State ex rel. Greufe v. Davis
2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 1045
| Mo. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- June 9, 2008: 165 identifiable images of child pornography (33 series) were recovered from Nathan Greufe’s computer; one victim was identifiable (born Jan 23, 1990).
- August 9, 2011: State charged Greufe with one count of possession of child pornography (class D felony under § 573.037).
- Greufe moved to dismiss as time‑barred under the general three‑year statute of limitations (§ 556.036.2(1)); trial court denied the motion.
- Greufe sought a writ of prohibition in the appellate court; a preliminary writ was granted and later made permanent.
- The court’s legal question: whether possession of child pornography is an ‘‘unlawful sexual offense involving a person eighteen years of age or under’’ so that the 30‑year statute (§ 556.037) applies, or whether the general three‑year limitation governs.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether possession of child pornography is an ‘‘unlawful sexual offense’’ for purposes of the 30‑year limitation (§ 556.037) | Greufe: No; possession is a separate offense subject to the general 3‑year limitation (§ 556.036) | State: Yes; possession involves sexual exploitation of minors and should fall under the 30‑year rule (§ 556.037) | Held: No; possession is not a ‘‘sexual offense’’ under § 556.037, so the 3‑year statute applies and the charge is time‑barred. |
| Whether sexual‑offender registration for possession means the offense is a ‘‘sexual offense’’ for limitations purposes | Greufe: Registration requirement does not alter the nature of the offense | State: Registration indicates the offense is sexual in nature and supports 30‑year rule | Held: Registration status alone does not make possession a ‘‘sexual offense’’ for § 556.037. |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Holzum v. 342 S.W.3d 313 (Mo. banc) (writ of prohibition appropriate to prevent prosecution barred by statute of limitations)
- State v. Rains, 49 S.W.3d 828 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D.) (knowledge of sexual abuse is not equivalent to committing a sexual offense for limitations purposes)
- State v. Hyman, 37 S.W.3d 384 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D.) (related offenses retain separate identities for statute of limitations analysis)
- State v. Naasz, 142 S.W.3d 869 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D.) (statute‑by‑its‑terms test: non‑chapter‑566 offenses qualify as ‘‘sexual offenses’’ only if the statute’s conduct is by its own terms sexual)
- United States v. Coutentos, 651 F.3d 809 (8th Cir.) (distinguishing possession from production of child pornography when assessing sexual‑offense analogies)