OPINION OF THE COURT
This is an appeal by allowance from an 'order of Superior Court which affirmed an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County denying, in part, injunctive relief sought by the appellants, Dr. Chi-Chien Kao and his wife Dr. Te Hua Liu, Carol C. Snyder, and Terry Hummel. Appellants own an easement for a private road that serves their properties, and they seek to prevent a nearby property owner from trespassing thereon.
The easement, which is located in the Borough of Langhorne, is known as West Watson Avenue. See map, infra. The width of the easement is forty feet, but the portion that has been paved with gravel or blacktop for use as a road is much more narrow, ranging from eleven to slightly more than sixteen feet. There are points where the road is barely wide enough for two cars to pass; hence, drivers must proceed very carefully, and, at certain points, a driver might need to pull to the side and stop to let another pass. The road incorporates a small bridge over a creek at the border of the Snyder and Kao/Liu properties. Appellants own residential properties along the northern edge of the easement. Blaze Enterprises, Inc. (Blaze) shares ownership of the easement and owns undeveloped land that borders its southern edge. The owners of property at the eastern end of the easement, Scott and Judith Haldeman, have been using the easement for access to their residence.
Haldemans’ use of the easement is one of preference, not necessity, inasmuch as they have access to their property from a public street, Maple Avenue. They have no ownership interest in West Watson Avenue and have not been granted a license for its use. Appellants initiated this action to enjoin that use, and to recover damages for deterioration caused to the easement. Blaze has remained neutral in this matter, neither objecting to Haldemans’ use nor granting permission therefor.
Because the paved portion of the easement extends past the Hummel and Snyder properties and terminates midway in front of the Kao/Liu property, the remaining length of the easement from that point to the Halde-man border has been maintained in grass and shrubbery. Appellants claim that Haldemans have driven over the grass and
The properties owned by appellants and Blaze were part of a common subdivision plan, created in 1919, that encompassed West Watson Avenue. Haldemans’ property was not a part of that subdivision. It was, in fact, acquired from a different grantor. Haldemans did not, therefore, acquire an easement by implication. See Sentz v. Crabbs,
In the present case, the trial court denied appellants’ request for a permanent injunction to prevent Haldemans from using West Watson Avenue, and, likewise, denied their claim for damages. The court did, however, enjoin Haldemans from using the northern half of the road, i.e., the side in which appellants have fee ownership to the center line, thus leaving Haldemans free to drive on the southern half. An appeal was taken, and Superior Court affirmed.
We granted allowance of appeal as to the limited issue of whether an easement holder has a right to enjoin a trespasser from using the easement. On the basis that the courts below too narrowly construed appellants’ right to exclude trespassers from their easement, we reverse.
It has long been recognized that intrusions upon private easements may be enjoined. Mershon v. Walker,
An easement for a private road is private property that can be protected through appropriate legal process. Chambersburg Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Cumberland Valley R.R. Co.,
Appellants and Blaze are the only owners of property to which the easement' for West Watson Road is appurtenant.
We have uniformly held that where an owner of land subdivides it into lots and streets on a plan and sells his lots accordingly, there is an implied grant or covenant to the purchaser that the street shall be forever open to the use of the public and operates as a dedication of them to public use_ Prior to the Act of 1889 no limitation of time was imposed on the public for perfecting the dedication by their acceptance; [In re Widening of] State Road,236 Pa. 141 , 144,84 A. 686 . The Act fixed a time limit within which an acceptance by the public must take place....
... The enactment is actually a statute of limitation applicable to any and all seeking to assert the public character of a street, be they municipal authorities or the individual lot owners. In Scott v. Donora Southern Railroad Company,222 Pa. 634 , 642,72 A. 282 , this Court said in discussing the Act: “... After the statutory period, therefore, if no action has been taken to subject the street to public use, the servitude imposed by the owner upon his land for such use is removed, and the street is of no force or effect as a public highway. The land is discharged from such servitude and the dedicated portion of it has entirely lost its character as a public street.” (Emphasis supplied).
Haldemans contend, however, that trespassers cannot be excluded unless they have interfered with the rights of passage of the easement holders. We do not agree. Halde-mans’ view essentially deems private roads to be public roads, subject only to the requirement that the public not interfere with use by the private owners. This largely negates the failure of public bodies to have accepted dedications to public use, and runs contrary to the dictates of Rahn v. Hess, supra. Private roads, quite simply, are not dedicated to public use; hence, they are not to be burdened with such use, and inquiry into whether there has been an actual interference with the owners’ rights of passage is not required.
Where an easement is concerned, therefore, the owners of the dominant and servient estates must not unreasonably interfere with each other’s uses. Taylor v. Heffner,
Haldemans also assert that the only party with standing to object to a trespasser’s use of the easement is the owner of the fee that underlies the easement; hence, that only Blaze can challenge the use of the southern half of West Watson Avenue. We do not agree. The courts below erred in treating appellants’ property interests as though they were confined to the northern side of the easement. Appellants share in the entire width of the easement, not merely the portion between the center line of the road and their individual lots. Their full interests in the easement can be protected against unauthorized intrusions. As owners of the easement for West Watson Avenue, appellants are entitled to obtain injunctive relief to prevent trespasses thereon. We reverse, therefore, and remand to the court of common pleas for entry of appropriate injunctive relief.
Order reversed, and case remanded.
Justice ZAPPALA concurs in the result.
Justice NEWMAN notes her dissent.
Notes
. It is noted that Haldemans claim a property interest in West- Watson Avenue derived from, inter alia, the recorded subdivision plan, even though their property was not part of the subdivision. This argument was rejected by the trial court and is not within the hounds of the limited issue on which allocatur was granted, namely, whether easement holders can obtain injunctive relief to exclude trespassers.
. Haldemans state in their brief that they contemplate subdividing their property in a manner that will use West Watson Avenue as a route of access. This, quite obviously, would exacerbate the public intrusion on appellants’ private roadway. Even without the added traffic that such a subdivision might bring, Haldemans’ use of the road appears an inherent impediment to appellants’ use. Haldemans must, under the decisions of the courts below, use only the southern side of the road. This places them on the wrong side of the road when exiting from their property, so that they will meet oncoming traffic head on. Further, the record shows that die road is a narrow one, wide enough at certain points to permit cars to pass only if one stops or pulls off the roadway or slows to proceed with great care. The presence of such traffic on the easement is inherently detrimental to appellants’ use. Our decision, however, is based not on the existence of these impediments but rather on Haldemans’ complete lack of property rights in the easement.