2018 Ohio 3460
Ohio Ct. App.2018Background
- Bolivar Village Council held a special meeting May 19, 2014 about pending litigation with Lake Region Development; the published notice said Council would discuss the settlement in executive session and take action in public.
- At the meeting the mayor and a village attorney announced Council would enter executive session to discuss pending litigation; a motion was made and a roll-call vote taken, but the motion itself did not state the statutory reason for the executive session.
- The public (including relator Irvin Huth and his counsel) protested and were disruptive before executive session; all non-attorneys left for the executive session; after it ended the public was allowed to comment and Council passed Ordinance O-94-2014 adopting the settlement as an emergency (5–1 vote).
- Huth sued in mandamus and for injunction alleging multiple Open Meetings Act (R.C. 121.22) violations: improper executive-session procedure, discussing whether to allow public comment in executive session, admission of certain exhibits, and invalidity of the ordinance.
- After a bench trial the trial court ruled for the Village; Huth appealed contesting evidentiary rulings and that Council violated R.C. 121.22 (G),(H) and (F) requirements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of exhibits (2a/2b) | Trial court wrongly excluded statements about what occurred in executive session as privileged and thus admissible | Statements are protected by executive-session/attorney-client privilege and properly excluded | Affirmed exclusion; issue treated as moot given merits disposition |
| Whether Council properly stated purpose for executive session under R.C. 121.22(G) | Council violated statute because motion/vote did not state the statutory purpose | Notice and pre-motion announcements informed the public that executive session would address pending litigation | No abuse of discretion — substantial compliance found; public was adequately informed |
| Whether discussing whether to allow "Public Speaks" in executive session violated R.C. 121.22(H) (formal action rule) | Any deliberation about permitting public comment was an impermissible secret deliberation/formal action | Deciding whether to allow public comment is administrative, not a formal resolution/rule; not a prohibited deliberation | Court found no OMA violation; not a formal action under R.C. 121.22(H) |
| Whether settlement offer discussion in executive session was permitted under R.C. 121.22(G)(3) | Settlement discussion was not a proper subject for executive session (or was effectively a zoning topic) and thus illegal | Conferences with the village's attorney about pending litigation — including settlement strategy — fall under (G)(3); action was later adopted in open session | Court held settlement discussion fit (G)(3); permissible since final action was taken publicly |
| Validity of Ordinance No. O-94-2014 adopting settlement | Ordinance is invalid because it resulted from deliberations not open to the public | Ordinance was adopted in open session after permitted executive-session deliberations about litigation | Ordinance upheld — no OMA violation found |
Key Cases Cited
- Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (Ohio 1983) (abuse-of-discretion standard explained)
- L.J. Smith, Inc. v. Harrison Cty. Bd. of Revision, 140 Ohio St.3d 114 (Ohio 2014) (presumption of regularity for official actions)
- Cincinnati Enquirer v. Cincinnati Bd. of Edn., 192 Ohio App.3d 566 (Ohio Ct. App.) (purpose of OMA and prohibition on secret deliberations)
- State ex rel. Kinsley v. Berea Bd. of Edn., 64 Ohio App.3d 659 (Ohio Ct. App.) (settlement agreements and disclosure under OMA/public-records principles)
- State ex rel. Findlay Publ'g Co. v. Hancock Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 80 Ohio St.3d 134 (Ohio 1997) (treatment of settlement-related disclosure and executive-session limits)