuries that are "expected or intended" by the insured.
State Farm filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that it owed no duty to defend because the underlying allegations constituted intentional sexual misconduct with a minor and thus fell within the policy’s intentional act exclusion.
At summary judgment Tully submitted affidavits (physician, psychologist, and his own) asserting alcoholism/ intoxication so severe he could not form intent; the trial court granted State Farm summary judgment, relying on Marburg’s presumption of intent for sexual misconduct with a minor and holding voluntary intoxication cannot negate that presumption.
The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed: it held Marburg’s presumption remains good law, Barron did not overrule it, and voluntary intoxication cannot, as a matter of law, be used to negate intent where intent is inferred from allegations of sexual misconduct with a minor.

Issues

Issue	State Farm's Argument	Tully/Doe's Argument	Held
Whether Marburg’s presumption of intent for sexual misconduct with a minor remains valid after Barron	Marburg presumption stands; insurer may rely on it to meet initial burden on summary judgment	Barron overruled or limited Marburg; intent should be negated if insured couldn’t understand wrongfulness	Marburg remains good law; Barron clarified evidentiary standard but did not overrule Marburg
Whether the complaint’s allegations trigger the intentional‑act exclusion (i.e., whether the acts alleged are presumptively intentional)	Allegations of sexual misconduct with a minor permit inference of harmful intent and fall outside coverage	Complaint pleaded negligence and intoxication, so facts create ambiguity whether acts were intentional	Allegations fairly read as sexual misconduct with a minor; intentional‑act exclusion applies and insurer met initial burden
Whether evidence of voluntary intoxication may rebut the Marburg presumption and create a genuine issue for trial	Voluntary intoxication should not negate intent for sexual misconduct with minors; public policy forbids it	Voluntary intoxication/alcoholism evidence (affidavits) negates capacity to form intent, so summary judgment improper	Rejected: as a matter of law voluntary intoxication may not be used to negate intent where intent is inferred from sexual misconduct with a minor
Whether alcoholism (dependency) is different from ordinary voluntary intoxication for this purpose	Legislative and case law distinguish mental disease defenses from voluntary intoxication; alcoholism does not render intoxication involuntary as a matter of law	Alcohol dependence produced incapacity, so intoxication was effectively involuntary and could negate intent	Court treats alcoholism as a mental disorder but holds dependency does not make intoxication involuntary as a matter of law; voluntary intoxication bar still applies

Key Cases Cited

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Marburg, 46 Conn. App. 99 (Conn. App. 1997) (presumption of intent where insured committed sexual misconduct with a minor)
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Barron, 269 Conn. 394 (Conn. 2004) (standard for negating intent: inability to appreciate wrongfulness or to control conduct)
Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 35 Conn. App. 94 (Conn. App. 1994) (adopted standard for mental incapacity to negate intent)
Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 995 F.2d 457 (3d Cir. 1993) (survey of approaches to voluntary intoxication as a defense to intentional‑act exclusions)