St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 14

Background

In 1991 Michael D. St. Clair escaped an Oklahoma prison with Dennis Gene Reese; both participated in a series of car thefts, kidnappings and murders across multiple states, including the abduction and later death of Frank (Frances) Brady in Kentucky and the abduction and murder of Timothy Keeling in Colorado/New Mexico.
St. Clair faced parallel prosecutions: a Bullitt County murder case and a Hardin County capital-kidnapping case (charging kidnapping of Brady elevated to capital because the victim was not released alive). The prosecutions were tried separately after venue and joinder issues.
The Hardin County kidnapping charge was retried multiple times: a 2009 trial ended in mistrial after a prosecutor referenced the Keeling murder contrary to prior rulings; St. Clair was retried in 2012, convicted on kidnapping and related counts, and sentenced to death for kidnapping.
On appeal St. Clair raised 35 claims; the Kentucky Supreme Court reviewed double-jeopardy and numerous evidentiary questions under heightened scrutiny applicable to death-penalty cases.
The Court upheld retrial (no double-jeopardy bar) but found prejudicial evidentiary error in admitting evidence of Keeling’s murder and in allowing Keeling’s widow to testify about his life; those errors were not harmless and required reversal and remand for new trial.

Issues

Issue	St. Clair's Argument	Commonwealth's Argument	Held
Whether retrial was barred by double jeopardy after mistrial allegedly prompted by prosecutorial remarks	Prosecutor intentionally provoked mistrial, so double jeopardy bars retrial	Remarks were inadvertent/misremembered; prosecutors lacked intent to provoke mistrial	No double jeopardy bar — no clear evidence prosecutor intended to provoke mistrial (Oregon v. Kennedy standard)
Admissibility of evidence that Brady was murdered (vs. merely "not released alive") in kidnapping guilt phase	Murder evidence irrelevant to kidnapping elements and unduly prejudicial	Manner/circumstances of death provide necessary context to show death occurred during kidnapping; res gestae and KRE 404(b)(2) allow contextual proof	Admission of evidence about Brady’s murder was permissible as context and not unduly prejudicial in guilt phase
Admissibility of evidence of Keeling’s abduction and Keeling’s murder (uncharged, out-of-state)	Both abduction and murder evidence highly prejudicial and irrelevant to Hardin kidnapping; murder evidence improperly used to show propensity/identity	Abduction evidence showed modus operandi/identity (same gun/handcuffs/target trucks); some Keeling evidence admissible under KRE 404(b) but murder details probative for identity	Abduction/modus operandi evidence admissible; evidence of Keeling’s murder (and related inflammatory details) was improperly admitted — probative value low and undue prejudice high; requires reversal
Admissibility of testimony from Keeling’s widow about his life (guilt phase)	Testimony was victim-background/victim-impact for a crime not on trial — irrelevant and inflammatory	Argued as victim-background or relevant contextual testimony	Testimony inadmissible: widow was not a victim of the charged Kentucky offense; her life-impact evidence was irrelevant in guilt phase and prejudicial
Use of prior testimony referencing LWOP to impeach St. Clair (re: motive for shooting trooper)	References to LWOP irrelevant and overly prejudicial	Prior statements showed motive and were admissions or proper prior inconsistent statements; relevant to attempted-murder charge	Admission was proper: impeaching prior statements and admissions were relevant to motive and not unduly prejudicial
Exclusion of evidence that Reese (alternative perpetrator) killed Kathy Burns-Emerson (reverse 404(b))	Evidence would show Reese’s pattern and support alternative-perpetrator defense; admissible under lower similarity standard for reverse 404(b)	Burns-Emerson killing too dissimilar in method/context to show Reese committed Brady killing; admissibility discretionary	Exclusion proper: dissimilarities outweighed probative value; trial court did not abuse discretion (some impeachment inquiry later allowed but extrinsic evidence properly excluded)

Key Cases Cited

St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.3d 597 (Ky. 2014) (discussing victim-impact and evidentiary limits in related Bullitt County matter)
St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 174 S.W.3d 474 (Ky. 2005) (Hardin) (prior appeal addressing issues in kidnapping prosecution)
St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 140 S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2004) (Bullitt I) (admissibility of prior crimes in murder prosecution)
St. Clair v. Roark, 10 S.W.3d 482 (Ky. 1999) (holding death elevates kidnapping to capital when victim not released alive; murder not required element)
Meece v. Commonwealth, 348 S.W.3d 627 (Ky. 2011) (death penalty cases require expansive review)
Sanders v. Commonwealth, 801 S.W.2d 665 (Ky. 1990) (review of unpreserved errors in capital cases)
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982) (double-jeopardy bar applies only where prosecutor intended to provoke mistrial)
United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976) (defendant-initiated mistrial generally permits retrial)
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) (harmless-error/grave-doubt standard)
Webb v. Commonwealth, 387 S.W.3d 319 (Ky. 2012) (res gestae/context exceptions to KRE 404(b))
Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1994) (danger of other-acts evidence when uncorroborated)