Starling v. Lake Meade Property Owners Ass'n
2017 Pa. LEXIS 1209
| Pa. | 2017Background
- Lake Meade is a large planned subdivision with a recorded 1967 Plan; LMI (developer) conveyed lots 725–726 to predecessors and in 1968 deeded “all those roads, the dam, lake and basin, and [enumerated lots]” to the homeowners association (Association). The 1968 deed did not expressly mention the narrow shoreline strips west and north of Custer Drive (the “Disputed Property”).
- Custer Drive is a platted road that runs to a cul-de-sac at the tip of a peninsula; the Plan shows points of tangency between the cul-de-sac and the waterline but lacks metes-and-bounds for Lot 726’s northern boundary.
- The Starlings bought Lots 725–726 (the Starling Tract) and allege repeated unauthorized recreational use, littering, and parking on Custer Drive and the Disputed Property beginning after they built their home.
- The Starlings sued asserting trespass, ejectment, declaratory relief (ownership/boundaries), nuisance, and injunctive relief to bar non‑vehicular or non‑residential use; the Association moved for partial summary judgment claiming fee title to Custer Drive and permissive recreational use of the undesignated strip.
- Trial court granted summary judgment to the Association: held the Association took fee simple title to Custer Drive in the 1968 deed (subject to owners’ access easements), and interpreted the Plan to bound Lot 726 at the depicted tangency point, so the Starlings did not own the Disputed Property; the court also held undesignated shoreline could be used lawfully for recreation.
- The Superior Court reversed in part: it concluded LMI had not retained fee title to roads vis‑à‑vis purchasers (so Association had only an easement), found the Plan ambiguous as to Lot 726’s wraparound boundary, and directed injunctive relief limiting Custer Drive to ingress/egress; this Court granted review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Association holds fee simple title to Custer Drive or only an easement | Starlings: if Association lacks fee, then underlying fee may belong to lot owners (including Starlings) subject to access easements | Association: 1968 deed conveyed roads in fee; grantor LMI intended to pass fee simple title unless limited | Court held Association holds fee simple to Custer Drive (subject to owners’ access easements); Superior Court erred reversing trial court |
| Whether Plan is ambiguous re: Lot 726 wrapping around cul‑de‑sac (ownership of Disputed Property) | Starlings: Plan ambiguous; parol evidence and later surveys/tax treatment create triable fact that Lot 726 (or Starling tract) includes Disputed Property | Association: Plan depicts tangency to waterline as Lot 726 boundary; no metes extend across Custer Drive; parol evidence irrelevant to LMI’s intent at recordation | Court held Plan should be read reasonably to treat the depicted tangency point as Lot 726’s boundary; Starlings do not own Disputed Property; Superior Court erred in finding triable issue |
| Whether extrinsic/parol evidence can vary boundaries on a recorded subdivision plan | Starlings: extrinsic evidence (Cookson decree, surveys, tax maps, post‑plan conduct) supports different boundary | Association: parol evidence after recordation cannot alter LMI’s contemporaneous intent; must show pre‑existing evidence of mistake/fraud to vary plan | Court held extrinsic evidence post‑dating plan generally inadmissible to alter plan boundaries; only evidence of developer’s contemporaneous intent may be considered |
| Whether Association may permit recreational/non‑vehicular uses of Custer Drive and Disputed Property under covenants/UPCA | Starlings: covenants limit non‑residential uses and restrict Custer Drive to vehicular travel; Association’s use and events exceed permissible scope | Association: covenants don’t confine road to vehicular travel; Plan’s stated primary purpose is outdoor recreation; UPCA authorizes regulation/use of common elements | Court held Association may use Custer Drive for non‑interfering purposes consistent with fee ownership subject to easements; on Disputed Property the question of permissible use remanded for further proceedings (trial court may reconsider in light of holdings) |
Key Cases Cited
- Miles Land Co. v. Hudson Coal Co., 91 A. 1061 (Pa. 1914) (distinguishes meaning of deed, construction of boundaries, and factual locating of boundary)
- Gilbert v. Synagro Cent., LLC, 131 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2015) (summary judgment standard and view record in favor of nonmoving party)
- Kao v. Haldeman, 728 A.2d 345 (Pa. 1999) (purchasers under a recorded subdivision plan acquire an easement of access in platted streets)
- Minard Run Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Co., 214 A.2d 234 (Pa. 1965) (owner of servient tenement may use land so long as it does not interfere with easement)
- Pocono Manor Ass’n v. Allen, 12 A.2d 32 (Pa. 1940) (interpretation of subdivision plan and deed restrictions to avoid absurd results)
- Allen v. Scheib, 101 A. 102 (Pa. 1917) (private road language typically indicates easement, scope of use tied to original purpose)
- Soffer v. Beech, 409 A.2d 337 (Pa. 1979) (ejectment requires right to possession)