Stacey Scott v. Larry Furrow and Keller Williams Legacy Group
04-15-00074-CV
| Tex. App. | Oct 1, 2015Background
- Stacey Scott purchased a Seguin, Texas house (1104 Peggy Lane) in 2006 after listing advertised the property as "waterfront" and the listing agent, Larry Furrow (Keller Williams Legacy Group), told her ownership of the waterfront lot was tied to the house.
- In 2007 Scott bought the adjacent vacant lot believing that purchase would secure exclusive ownership and control of the waterfront lot; she later placed her own lock on the gated waterfront access.
- In 2013 Scott learned (via seller's counsel and a subdivision plat shown at deposition) that the waterfront lot had been dedicated for common use by subdivision lot owners, contrary to Furrow’s representations; she filed suit the same year asserting DTPA, fraud (including nondisclosure), and negligent misrepresentation claims.
- Furrow and Keller Williams moved for traditional and no‑evidence summary judgment asserting, inter alia, limitations and lack of evidence; the trial court denied the no‑evidence motion but granted the traditional motion, holding Scott should have discovered title issues from public records (thus the discovery rule did not apply) and severed the claims.
- The trial court later granted defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees and entered a Final Judgment awarding defendants $70,179 plus conditional appellate fees; Scott appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether constructive notice in public property records defeats the discovery rule for Scott’s DTPA, fraud, and negligent‑misrepresentation claims | Scott: constructive notice of recorded title matters does not bar application of the discovery rule for DTPA/fraud/negligent‑misrepresentation claims (Ojeda de Toca line) | Defendants: title information was available in public records; Scott had constructive notice and thus limitations was not tolled | Trial court held constructive notice barred the discovery rule; appellant argues this ruling conflicts with controlling precedent and was erroneous |
| Whether other grounds in defendants’ summary‑judgment motion independently supported summary judgment | Scott: other factual record citations (deposition excerpts, emails) do not conclusively negate elements or establish notice as a matter of law | Defendants: deposition and email excerpts showed Scott was on notice or doubted her title, so limitations and merits fail | Trial court relied only on the public‑records/limitations ground; appellant contends the remaining grounds do not establish no genuine issue of material fact |
| Whether defendants (realtor and brokerage) could recover attorneys’ fees under the New Home Contract between Scott and the sellers | Scott: defendants were neither parties nor intended third‑party beneficiaries of the purchase contract, so they cannot enforce its attorney‑fees clause (Lesieur) | Defendants: as prevailing parties they are entitled to fees under Paragraph 17 of the contract | Appellant argues (and cites Lesieur) defendants were not parties or intended beneficiaries; trial court nevertheless awarded fees — appellant contends error |
| Whether attorneys’ fees under Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.50(c) are supported by required findings | Scott: statute requires an explicit judicial finding that the DTPA claim was groundless in fact or law, brought in bad faith, or for harassment | Defendants: they asserted Scott’s DTPA claim was groundless/brought in bad faith and sought fees under § 17.50(c) | Final Judgment awards fees but contains no express findings required by § 17.50(c); appellant contends absence of findings requires reversal |
Key Cases Cited
- Ojeda de Toca v. Wise, 748 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. 1988) (recorded‑title/constructive notice under property recordation statutes does not bar DTPA or fraud claims or replace discovery‑rule analysis)
- Lesieur v. Fryar, 325 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010) (nonparty realtors cannot enforce buyer‑seller contract attorney‑fee clause absent clear third‑party beneficiary status)
- Salinas v. Gary Pools, Inc., 31 S.W.3d 333 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000) (doctrine of constructive notice limited; public records generally do not start DTPA limitation running)
- Exxon Mobil Chemical Co. v. Ford, 235 S.W.3d 615 (Tex. 2007) (recordation/notice principles appropriately applied to title disputes; not controlling for DTPA/fraud claims outside title context)
- Ryland Group, Inc. v. Hood, 924 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. 1996) (standard that movant must establish each element of an affirmative defense on traditional summary judgment)