Starbuck v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
102 F. Supp. 3d 1281
| M.D. Fla. | 2015Background
- Starbuck sued RJR and PM USA for smoking-related damages in an Engle progeny case; trial occurred in December 2014 with Phase 1 verdict in favor of the defendants on addiction.
- The court held a post-trial inquiry into juror conduct after the foreperson consulted dictionary definitions of addiction during deliberations.
- Starbuck moved for a new trial alleging juror misconduct, a verdict against the great weight of the evidence, and an improper jury instruction with a temporal addiction element.
- The court also addressed the defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, which was later denied as moot after granting in part Starbuck’s new-trial request.
- The court conducted extensive analysis under Rule 59 and Eleventh Circuit precedent, including deliberations on prejudice standards and Mayhue factors for dictionary-definition prejudiciality.
- The court granted a new trial on the ground that the verdict on addiction was against the great weight of the evidence but denied relief for juror misconduct and the temporal-addiction instruction as grounds for new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Juror exposure to dictionary definitions requires new trial | Starbuck argues dictionary definitions were extrinsic evidence prejudicially influencing the verdict. | RJR/PM argue no prejudice given curative steps and lack of effect on other jurors. | Denied; no new trial on this ground. |
| Verdict on addiction was against the great weight of the evidence | Starbuck claims overwhelming evidence showed nicotine addiction before 1996. | Defendants contend evidence supported no addiction; other witnesses undermined Starbuck’s claim. | Granted; new trial on this ground. |
| Temporal limitation added to addiction instruction caused confusion | Starbuck contends the time-bound addiction element misled jurors. | Defendants say the Engle class requires addiction before the cut-off date; no confusion. | Denied; no new trial on this ground. |
| Attorneys’ fees and costs | Denied as moot. |
Key Cases Cited
- BankAtlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 955 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir.1992) (juror extrinsic-evidence prejudice test; no automatic prejudice presumption in civil cases)
- United States v. Rowe, 906 F.2d 654 (11th Cir.1990) (extraneous information prejudice analysis; burden shifting to show harmlessness)
- Mayhue v. St. Francis Hospital of Wichita, Inc., 969 F.2d 919 (10th Cir.1992) (dictionary definitions; five factors for prejudice in civil cases)
- Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc., 267 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir.2001) (great weight of the evidence standard; court may grant new trial if weight favors movant)
- United States v. Honken, 381 F.Supp.2d 936 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (juror-misconduct inquiries and corrective procedures)
- Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014) (juror prejudicial information; Rule 606(b) limitations)