State Ex Rel. KCP & L Greater Missouri Operations Co. v. Cook
2011 Mo. App. LEXIS 1161
| Mo. Ct. App. | 2011Background
- Relator KCP & L seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent Respondent Judge Cook from acting other than granting summary judgment in Gunter v. KCP & L, et al.
- Gunter alleges asbestos exposure at KCP & L caused mesothelioma, asserting premises liability and negligence theories against KCP & L and other defendants who were dismissed.
- KCP & L argues Gunter’s claims are exclusively remedied by workers’ compensation under §287.120 because they arise from an accident.
- Gunter contends post-2005 amendments carve occupational-disease claims out of §287.120’s exclusivity, so common-law remedies remain viable.
- Court holds that Gunter’s occupational-disease claims do not arise from an “accident” as defined in §287.020.2, hence §287.120 exclusivity does not apply.
- Under MARA, the definitions of accident and injury are narrowed or separated from occupational-disease standards; the 2005 amendments further support a separate regime for occupational diseases.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §287.120 exclusivity applies to Gunter’s occupational-disease claims | Gunter—Gunter claims not subject to exclusive remedy since disease not arising from accident | KCP & L—exclusivity applies if injury is an accident under §287.020.2 | No, exclusivity does not apply to occupational-disease claims. |
| Do the 2005 amendments require narrowing or eliminating occupational-disease claims from the Act’s scope | MARA and pre-2005 liberal construction support broader scope | Statute’s plain language and strict construction limit exclusive remedy to accidents | Occupational-disease claims remain within the Act’s scope; exclusivity not triggered. |
| Is the circuit court the proper forum for initial determination of these claims | Circuit court should decide causation and negligence | Division/LIRC should adjudicate workers’ compensation issues | Claims are committed to initial determination of the Commission/Division; circuit court should not grant summary judgment. |
| Does the relationship/employee status affect the exclusivity analysis | Gunter’s claim arises from employer’s workplace exposure | Existence of employer-employee relationship is necessary for exclusivity | Employer-employee status and exclusivity do not salvage §287.120 here because no accident is involved. |
Key Cases Cited
- Missouri Alliance for Retired Americans v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. Relations, 277 S.W.3d 670 (Mo. banc 2009) (defines accident vs. injury; MARA v. DOLIR interprets exclusivity scope)
- Staples v. A.P. Green Fire Brick Co., 307 S.W.2d 457 (Mo. banc 1957) (pre-2005 liberal construction of accident to include occupational disease)
- Robinson v. Hooker, 323 S.W.3d 418 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (strict construction applies to §287.120 and term usages)
- McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 298 S.W.3d 473 (Mo. banc 2009) (exclusive jurisdiction framework; primary forum analysis)
- State ex rel. Unnerstall v. Berkemeyer, 298 S.W.3d 513 (Mo. banc 2009) (statutory interpretation principles; strict construction)