Spicuzza v. State, slip.op

Background

Brian Spicuzza was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor, second-degree rape, and third-degree sexual offense involving his daughter H. 1
Before trial, the court admitted testimony from H.’s friends A.L. and A.B. about sexualized conduct, intoxicants, and pornography under Rule 5-404(b)’s common-scheme-or-plan exception. 2
At trial, H., A.L., A.B., and the CPS investigator testified to a pattern of grooming, sexual comments, intoxicants, pornography, and alleged sexual abuse in Spicuzza’s apartment. 3
During Spicuzza’s testimony, defense counsel elicited that H.’s accusations were a “vile, false statement,” and the prosecutor then asked why H. was lying. 4
The circuit court barred Spicuzza’s proposed honesty character witnesses, finding the proffers conclusory and not tied to a relevant character attack. 5
The Appellate Court affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on preservation, Rule 5-404(b), the “why-is-she-lying” question, and character evidence. 6

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the Rule 5-404(b) objection preserved? 7	Spicuzza preserved the objection with motions in limine and continuing objections.	The State said later trial objections were too narrow and untimely.	Preserved as to A.L. and part of A.B.; some A.B. testimony waived. 8
Was other-bad-acts evidence admissible as a common scheme or plan? 9	Spicuzza said the friends’ misconduct was separate propensity evidence.	The State said it showed a unified grooming-and-abuse plan using H. and her friends.	Admissible under the common scheme or plan exception. 10
Was the “why is your daughter lying” question improper? 11	Spicuzza said it invaded the jury’s role and called for speculation.	The State said he opened the door by calling H.’s accusation false.	Yes, the question was improper and opening-the-door did not apply. 12
Was the improper question harmless? 13	Spicuzza said the error affected the credibility contest.	The State said any prejudice was self-inflicted and minimal.	Harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 14
Could Spicuzza call character witnesses for honesty? 15	Spicuzza argued vigorous cross-examination attacked his truthfulness.	The State said Rule 5-608(a) allows honesty evidence only after a veracity attack.	No error; exclusion was proper, and proffers were insufficient. 16

Key Cases Cited

Browne v. State, 486 Md. 169 (Md. 2023) (states the three-part Rule 5-404(b) test and de novo review for special relevance 17)
State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630 (Md. 1989) (articulates the three requirements for admitting other-bad-acts evidence 18)
Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468 (Md. 1978) (explains common-scheme evidence requires acts that prove one another, not mere similarity 19)
State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232 (Md. 1979) (common scheme requires a causal, logical, or natural connection among acts 20)
Bell v. State, 234 Md. 254 (Md. 1964) (admits linked sexual-abuse evidence where one victim actively facilitated abuse of another 21)
McKinney v. State, 82 Md. App. 111 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (similar sexual acts with different victims were not a common scheme 22)
Behrel v. State, 151 Md. App. 64 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (similar sex-abuse evidence was not admissible as a common scheme or plan 23)
Hunter v. State, 397 Md. 580 (Md. 2007) (“were-they-lying” questions invade the jury’s credibility role 24)
Grier v. State, 351 Md. 241 (Md. 1998) (opening the door admits competent, otherwise irrelevant evidence, not incompetent evidence 25)
Devincentz v. State, 460 Md. 518 (Md. 2018) (character-opinion testimony requires adequate basis and personal knowledge 26)
Sahin v. State, 337 Md. 304 (Md. 1995) (truthfulness character evidence is allowed for veracity-impeaching offenses after the defendant testifies 27)
Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638 (Md. 1976) (harmless-error standard requires no reasonable possibility of effect on the verdict 28)