St. Clair v. Commonwealth
2014 Ky. LEXIS 341
| Ky. | 2014Background
- Michael D. St. Clair was convicted of murder (Brady) after a multi-state crime spree and previously sentenced to death; prior appeals resulted in vacatur/remand of penalty-phase proceedings and one reversal of a death sentence for instructional error.
- At the 1998 guilt phase the Commonwealth introduced comparative bullet lead analysis (CBLA) evidence and other forensic and testimonial proof (including co-defendant Reese’s testimony and ballistics) linking St. Clair to the murders.
- Scientific consensus later discredited CBLA; the FBI notified defense counsel that CBLA conclusions previously offered were unreliable. St. Clair filed an RCr 10.02 new-trial motion based on this new evidence.
- A 2011 re-sentencing jury (after prior procedural interlocutory events and prior appellate rulings) again returned a death verdict; St. Clair appealed as of right, raising 32 claims including attacks on the conviction and on the resentencing.
- The Kentucky Supreme Court reviewed preservation and law‑of‑the‑case issues, conducted expanded review applicable to capital cases (Sanders standard for unpreserved quasi-errors), and performed the statutorily required KRS 532.075 proportionality review.
Issues
| Issue | St. Clair’s Argument | Commonwealth’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility/impact of CBLA and whether it warrants a new guilt trial | CBLA is now scientifically discredited; its prior use was newly discovered evidence that probably changed the verdict | CBLA was only a small part of a larger, compelling record (Reese, ballistics, IDs, physical evidence); trial court’s denial of new trial was within discretion | Denial of new trial affirmed — CBLA now inadmissible but not decisive; evidence of guilt overwhelming, no abuse of discretion in denying RCr 10.02 motion |
| Re-litigating prior-bad-acts (KRE 404(b)) on retrial | Changed interpretations of KRE 404(b) mean prior rulings should be revisited | Law-of-the-case bars relitigation; exception for intervening changes in law doesn’t apply to an issue fully litigated earlier | Barred by law-of-the-case doctrine; claim rejected |
| Suggestive identification/due process (not raised earlier) | Identification was impermissibly suggestive and violated due process | Issue could have been raised on the earlier direct appeal and is now procedurally barred | Procedurally barred — could and should have been raised earlier; no review on merits |
| Admission of victim-impact testimony from non-victim (Keeling’s widow) | Testimony about a different homicide’s victim was improper and prejudicial | Evidence of other crimes and guilt-phase summaries permitted at re-sentencing; any error harmless | Admission was error (not a victim of the charged crime) and implicated Eighth/Fourteenth due process, but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; no reversal |
| Voir dire procedure (Jefferson County method) and waiver | Court’s departure from Administrative Procedures deprived St. Clair of meaningful voir dire | Defense counsel expressly preferred the Jefferson method; counsel can waive procedural rules | Waiver by counsel; no reversible error |
| Juror pay / socioeconomic exclusion (Batson) | Low juror pay systematically excludes low-income jurors; excusal of Juror 667 violated Batson/equal protection | Juror sought excusal for hardship; Batson inapplicable because judge excused, not prosecutor; single excusal not systematic | No Batson violation; counsel reasonably did not object; no prejudice shown |
| Questions forcing defendant to call witnesses liars (Moss line) | Prosecutor improperly forced St. Clair to label other witnesses liars | Exchanged testimony largely from prior transcripts and defendant opened door; some characterization voluntary | Not preserved; even if error, not prejudicial under Sanders standard |
| Jury instructions: aggravator wording, reasonable doubt, unanimity on mitigation, written mitigation findings | Several instructional defects shifted burden or limited mitigation | Instructions tracked accepted Kentucky practice; defendant had tendered some instructions; no required definition/unanimity/written-mitigation rule violated | Instructions upheld; no reversible error |
Key Cases Cited
- St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 140 S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2004) (St. Clair I) (prior direct appeal resolving guilt-phase issues and 404(b) rulings)
- St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 319 S.W.3d 300 (Ky. 2010) (St. Clair II) (prior decision addressing sentencing-phase instructional defects)
- Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2006) (explaining scientific unreliability of CBLA and its inadmissibility)
- Meece v. Commonwealth, 348 S.W.3d 627 (Ky. 2011) (describing standards of review and capital-case procedural principles)
- Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212 (U.S. 2006) (holding on impact of invalid aggravating factors and appellate review principles)
- Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (U.S. 1991) (permitting victim-impact evidence relating to the victim of the offense tried)
- Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (U.S. 1994) (explaining capital sentencing’s eligibility/selection framework)
- Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (U.S. 1972) (identification/due-process standards)
- Moss v. Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1997) (warning against prosecutor badgering a witness into calling another witness a liar)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (U.S. 2005) (bar on execution of juvenile offenders)