2020 Ohio 3233
Ohio Ct. App.2020Background
- In Jan. 2017 Roy Ewing was convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence (R.C. 2919.25(A)); that conviction qualifies as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" under federal law (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9)), creating a federal firearms disability.
- On Feb. 5, 2019 Ewing applied under Ohio Rev. Code §2923.14 to the Warren C.P. to be relieved of his firearms disability; Judge Robert Peeler held a hearing and granted relief under R.C. 2923.14(D).
- Victim Jamie Suwalski, invoking Marsy’s Law (Ohio Const. Art. I, §10a), petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Peeler from removing the federal firearms disability.
- Federal law provides only four avenues to remove a 922(g)(9) disability: set aside the conviction, expungement, pardon, or full restoration of civil rights; Ewing had none of these postconviction remedies.
- R.C. 2923.14(D)(3) permits relief only if the applicant “is not otherwise prohibited by law from acquiring, having, or using firearms”; because Ewing remained federally prohibited, the court concluded the trial judge lacked authority to grant relief under state law.
- The Court of Appeals granted the writ of prohibition, holding Judge Peeler had no power under Ohio law to relieve Ewing of the federal 922(g)(9) firearms disability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to seek writ under Marsy’s Law | Suwalski: Marsy’s Law (Art. I, §10a(B)) lets a victim petition the court of appeals when victims’ rights are implicated. | Judge/Ewing: (implicitly) victim lacks equivalent rights of a party who appealed or intervened below. | Court: Suwalski has standing under Marsy’s Law to petition for prohibition. |
| Whether R.C. 2923.14 authorizes a state judge to relieve a person of a federal 922(g)(9) disability | Ewing/Judge Peeler: R.C. 2923.14 procedures allow state courts to restore firearms rights and therefore can operate to remove federal disabilities. | Suwalski: Federal statutory scheme (922(g)(9) plus 921(a)(33) definitions) means relief only via the four federal mechanisms; state judge cannot override federal prohibition when applicant remains "otherwise prohibited by law." | Court: R.C. 2923.14(D)(3) conditions relief on not being otherwise prohibited by law; because Ewing remains federally prohibited, the state judge lacked authority to grant relief from the federal 922(g)(9) disability. |
| Effect of 2011 H.B. 54 uncodified language (legislative intent) | Ewing: Legislature intended §2923.14 to apply retroactively and to restore civil firearm rights vis‑à‑vis federal bans (cites uncodified section referencing Caron). | Suwalski: Uncodified language addresses 922(g)(1) and Caron; it does not purport to alter federal statutory bars for 922(g)(9) matters. | Court: The uncodified language applies to 922(g)(1) contexts, not to 922(g)(9); it does not authorize relief from 922(g)(9) federal prohibitions. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009) (Congress extended federal firearms prohibition to misdemeanor domestic‑violence convictions).
- Stimmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198 (6th Cir. 2018) (identifies four mechanisms to relieve a 922(g)(9) disability).
- United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013) (a misdemeanor domestic‑violence conviction does not necessarily strip a person of civil rights).
- United States v. Bridges, 696 F.3d 474 (6th Cir. 2012) ("civil rights restored" in 921(a)(33) excludes persons whose civil rights were never removed).
- Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23 (2007) (interpretation of "civil rights" restoration in federal firearms context).
- Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308 (1998) (discussed by Ohio legislature in uncodified notes regarding effect of state restoration on federal firearms bans).