Stapp v. Curry County Board of County Commissioners
672 F. App'x 841
| 10th Cir. | 2016Background
- Carolyn Stapp, a booking officer at Curry County Detention Center, sued under the ADEA alleging age-based hostile work environment (HWE), constructive discharge, and retaliation after workplace comments and interpersonal hostility by younger coworkers.
- County had an anti-harassment policy, distributed to employees, designating a Personnel Coordinator (Carrie Wilhite) to receive and investigate complaints; Stapp acknowledged receipt and attended training.
- Stapp complained multiple times generally about hostility to Wilhite and Detention Center Administrator Tori Sandoval but did not reliably report age-based comments to the designated personnel coordinator or the County Manager.
- Stapp resigned March 26, 2012, claiming constructive discharge; she also experienced a two-month delay in a scheduled pay raise but presented no evidence tying the delay to age-based animus.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Curry County; the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding the County established the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense and that Stapp failed to show causation for retaliation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether County waived Ellerth/Faragher defense by not naming it in the answer | Stapp: County failed to plead the defense under Rule 8(c) so it should be barred | County: answer alleged the two elements (reasonable care and employee failure to use procedures), providing adequate notice | Held: No waiver — answer gave sufficient notice; hypertechnical labeling not required |
| Whether Ellerth/Faragher defense applies to ADEA HWE and constructive discharge claims | Stapp: defense inapplicable or inapposite to ADEA claims | County: defense applies as ADEA and Title VII harassment standards are harmonized and employer-liability standards are same | Held: Defense applies to ADEA HWE and constructive discharge claims |
| Whether Stapp suffered a tangible employment action preventing Ellerth/Faragher defense | Stapp: incidents (exclusion from duties, delayed raise, later-cited memorandum alleging abandonment/firing) constitute tangible actions | County: incidents were not significant changes in employment status; raise delay was administrative; firing argument waived | Held: No tangible employment action shown; firing argument waived for failure to raise earlier |
| Whether employer satisfied Ellerth/Faragher elements (reasonable care & employee unreasonably failed to use procedures) | Stapp: County’s policy and its non-investigation rendered defense inapplicable; she complained to supervisors so she used internal avenues | County: had valid policy, training, and designated investigator; Stapp did not report age-based harassment to the Personnel Coordinator or appeal to County Manager | Held: County met its burden (policy and training); Stapp unreasonably failed to report age-based claims to the designated official, so defense established |
| Whether Stapp established prima facie retaliation (causal link) | Stapp: hostility increased after her complaint to Sandoval; delayed raise and working conditions were materially adverse and retaliatory | County: complaints were not clearly protected (no mention of age to coordinator/Sandoval); no evidence tying raise delay or hostility to protected activity | Held: Stapp failed to show causation; complaints she made were not shown to be protected under the ADEA and no evidence connected adverse actions to protected activity |
Key Cases Cited
- Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004) (Ellerth/Faragher framework and availability for constructive discharge absent tangible employment action)
- Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (employer vicarious liability standard and affirmative defense elements)
- Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (employer liability and defense for hostile-work-environment claims)
- Wright-Simmons v. City of Oklahoma City, 155 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying Ellerth/Faragher principles beyond sexual-harassment context)
- Debord v. Mercy Health Sys. of Kan., Inc., 737 F.3d 642 (10th Cir. 2013) (elements of the Ellerth/Faragher defense and prevention/correction analysis)
- Thomas v. Berry Plastics Corp., 803 F.3d 510 (10th Cir. 2015) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Hinds v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 523 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2008) (ADEA retaliation prima facie elements and definition of protected opposition)
- MacKenzie v. City & Cty. of Denver, 414 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2005) (applying Title VII sexual-harassment standards to ADEA hostile-environment claims)
- Penry v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 155 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 1998) (standard for severe or pervasive hostile work environment)
- Fischer v. Forestwood Co., 525 F.3d 972 (10th Cir. 2008) (constructive discharge standard)