St. Jeor v. Kerr Corporation
353 P.3d 137
Utah2015Background
- In June 2007 Barbara St. Jeor (with her husband) sued multiple defendants, including Kerr, for asbestos-related claims; Kerr answered in August 2007.
- Mr. St. Jeor died in November 2007; St. Jeor filed a Suggestion of Death and then, on May 21, 2008, filed a Second Complaint (naming defendants by exhibit lists that included Kerr).
- On May 16, 2008, St. Jeor and Kerr stipulated to dismissal of Kerr without prejudice; five days later St. Jeor filed the Second Complaint.
- Within 120 days of filing the Second Complaint St. Jeor served several defendants but did not serve Kerr; she later served Kerr with the Fifth Amended Complaint on February 20, 2013 (nearly five years later).
- Kerr moved to dismiss again on multiple grounds (statutes of limitations, laches, untimely service). The district court found statutes of limitations did not bar the suit and that service complied with Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b); Kerr appealed the interlocutory denial of dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether service of process on Kerr was timely under Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b) | St. Jeor: Service was timely because at least one co-defendant was served within 120 days and other defendants may be served “at any time prior to trial.” | Kerr: Rule 4(b)’s "at any time prior to trial" should be limited by public policy and prior case law (Hunter) when delay follows dismissal events. | Court: Held service was timely—because at the time Kerr was served other timely-served defendants remained parties, Rule 4(b)(ii) applied literally. |
| Whether Hunter v. Sunrise Title limits application of Rule 4(b)(ii) here | St. Jeor: Hunter is distinguishable; Hunter involved dismissal of all served co-defendants, eliminating the predicate for Rule 4(b)(ii). | Kerr: Hunter supports restricting “at any time” where delay undermines fairness. | Court: Hunter limited to cases where all timely-served co-defendants were dismissed; not applicable here. |
| Whether court should rewrite/limit Rule 4(b) based on policy concerns | St. Jeor: Court must apply plain language of the rule. | Kerr: Public policy (fairness, statutes of limitations) should temper rule’s breadth. | Court: Declined to rewrite rule; applied plain text; referred Rule 4(b) to rules committee for policy review. |
| Whether laches bars the action based on delay in serving Kerr | St. Jeor: Not addressed as primary issue. | Kerr: Asserted laches as alternative equitable defense. | Court: Laches issue not properly before court on interlocutory appeal and was inadequately briefed; did not decide laches. |
Key Cases Cited
- Orvis v. Johnson, 177 P.3d 600 (Utah 2008) (standard of appellate review for legal conclusions)
- First Equity Federal, Inc. v. Phillips Dev., LLC, 52 P.3d 1137 (Utah 2002) (no deference for denial of motion to dismiss)
- Hunter v. Sunrise Title Co., 84 P.3d 1163 (Utah 2004) (Rule 4(b)(ii) no longer applies where all timely-served co-defendants were dismissed)
- Dipoma v. McPhie, 29 P.3d 1225 (Utah 2001) (courts must adhere to plain language of rules)
- Clark v. Archer, 242 P.3d 758 (Utah 2010) (interpretation ends when rule language is clear and unambiguous)
- Carter v. Lehi City, 269 P.3d 141 (Utah 2012) (litigants may rely on consistent constructions of rules)
- Houghton v. Department of Health, 125 P.3d 860 (Utah 2005) (scope of interlocutory review limited to issues presented)
- State v. Baker, 229 P.3d 650 (Utah 2010) (court reluctant to decide unsettled law without adversarial briefing)