Starkey v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections
2013 OK 43
| Okla. | 2013Background
- Starkey pled nolo contendere in Texas (Oct. 12, 1998) and received deferred adjudication for sexual assault of a minor; he moved to Oklahoma and was subject to Oklahoma SORA registration requirements.
- At sentencing Starkey’s registration exposure was understood to be ten years under the SORA provisions then in force; later statutory amendments increased registration durations and created a numeric level-assignment scheme (2007–2009), culminating in a DOC assignment of level 3 (lifetime) shortly before his 10-year expiration.
- Starkey petitioned a court (Aug. 2009) to override his level assignment and sought summary judgment arguing (1) deferred adjudication did not trigger SORA conviction-based requirements at sentencing, (2) retroactive application of later SORA amendments violated ex post facto protections, and (3) he was denied due process because level assignment occurred without opportunity to be heard.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Starkey, holding the newer SORA provisions did not apply retroactively and that Starkey should have been discharged after the original ten-year registration period.
- On appeal the Department defended retroactive application of SORA and argued level assignment and registration extensions are civil, regulatory measures (citing federal precedent) and do not violate due process or ex post facto prohibitions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2007–2009 level-assignment scheme applies retroactively to persons already subject to SORA | Starkey: level assignments should not apply retroactively; they were enacted after his sentencing and cannot increase his burdens | Department: level assignment applies and may be retroactive; level is based solely on offense and need not be individually reexamined | Court: level-assignment provisions are prospective only; DOC’s retroactive application violated the Oklahoma ex post facto prohibition |
| Whether the 2004 amendment (registration measured from completion of sentence) was intended to apply retroactively | Starkey: original 10‑year term governed; later amendments cannot lengthen his registration retroactively | Department: 2004 amendment governs registration period (effectively extending for deferred adjudications) | Court: Legislature necessarily implied the 2004 amendment applied retroactively, but retroactive application to Starkey violated the Oklahoma ex post facto clause |
| Whether retroactive application of SORA amendments (as applied to Starkey) violates the ex post facto clause | Starkey: retroactive increases in registration and lifetime level assignment are punitive and violate state ex post facto protections | Department: SORA is civil/regulatory (per Smith v. Doe and related authority); retroactive application does not punish | Court: applying Mendoza‑Martinez intent/effects test, majority found SORA’s retroactive extensions punitive (5 of 7 factors favor punitive effect) and therefore violative of Oklahoma’s ex post facto prohibition as applied to Starkey |
| Whether DOC’s level assignment procedure (without hearing) violated procedural due process | Starkey: assignment without hearing denies opportunity to contest level or show rehabilitation | Department: no hearing required because inclusion/level based on conviction/offense alone (citing Connecticut Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe) | Court: did not decide due process claim on merits because prospective-only holding for level assignments was dispositive; Starkey’s procedural due process claim left unaddressed |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (establishes the intent/effects framework for determining whether sex‑offender registration statutes are punitive for ex post facto purposes)
- Kennedy v. Mendoza‑Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (articulates multi‑factor test for determining whether a civil statute is punitive in effect)
- Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) (held registrants are not entitled to a pre‑inclusion hearing under federal due process where statute relies on conviction alone)
- Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008) (Alaska Supreme Court applying Mendoza‑Martinez concluded ASORA effects were punitive under that state constitution)
- Reimers v. State ex rel. Dept. of Corrections, 257 P.3d 416 (Okla. Civ. App. 2011) (Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals holding retroactive increases to registration periods are substantive and require clear legislative intent)
- Freeman v. Henry, 245 P.3d 1258 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010) (addressed retroactivity and SORA; relied on in lower courts and considered in trial court’s analysis)