328 Conn. 198
Conn.
2018
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Background

  • Jean St. Juste pleaded guilty to second‑degree assault and possession of a sawed‑off shotgun in 2007; he later filed a habeas petition claiming ineffective assistance because counsel failed to advise him of immigration consequences under Padilla v. Kentucky.
  • After the habeas court denied relief and certified the appeal, St. Juste was deported to Haiti; the Appellate Court dismissed his habeas appeal as moot, reasoning an earlier unchallenged conviction for threatening in the second degree (§ 53a‑62(a)) independently barred reentry as a crime of moral turpitude (COMT).
  • The threatening statute (§ 53a‑62(a)) has three alternative subdivisions: (1) intentional physical threat causing fear of imminent serious physical injury; (2) intentional threat to commit a crime of violence with intent to terrorize; and (3) threat in reckless disregard of causing terror.
  • The central legal question became whether § 53a‑62(a) is divisible and, if so, whether the record shows which subdivision St. Juste pleaded to—because subdivisions (1) and (2) involve intent (generally COMT) while subdivision (3) involves recklessness (may not be COMT as a matter of law).
  • The Connecticut Supreme Court applied the Second Circuit’s categorical/modified categorical framework and concluded the statute is divisible, the record does not identify the subdivision of conviction, and therefore the Appellate Court erred in deeming the habeas appeal moot; the case was remanded for consideration of the merits.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether § 53a‑62(a) categorically constitutes a crime of moral turpitude St. Juste: statute is divisible; modified categorical approach applies and the record does not show he was convicted under an intentional‑mens‑rea subdivision, so COMT cannot be assumed Commissioner: all subdivisions involve conduct that qualifies as COMT; categorical analysis supports COMT Court: statute is divisible; categorical approach inappropriate because subdivision (3) (recklessness) may not be COMT
Whether modified categorical approach should be applied to § 53a‑62(a) St. Juste: yes—statute lists alternative elements so modern approach required to identify which alternative formed the conviction Commissioner: categorical approach suffices; if modified approach used, record supports an intentional subdivision Court: apply modified categorical approach because statute is divisible; record insufficient to identify subdivision
Whether reckless threatening (§ 53a‑62(a)(3)) is a crime of moral turpitude as a matter of law St. Juste: reckless threats lack the aggravating circumstances required by Second Circuit to establish COMT Commissioner: reckless threatening can be COMT depending on facts Court: under Second Circuit precedent, recklessness alone without aggravating circumstances does not categorically constitute COMT
Whether the habeas appeal is moot given the earlier threatening conviction St. Juste: not moot because record does not establish threatening conviction is COMT and therefore may not permanently bar reentry Commissioner: moot because threatening conviction independently bars reentry regardless of assault challenge Court: not moot—because it is unclear whether the threatening conviction is COMT, collateral consequences remain; Appellate Court erred in dismissing as moot

Key Cases Cited

  • Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (U.S. 2010) (counsel must advise about deportation consequences of a plea)
  • Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2001) (categorical analysis for COMT; statute that covers both COMT and non‑COMT acts requires divisibility inquiry)
  • Mendez v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 345 (2d Cir. 2008) (describes categorical and modified categorical approaches for COMT analysis)
  • Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (U.S. 2013) (limits and explains the modified categorical approach for divisible statutes)
  • Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2006) (definition of crime of moral turpitude per BIA and Second Circuit approach)
  • Gill v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 420 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2005) (recklessness may be COMT only with aggravating circumstances)
  • Avendano v. Holder, 770 F.3d 731 (8th Cir. 2014) (Eighth Circuit held a similar reckless‑threat statute was COMT; discussed but deemed less persuasive under Second Circuit law)
  • State v. Jerzy G., 326 Conn. 206 (Conn. 2017) (Connecticut precedent on collateral‑consequences doctrine in immigration context)
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