Stacy B. v. Robert S.
140 A.3d 1004
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- Plaintiff (for privacy, named generically) applied for a civil protective order under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-16a alleging stalking under § 53a-181d; trial court granted the order.
- Defendant, an attorney, had a prior personal relationship with plaintiff that soured after 2011; defendant sent numerous emails, voice messages, internet posts, and communications to third parties criticizing plaintiff’s professional and personal background.
- Defendant circulated a 2009 Boston ex parte abuse prevention order and an unpaid civil judgment, posted disparaging material on websites and Psychology Today, and contacted professional boards, potential clients, and the LAPD conference organizer.
- Plaintiff testified he feared for his safety and career, took protective steps (PO box, car registered in wife’s premarital name, hired internet firm to remove postings), and reported incidents to police.
- Trial court found the defendant’s conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for safety and that the defendant intended to damage plaintiff’s employment/career; it enjoined a broad range of contact and dissemination.
- On appeal defendant argued (1) his conduct was constitutionally protected speech, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support stalking; the appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendant preserved and presented a First Amendment claim such that appellate review is proper | Plaintiff argued protective order was justified by stalking evidence and record | Defendant argued his communications were constitutionally protected speech under the First Amendment and Conn. Const. | Court: claim not preserved/briefed under Golding; record inadequate for review; First Amendment claim declined. |
| Whether evidence was sufficient to support finding of stalking under § 53a-181d(b)(1) (fear for physical safety) | Plaintiff: defendant’s pattern of alarming contacts, including school warning, caused reasonable fear and precautions | Defendant: no evidence he was physically dangerous and isolated incident insufficient | Court: substantial evidence (testimony, emails, police warnings, conduct) supported reasonable fear; finding not clearly erroneous. |
| Whether evidence satisfied § 53a-181d(b)(2) (intent to threaten employment/business and prohibited means) | Plaintiff: defendant targeted plaintiff’s professional contacts, publications, and clients to impair career | Defendant: disputed that defendant contacted plaintiff’s place of employment, and argued some activity was protected speech | Court: plaintiff’s consulting, voluntary board roles and public fora qualified as employment/business; court found defendant contacted those venues and ignored warnings; sufficient evidence and independent basis under (b)(1) as well. |
| Whether alleged conduct constituted constitutionally protected activity so as to bar (b)(2) claim | Plaintiff: conduct was not protected because it was harassing, defamatory, and targeted to harm employment | Defendant: asserted speech protections (argued on appeal) | Court: defendant failed to brief/apply First Amendment standards to § 53a-181d; record inadequate; did not resolve on merits. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gleason v. Smolinski, 319 Conn. 394 (first amendment analyses for IIED and defamation in public‑concern contexts)
- State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 (criteria for appellate review of unpreserved constitutional claims)
- State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726 (Golding review may be permitted where appellant clearly demonstrates Golding requirements)
- Woodcock v. Journal Publishing Co., 230 Conn. 525 (First Amendment defamation/public‑official analysis)
- Knize v. Knize, 121 Conn. App. 787 (defamation/First Amendment standards for private individuals and matters of public concern)