898 F.3d 952
9th Cir.2018Background
- Stanley Christie worked for Georgia-Pacific in Portland, injured his back at work in 1999 and underwent surgery in 2004; his back injury is undisputedly work-related.
- Georgia-Pacific reassigned him to lighter safety-inspection duties in 2006; Christie had difficulty performing some tasks due to physical limits.
- In December 2010 (age 56) Christie took early retirement to preserve an early-retirement option (18% pension reduction) because he believed he could not work until full retirement age.
- After retirement, Christie pursued conservative pain treatment and was declared at maximum medical improvement on November 2012; his treating physician opined he could not return to his regular job as of December 3, 2012.
- Christie filed for permanent total disability (PTD) benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act; the ALJ awarded PTD benefits effective December 3, 2012, but the Benefits Review Board reversed, relying on Board precedent that voluntary retirement negates loss of earning capacity.
- The Ninth Circuit granted review and reversed the Board, holding retirement status alone does not bar PTD benefits and upholding the ALJ’s factual findings that Christie reached maximum medical improvement, cannot return to prior employment, and that no suitable alternative work was shown.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether voluntary retirement precludes "disability" under 33 U.S.C. § 902(10) | Retirement does not negate disability; disability is incapacity caused by work injury to earn pre-injury wages | Retirement severed wage-earning loss from the injury, so no compensable loss of earning capacity | Retirement status alone is not dispositive; voluntary retirement does not automatically preclude disability under § 902(10) |
| Proper interpretation of § 902(10) — text controlling? | Plain text requires incapacity caused by injury; statute says nothing about retirement timing or voluntariness | Board precedent treats retirement as resulting in loss of earning capacity and so relevant | Court reads § 902(10) according to plain meaning; disagrees with Board's restrictive reading and follows textual approach |
| Whether Board correctly relied on its precedents (Moody I, Burson, Hoffman) | N/A (plaintiff distinguishes those as wrongly treating retirement as dispositive) | Board: its precedents establish that retirement unrelated to injury defeats a disability claim | Court rejects those precedents as misinterpreting § 902(10), finding Moody II persuasive and overruling Moody I’s approach in this circuit |
| Whether substantial evidence supports ALJ’s award of PTD benefits | ALJ’s medical findings (max. medical improvement and inability to work) and employer’s failure to show suitable alternate work support award | Employer contends Christie could have continued with accommodations / safety-inspector duties | ALJ’s factual findings upheld as supported by substantial evidence; employer failed to show suitable alternative employment; award reinstated |
Key Cases Cited
- Stevens v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 909 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1990) (defines "maximum medical improvement" for disability claims)
- General Construction Co. v. Castro, 401 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2005) (elements for permanent total disability under the Longshore Act)
- Stevedoring Services of America v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 297 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2002) (standard of review for Board factual findings and legal questions)
- Moody v. Huntington Ingalls Inc., 879 F.3d 96 (4th Cir. 2018) (rejected Board's rule that voluntary retirement alone bars disability under § 902(10))
- Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 449 U.S. 268 (1980) (describes the Act as a compromise between injured workers and employers)