269 Conn. 394 | Conn. | 2004
Opinion
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiff, Allstate Insurance Company, had a duty to indemnify its insured under a homeowners’ insurance policy issued by the plaintiff to Charles S. and Kelly S. The plaintiff filed this declaratory judgment action against the defendants
The horrific events underlying this case were set forth by this court in In re Joshua S., 260 Conn. 182, 796 A.2d 1141 (2002). “During the early morning hours of June 10, 1999, Kelly S., a woman with a long history of psychiatric problems, stabbed to death her husband, Charles S., in the bedroom of their East Hartford home. Awakened by the screams of Charles S., Kelly S.’ then nine year old daughter, Jessica M., ran into the same bedroom, where Kelly S. then began to stab her repeatedly. Jessica M. ran from the bedroom and down the hall, while being pursued by Kelly S. Kelly S. then doused herself, Jessica M. and a bedroom with gasoline, and set the house on fire. Kelly S. ... as well as two of [her and Charles S. ’ children] Jennifer S., nearly three years old, and Jonah S., one and one-half years old, died in the conflagration. Their son, Joshua S., then two months old, survived.” Id., 185-86. Jessica M. fled from the house and also survived. Id., 186.
Separate wrongful death actions against the estate of Kelly S. (Kelly) were filed by Frank A. Leone, the administrator of the estates of Jennifer S. and Jonah S. and Frank A. Leone, the administrator of the estate of Charles S. The complaints in both actions alleged that the deaths had resulted from Kelly’s negligent or reckless conduct. They also alleged that her mental capacity was severely impaired at the time of the incident. On
On April 24, 2002, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment in which it claimed, inter alia, that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Kelly’s conduct fell within the policy exclusion barring coverage for bodily injury that was intended or that reasonably could have been expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts or omissions of the insured. In support of its motion, the plaintiff relied on the allegations in the defendants’ complaints in the underlying cases describing Kelly’s conduct on the morning of June 10,1999. The plaintiff also attached to its motion a copy of the insurance policy and the official death certificates from the office of the chief medical, examiner for Charles S., Jonah S. and Jennifer S. indicating that the
The defendants objected to the motion for summary judgment. In support of their argument that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Kelly’s conduct had been intentional, the defendants presented to the court the transcript of the deposition of Ann H. Kazarian, Kelly’s treating psychiatrist. Kazarian testified that she treated Kelly from April 27, 1998, through July 2, 1998. At her first office visit, Kelly appeared to be depressed and reported being anxious. Kelly stated that, since high school,
Kelly told Kazarian that she had been suicidal at times and that she had been hospitalized in 1994 after taking an overdose of Xanax. During the 1994 episode, Kelly had refused to take the medications prescribed to treat her depression. She had been hospitalized again in 1995 when she had developed a desire to hang herself.
Kazarian’s initial impression of Kelly was that she was severely depressed but not psychotic. She made a diagnosis of “recurrent major depression, severe.” Kazarian prescribed Prozac to treat the condition. Kelly called the next day, April 28, 1998, and informed Kaz-arian that she had thrown the prescription away because she was nursing a baby and her husband was concerned about the effect that the medication would have on the baby. Kazarian warned Kelly about the
Kazarian saw Kelly again on May 5, 1998, and determined that her severe depression was worsening. She was more helpless, more hopeless, more anxious, not sleeping and unable to get things done. Kelly denied that she was suicidal at that time, but Kazarian was concerned that suicidal impulses might appear suddenly because her condition was changing rapidly and she had a history of impulsive decisions. Kazarian also knew that Kelly had had previous episodes of depression and that a person who has had three discrete episodes of serious depression has a 95 percent chance of experiencing additional episodes. In addition, Kazarian knew that Kelly previously had suffered from severe postpartum depression. She testified that, after one such episode, the likelihood of recurrence is “very, very, very high.” Kazarian did not know at that time whether Kelly had had discrete episodes of depression or chronic depression, but the long-term prognosis was poor in either case. Kazarian prescribed additional medications and gave Kelly a list of persons to call if her suicidal impulses recurred.
Kazarian saw Kelly again on May 11, 1998. Kelly had been taking the medications, but had had a “terrible week.” Kazarian prescribed additional medications and recommended that Kelly be hospitalized. She refused. On the evening of May 12, Kelly took an overdose of a variety of medications. She was found the next morning and admitted to a hospital. After Kelly was hospitalized, Kazarian determined that Kelly’s moods swung from
Kelly was discharged from the hospital on May 20, 1998. She called Kazarian the next day and indicated that she was taking the medications that had been prescribed. Kelly denied at that time that she was suicidal, but Kazarian believed that she was still a definite suicide risk.
Kazarian saw Kelly again on June 2, 1998. At that time, she increased Kelly’s medications because “she was still so stressed.” On July 2,1998, Kelly had another office visit and reported that she had stopped taking the medications. She stated that she now believed that her illness was the result of sin and that, if she followed the teachings of the Bible, she would recover. Kazarian told her that if she did not take the medications, there was a likelihood rising almost to a certainty that her depression and suicidal thoughts would recur.
Kazarian did not see Kelly again after the July 2,1998 visit. She testified that the events of June 10,1999, were consistent with her diagnosis of bipolar disorder and
On cross-examination during her deposition, Kaz-arian testified that, dining her treatment of Kelly, there had been times when Kelly seemed to know “exactly what she was doing and there were other times when . . . her understanding of the whole situation was abominable.” She also testified that she did not believe that Kelly’s noncompliant behavior was deliberate. Finally, she testified that, because she had not seen Kelly after July 2, 1998, she did not believe that she could give an opinion as to whether postpartum depression had impaired Kelly’s ability to tell right from wrong, to control her actions or to form an intent during the events of June 10, 1999.
The defendants also presented to the trial court an affidavit by Walter Borden, a psychiatrist. Borden stated in his affidavit that he had reviewed the complaint in this case, the police report relating to the events of June 10, 1999, statements of witnesses, the medical examiner’s report, electronic mail and other documents authored by Kelly, all of Kelly’s medical records and the transcript of Kazarian’s deposition. On the basis of his review of these documents, he stated: “In my opinion to a reasonable degree of medical probability, on June 10,1999 Kelly was incapable of appreciating the nature of her behavior, unable to control herself and incapable of forming rational intent to do the acts attributed to her.”
In its memorandum of decision on the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, the trial court deter
The defendants then filed separate motions for reconsideration to which they attached a second affidavit by Borden in which he set forth the factual basis for the opinions contained in his first affidavit. The trial court denied the motions on the ground that “[a] motion to reargue is not to be used as an opportunity to present
The defendants claim on appeal that the trial court improperly: (1) determined that the allegations of the underlying negligence complaints did not sufficiently allege facts barring the application of the policy’s intentional conduct exclusion clause;
We first address the defendants’ claim that the trial court improperly determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Kelly’s conduct was intentional within the meaning of the intentional conduct exclusion clause. As a preliminary matter, we set forth the standard of review. “In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. ‘The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.’
“Under our law, the terms of an insurance policy are to be construed according to the general rules of contract construction. . . . The determinative question is the intent of the parties, that is, what coverage the . . . [insured] expected to receive and what the [insurer] was to provide, as disclosed by the provisions of the policy. ... If the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, then the language, from which the intention of the parties is to be deduced, must be accorded its natural and ordinary meaning. . . . However, [w]hen the words of an insurance contract are, without violence, susceptible of two [equally reasonable] interpretations, that which will sustain the claim and cover the loss must, in preference, be adopted. . . . [T]his rule of construction favorable to the insured extends to exclusion clauses.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Travelers Ins. Co. v. Namerow, 261 Conn. 784, 796, 807 A.2d 467 (2002).
In the present case, the plaintiff submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment copies of the complaints in the underlying negligence actions against Kelly’s estate and the death certificates from the office of the chief medical examiner for Charles S., Jonah S. and
As the trial court noted in its memorandum of decision, however, the Appellate Court concluded in Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, 35 Conn. App. 94, that an insured’s intent to commit an act may be negated for purposes of an intentional conduct exclusion clause when “the insured did not understand the nature or wrongfulness of his conduct, or was deprived of the capacity to control his actions regardless of his understanding of the nature or wrongfulness of his action.” Id., 106-107. The Appellate Court recognized in Home Ins. Co. that, in Connecticut, “mentally infirm persons face civil liability for intentional torts”; id., 104; but concluded that that does not “preclude a holding that the actions of such persons are regarded as unintentional for the puiposes of an intentional action exclusion clause of an insurance policy because the principles have different justifications. Intentional act exclusion clauses were adopted primarily to prevent individuals from benefiting financially when they deliberately injured others. ... An individual who lacks the capacity to conform his behavior to acceptable stan
The plaintiff does not ask this court to overrule Home Ins. Co., and we adopt the Appellate Court’s persuasive reasoning and holding in that case as the governing law herein.
After the defendants filed their objection to the plaintiffs motion with supporting documents, however, the plaintiff filed a reply memorandum in which it argued that the documents submitted by the defendants, specifically, Kazarian’s deposition transcript, established that there was no genuine issue as to Kelly’s mental condition on June 10, 1999. Although the defendants were not obligated to present documents in support of their objection to the plaintiffs motion; id.; the trial court was entitled to consider whether the evidence that they chose to present supported the plaintiffs claim. Cf. Cinque v. Orlando, 140 Conn. 591, 593, 102 A.2d 532 (1954) (although defendant was not obligated to put on evidence after his motion for nonsuit was denied, evidence that he did present could be used to establish plaintiffs case). Accordingly, we must determine whether the evidence that was presented by the defendants and relied on by the plaintiff established, prima facie, that there was no genuine issue of material fact and, if so, whether other evidence presented by the defendants supported their claim to the contrary.
In support of its motion, the plaintiff relied on Kaz-arian’s testimony that: she believed that she was professionally obligated to decline to offer an opinion as to whether Kelly’s mental condition had led to infanticide;
We agree that, standing alone, Kazarian’s refusal to render an opinion as to Kelly’s mental state on June 10, 1999, would cast serious doubt on the defendants’ claim that Kelly’s mental condition was seriously impaired on that date.
The trial court concluded, however, that even if Kelly suffered from this condition, “[t]he defendants do not
In the present case, Kazarian testified that she was concerned about the safety of the S. children because in postpartum mood disorders, there is a known increased risk of infanticide and at the time of Kelly’s hospitalization in May, 1998, her insight and judgment had been severely impaired. Kazarian stated that the events of June 10, 1999, were consistent with her diagnosis of bipolar disorder and were “the kind of thing that [she] worried about when [she] was taking care of [Kelly].” She also noted that a person with bipolar disorder may
II
We next turn to the plaintiffs first alternate ground for affirmance that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Kelly’s conduct was covered by the policy’s criminal conduct exclusion clause. The plaintiff argued in its brief to this court that, had Kelly survived, she could have been charged with various criminal offenses, thereby placing her conduct within the policy exclusion. At oral argument before this court, the plaintiff further argued that the exclusion would apply even if Kelly could not have been convicted of any crime because a reasonable policyholder would understand the phrase “criminal acts” to refer to any conduct that a layperson would perceive as criminal, regardless of whether a defense to criminal charges could be established. The defendants counter that a reasonable policy holder would understand the phrase “criminal acts” to refer to conduct for which a person could be convicted and punished. We agree with the defendants.
The insurer appealed, arguing that “the battery exclusion applies when there is proof of intent to act but no proof of intent to injure. This is so because to commit a battery one need not intend the harm that results from an act.” Id., 718. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the trial court. It noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court previously had held that “an insane person, within the meaning of the criminal law, lacked the cognitive ability to form the intent to injure another” for purposes of determining whether conduct is intentional within the meaning of an intentional conduct exclusion clause. Id., 720, citing State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Wicka, 474 N.W.2d
In Swift v. Fitchburg Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 45 Mass. App. 618, 620, the insured, who had attacked several people with a knife and a shovel, was charged with various criminal offenses and found not guilty by reason of insanity. Two of the victims thereafter brought a civil action against the insured alleging assault and battery. The victims also alleged that the insured had been negligent in failing to take prescribed medications to control his propensity for violence. Id., 619. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the victims on the negligence claim. Id., 621. Because the insurer previously had denied coverage on the ground that the conduct was covered by the criminal conduct exclusion, the victims filed an action against the insurer alleging, inter alia, breach of the duty to defend and indemnify the insured. Id. The trial court rendered judgment for the insurer, reasoning that, “[a]s the insured performed the physical acts that produced the injuries, it should make no difference . . . that the insured was mentally irresponsible at the time.” Id., 622.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed the trial court’s judgment. With respect to the allegations that the insurer had breached its duty to indemnify, the court first concluded that the criminal conduct exclusion was
As the Appellate Court stated in Home Ins. Co., which we have adopted as the governing law in this opinion, the standard for determining whether an insured’s conduct is intentional within the meaning of the intentional conduct exclusion clause is “consistent with our test for mental capacity in the criminal context. See General Statutes § 53a-13 (a).”
In support of its argument to the contrary, the plaintiff relies on several cases from other jurisdictions standing for the proposition that when an insured is convicted of criminal conduct that does not involve a specific intent to injure the victim, the conduct is nevertheless
The only case cited by the plaintiff that involves a claim of mental incapacity is Allstate Ins. Co. v. Raynor, 143 Wash. 2d 469, 21 P.3d 707 (2001). In that case, the insured fatally shot his neighbor and her young daughter and then committed suicide. Id., 471. He had a history of violent behavior and had become enraged because his neighbors were raising rabbits on their property. Id., 471-72. The defendant, the daughter’s father, brought a wrongful death action against the insured, among others. Id., 474. The plaintiff insurance company then filed a declaratory judgment action claiming that the insured’s conduct fell within the policy’s criminal conduct exclusion clause and filed a motion for summary judgment. Id., 474-75. In support of its motion, the plaintiff presented a statement by a psychiatrist that, although the insured’s mental capacity to form intent was seriously compromised, the psychiatrist did not believe that the insured met the insanity standard under Washington
Ill
Finally, we address the plaintiffs second alternate ground for affirmance that the incident fell within the policy’s pollution exclusion clause.
The plaintiff has not provided, and our research has not revealed any authority for the proposition that smoke from a house fire is covered by the pollution exclusion clause.
In any event, in the present case, we are persuaded by the defendants’ argument that, under the terms of the policy, smoke from a house fire is not an excluded cause of bodily injury. Under the personal property
The plaintiff implicitly argues that even if bodily injury from smoke is covered, injuries from toxic components within the smoke, such as carbon monoxide, are not. We disagree. If the plaintiffs interpretation were correct, then, presumably, the policy would provide coverage for losses caused only by smoke that does not contain any “vapors, fumes . . . toxic chemicals, toxic gasses . . . waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants.” We do not believe that a reasonable policyholder would understand “smoke” to be limited to substances that lack any of these components. Accordingly, we conclude that injuries caused by the toxic components of smoke from a
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings according to law.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
The defendants are Stephen C. Barron, administrator of the estate of Kelly S., Frank A. Leone, administrator of the estate of Charles S., and Frank A. Leone, administrator of the estates of Jennifer S. and Jonah S. The plaintiffs declaratory judgment complaint originally named as a defendant Jessica M., appearing through her next friend, Frank Phillippe. The plaintiff has withdrawn its complaint against that defendant.
The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
The plaintiff states in its brief to this court that it does not contest its duty to defend the underlying cases and that it has paid for the defense of those cases.
The policy provided that the plaintiff would pay damages for which the insured became legally obligated to pay arising from an “occurrence,” which it defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions during the policy period, resulting in bodily injury or property damage.” The policy also provided: “We do not cover any bodily injury or property damage intended by, or which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts or omissions of, an insured person. . . . This exclusion applies regardless of whether or not such insured person is actually charged with, or convicted of a crime.”
Kazarian testified that Kelly was thirty years old in 1998.
Jonah S. was bom in January, 1998.
Kazarian defined a “hypomanic" state as an elevated mood, but not as elevated as manic.
In support of this claim, the defendants rely on the proposition that an insurer’s duty to defend “does not depend on whether the injured party will successfully maintain a cause of action against the insured but on whether he has, in his complaint, stated facts which bring the injury within the coverage.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moore v. Continental Casualty Co., 252 Conn. 405, 409, 746 A.2d 1252 (2000). As we have noted, the plaintiff does not dispute that it has a duly to defend Kelly’s estate. See footnote 3 of this opinion. To the extent that the defendants claim that the trial court improperly required them to produce evidence to support the allegations in the underlying negligence complaints and in their counterclaims in this case in the absence of any proof by the plaintiff that there was no genuine issue of material fact, we address that claim later in this opinion.
During oral argument before this court, the plaintiff argued that the burden was on the defendants to establish the truth of the allegations in their counterclaim that Kelly suffered from mental impairment. We express no opinion on that question. Regardless of which party has the ultimate burden of proof on that issue, the burden is on the plaintiff, as the party seeking summary judgment, to establish the absence of any genuine issue as to Kelly’s mental condition.
The plaintiff did cite a number of cases standing for the unremarkable propositions that intent can be inferred from conduct and that intentional conduct by an insured falls within the intentional conduct exclusion clause. It argues that, under these cases, Kelly’s intent can be inferred from her conduct. It does not explain, however, why, if the defendants can establish that Kelly did not understand the nature or wrongfulness of her conduct, her intent would not be negated under the principles enunciated in Home Ins. Co.
The plaintiff also argued that Kelly’s conduct was not “accidental” and, therefore, was not an “occurrence” covered by the policy. To the extent that the plaintiff believes that Home Ins. Co. can be distinguished from the present case on the ground that that case did not involve any claim that the insured’s conduct was not an “occurrence,” we are not persuaded. The word “accident” has been defined as “[a]n unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence”; (emphasis added) Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Ed. 1999); “an occurrence for which no one is responsible"-, (emphasis added) Messina v. New Haven, 119 Conn. 166, 168, 174 A. 188 (1934); and “an event of unfortunate character that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 255 Conn. 295, 307, 765 A.2d 891 (2001), quoting Arthur A. Johnson Corp. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 7 N.Y.2d 222, 228, 164 N.E.2d 704, 196 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1959). We conclude that, to the extent that Kelly engaged in conduct for which she could not be held responsible because her mental incapacity negated her intent, the consequences of her conduct were accidental and, therefore, an “occurrence” within the meaning of the policy.
Accordingly, we reject the defendants’ claims that the trial court improperly failed to take into account the allegations of the underlying complaints that Kelly was mentally incapacitated on June 10,1999. When the defendants produced evidence supporting the plaintiff’s claim that there was no genuine issue as to Kelly’s state of mind, the trial court properly shifted the burden to them to produce evidence that there was such an issue.
Kazarian also testified that: a person who has had three discrete episodes of serious depression has a 95 percent chance of experiencing additional episodes; regardless of whether Kelly had had discrete episodes of depression or chronic depression, her long-term prognosis was poor; Kelly had a lifelong illness and the frequency and severity of her periods of depressions were likely to increase over time; and, to a reasonable medical certainty, a diagnosis of bipolar disorder will typically progress without treatment and medication.
We note that, during Kazarian’s deposition, the cross-examination questions were framed in categorical rather than probabilistic terms. Counsel for the plaintiff asked: “[A]m I correct in understanding that you do not have an opinion that the illness led to infanticide in this case?"; “[I]s it fair to say that you are not expressing an opinion that the event resulted from postpartum depression?”; “Would it also be fair to say that you are not prepared to render an opinion that the illness you diagnosed prevented her from controlling her actions on the night of the event?’; and “[Wjould it also be fair to say that you have no opinion that Kelly S. was incapable of forming art intent due to her illness on the night of the event!” (Emphasis added.) Kazarian's responses might well have been different if she had been asked her opinion as to the likelihood that these statements were true.
The court in Swift noted that some insurance companies have excluded coverage for “[a]n act or omission which is criminal in nature and committed by an insured person who lacked the mental capacity to appreciate the criminal nature or wrongfulness of the act or omission or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law or to form the necessary
General Statutes § 53a-13 (a) provides: “In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant, at the time he committed the proscribed act or acts, lacked substantial capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect, either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his conduct within the requirements of the law.”
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Brown, 16 F.3d 222 (7th Cir. 1994) (under Minnesota law, conviction for criminal recklessness constituted criminal conduct for purposes of criminal conduct exclusion); American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. White, 204 Ariz. 500, 504, 65 P.3d 449 (2003) (conviction for reckless assault constituted violation of criminal law for purposes of criminal conduct exclusion); 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Schurtz, 92 Cal. App. 4th 1188, 1192-96, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547 (2001) (conviction for assault with firearm constituted criminal conduct for purposes of criminal conduct exclusion); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Juniel, 931 P.2d 511 (Colo. App. 1996) (conviction for second degree felony assault and misdemeanor menacing constituted criminal conduct for purposes of criminal conduct exclusion when conduct was reckless); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sowers, 97 Or. App. 658, 661, 776 P.2d 1322 (1989) (conviction for resisting arrest constituted criminal conduct for purposes of criminal conduct exclusion).
The policy provides: “We do not cover any bodily injury which results in any manner from the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of vapors, fumes, acids, toxic chemicals, toxic gasses, toxic liquids, toxic solids, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants.
“We do cover bodily injury which results from such discharge if the discharge is sudden and accidental.”
The medical examiner analyzed the blood of both children for the presence of carbon monoxide. The carboxyhemoglobin saturation of the blood was 28.9 percent for Jonah S. and 18.6 percent for Jennifer S. Nothing in the medical examiner’s reports indicates that carbon monoxide poisoning caused their deaths.
The plaintiff represented to this court at oral argument that it had argued to the trial court that the children’s injuries had been caused by carbon monoxide. Our review of the record reveals that, to the contrary, the plaintiff argued in its brief on the motion for summary judgment that the children
Our research has revealed that a number of courts have concluded that carbon monoxide emissions in residential buildings are not pollutants within the meaning of the pollution exclusion clause. See Thompson v. Temple, 580 So. 2d 1133, 1134-35 (La. App. 1991) (because pollution exclusion clause was intended to exclude coverage for active industrial polluters, genuine issue existed as to whether exclusion covered tenant’s injury from carbon monoxide emitted by negligently maintained bathroom heater); see also Kenyon v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 163 Misc. 2d 991, 996-98, 626 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1993) (pollution exclusion clause was intended to ensure that polluters bear cost of wrongdoing and did not cover injury to condominium resident by release of carbon monoxide from improperly installed water heater), affd, 206 App. Div. 2d 980, 616 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1994), appeal denied, 84 N.Y.2d 813, 647 N.E.2d 453, 623 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1995). The courts in these cases reasoned that pollution exclusion clauses primarily were intended to protect insurance companies from liability for costs to remediate environmental damage from active industrial pollution. Courts have also considered the application of the pollution exclusion to injuries caused by other substances found in residential settings. See Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co. v. Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495, 498-501 (Minn. App. 1988) (because qualified pollution exclusion was intended to exclude coverage for polluters who “knew or should have known their actions would cause harm” and because
“Absolute” pollution exclusion clauses do not contain an exception for sudden and accidental discharges. “Qualified” pollution exclusion clauses, such as the one at issue in this case, do contain such an exception. See Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 126-27, modified on other grounds, 782 So. 2d 573 (La. 2002); see also id., 140 n.6 (Victory, J., dissenting).