879 F.3d 1177
D.C. Cir.2018Background
- The North Fork Rancheria (a federally recognized California tribe) sought Interior Department trust acquisition of a 305-acre site and authorization to operate a casino; Interior issued an IGRA determination and later took the land into trust.
- IGRA generally bars gaming on newly acquired trust land but permits an exception if the Department finds (1) the gaming is in the tribe’s best interest, (2) not detrimental to the surrounding community, and (3) the state governor concurs. California’s governor concurred.
- Opponents (Stand Up for California! and Picayune Rancheria) sued, challenging: (a) IRA authority to take land for the North Fork (arguing the tribe was not under federal jurisdiction in 1934 or lacks continuity), (b) the Department’s IGRA non-detriment finding and the governor’s concurrence, and (c) Clean Air Act conformity and procedural notice and modeling issues.
- The district court remanded the Air Act conformity determination for deficient notice (without vacatur), then granted summary judgment to the Department on most claims and dismissed others; plaintiffs appealed.
- The D.C. Circuit reviewed the administrative record de novo, applying arbitrary-and-capricious review and deference to agency interpretations of statutes and its own regulations where reasonable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Interior lacked IRA authority because North Fork was not a tribe under federal jurisdiction in 1934 | Stand Up: Section 18 election voters don’t prove a single tribe under federal jurisdiction in 1934 or connection to present tribe | Interior: IRA defines “tribe” to include “Indians residing on one reservation”; 1934 section 18 election + 1916 Rancheria purchase and Hardwick reinstatement show continuity | Held: Substantial evidence supports that North Fork was a tribe under federal jurisdiction in 1934 and is connected to the present tribe; IRA authority stands |
| Whether Interior’s IGRA non-detriment finding was arbitrary (effects, mitigation, and weight of comments, incl. Picayune competition) | Stand Up/Picayune: Department improperly balanced unmitigated harms vs. benefits, relied on non-binding NEPA mitigation/MOUs, and underweighted Picayune’s competitive harms | Interior: IGRA/regulations allow consideration of benefits and MOUs; MOUs and mitigation commitments were reasonably relied upon; Picayune is outside 25-mile "surrounding community" and its concerns were properly weighted | Held: Department reasonably considered benefits and MOUs, gave appropriate weight to commenters, and its non-detriment finding was supported by substantial evidence |
| Validity of governor’s concurrence under state law | Picayune: Governor’s concurrence invalid under California law | Interior: Concurrence was presented; Picayune failed to press this issue below and California is not a party | Held: Challenge forfeited and in any event barred because California not joined; concurrence not invalidated |
| Clean Air Act conformity: procedural notice and use of updated emissions model on remand | Stand Up: Department failed to notify all entitled entities before 2011 determination; on remand Department should have recalculated using the 2013 EMFAC model | Interior: District court ordered limited remand without vacatur; original 2011 determination complied with then-current modeling and remand was to cure notice only; reissuance was permissible | Held: Limited remand without vacatur was appropriate; Department’s reissuance was lawful and need not be re-done under the 2013 model because the final action occurred in 2011 |
Key Cases Cited
- Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (interpreting IRA’s definition of “Indian” as tribes under federal jurisdiction in 1934)
- District Hospital Partners, L.P. v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 46 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (standard of review for agency action under APA)
- Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Community of Oregon v. Jewell, 830 F.3d 552 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (deference to agency interpretations of its own regulations)
- Center for Auto Safety v. Federal Highway Administration, 956 F.2d 309 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (substantial evidence standard for administrative findings)
- Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281 (1974) (court may affirm if agency’s path can reasonably be discerned)
- FPL Energy Maine Hydro LLC v. FERC, 287 F.3d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (substantial evidence requires more than a scintilla)
- Amador County v. Salazar, 640 F.3d 373 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (California Rancheria Act and termination of federal trust relationship)
- Williams v. Gover, 490 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2007) (tribal power to define membership post-reinstatement)
- Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989) (NEPA does not create substantive mitigation obligations)
- Rural Cellular Association v. FCC, 588 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (deferential review of agency predictive judgments)
- Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (1994) (deference to agency interpretation of its own regulations)
- Sugar Cane Growers Co-operative of Florida v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (remand without vacatur equitable remedy analysis)
- Allied-Signal, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 988 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (agency need not redo entire rule on remand without vacatur)
- Sierra Club v. EPA, 762 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2014) (agency bound to follow guidelines in effect when it takes final action)