State ex rel. DeWine v. Burge, 948 N.E.2d 954

Nancy Smith and Joseph Allen were convicted in 1994 of multiple sex offenses and sentenced; Baker held that Crim.R. 32(C) requires a judgment to set forth plea, verdict, or findings and sentence; the 2009 proceeding sought resentencing or correction for lack of manner of conviction.
Following Baker, the trial court vacated acquittals and released Smith and Allen rather than resentencing, prompting complaints for writs of prohibition to compel correction and return to prison.
The Ninth District dismissed the prohibition as to Smith but granted it as to Allen; DeWine v. Burge (state) reversed in part, directing correction to comply with Crim.R. 32(C).
This Court initially granted a writ of prohibition directing Burge to vacate the acquittal and issue a corrected sentencing entry, based on Baker’s reasoning that the judgment lacked the manner of conviction.
The dissent argues that the 1994 judgment complied with Crim.R. 32(C) and was a final appealable order, making the writ improper; reconsideration is urged to withdraw or narrow the Baker-based interpretation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Crim.R. 32(C) requires the manner of conviction as a finality trigger	Smith (plaintiff) contends Baker’s manner-of-conviction requirement is a Crim.R. 32(C) mandate.	Burge (defendant) and state contend Baker’s language governs finality and requires a corrected entry.	Crim.R. 32(C) requires the plea, verdict, findings, and sentence, not the manner of conviction.
Whether the 1994 judgment of conviction complied with Crim.R. 32(C) and was a final appealable order	The 1994 judgment complied and was final; the acquittal was unlawful.	The judgment did not comply under Baker and thus required correction.	The 1994 judgment complied; finality existed; the acquittal was improper to disturb.
Proper remedy for Crim.R. 32(C) errors and jurisdiction to grant acquittal relief	Remedy may include corrected journal entry or resentencing; jurisdiction to grant acquittal could be maintained.	Remedy should correct journal entry; double jeopardy concerns limit review of acquittals.	Remedy and jurisdiction depend on whether the original order was final; the court’s approach hinges on Baker’s surplusage.
Double jeopardy concerns regarding disturbing an acquittal	Ross and Bistricky limit review of acquittals; double jeopardy bars retrial after acquittal.	Reconsideration may remedy Crim.R. 32(C) defects without violating double jeopardy.	Double jeopardy principles protect against disturbing an acquittal; reconsideration must be carefully limited.

State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197 (2008-Ohio-3330) (held finality requires specific elements; phrases about manner of conviction are not Crim.R. 32(C) requirements)
State ex rel. DeWine v. Burge, 128 Ohio St.3d 236 (2011-Ohio-235) (limited jurisdiction to correct judgment; delineates finality and Crim.R. 32(C) corrections)
State v. Poindexter, 36 Ohio St.3d 1 (1988) (conviction includes guilt and sentence; informs finality)
State v. Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319 (2010-Ohio-2) (definition of conviction includes guilt and penalty)
State v. Tuomala, 104 Ohio St.3d 93 (2004-Ohio-6239) (explains when no judgment of conviction is entered ( insanity))