Pеtitioner Robert Grier was convicted before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City with the crimes of attempted robbery with a deadly weapon, mayhem with intent to disfigure, and other related offenses. At trial, the State elicited evidence of Petitioner’s post-arrest silence, and Petitioner entered a general objection. We consider three issues in this case. First, we consider whether a general objection to the admission of evidence of Petitioner’s post-arrest silence was sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. Second, we consider whether evidence of Petitioner’s post-arrest silence was admissible as “fair response” to the defense theory of the case. Finally, if we find error, was the admission of evidence of Petitioner’s post-arrest silence harmless error.
*245 We shall hold that because the State’s questions did not generate any admissible evidence, a general objection was sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. Petitioner’s post-arrest silence was not admissible as “fair response.” Finally, the trial court’s error admitting evidence of post-arrest silence was not harmless. Accordingly, we shall reverse the Court of Special Appeals.
I.
While on patrol, two Baltimore City pоlice officers observed Robert Grier (Petitioner) and Carl Mack struggling with each other in the middle of the street. While the officers were turning their vehicle around, Grier and Mack stopped struggling, and Grier started to walk away. Grier was carrying a camera case. The officers noticed that Mack had a deep cut on his left hand, and that he was hysterical. Officer Farley remained on the scene and spoke with Mack, who told the officer that Grier had attacked him and stolen his backpack. Officer Purtell followed Grier. Officer Purtell stayed 20 feet behind Grier both for safety reasons and because he did not want to approach Petitioner “right off the bat” until he “knew what was going on.” After calling an ambulance for Mack, Officer Farley also followed in pursuit of Grier. Officer Farley observed Grier walk into a dead-end alley and throw something onto a porch. As Grier came out of the alley, the officers “got him and put him on the ground and then took him into custody.”
Grier was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. He was convicted of attempted robbery with a deadly weapon, in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1997 Supp.) Article 27, § 488; statutory maiming, in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.) Article 27, § 385 1 ; and other related offenses.
At trial, defense counsel told the jury in opening statement:
*246 Now, as the prosecutor has said, you will hear from a number of witnesses, two police officers and Mr. Mack, the infamous Mr. Mack . . . .
Now, you will hear through these witnesses what they did, at least the police officers, what they did by way of investigation, what they didn’t do by way of investigation, and you will also find testimony from these witnesses to be lacking. You will find the physical evidence to be lacking.
Officer Farley, the State’s first witness, testified to his observation of the struggle, his questioning of Mack, and his subsequent pursuit of Grier.
OFFICER FARLEY: When we rode by, I seen them standing right in front of each other arguing. After that point we did a U-turn and came back through. And as we did the U-turn I seen them struggling with each other. The defendant had grabbed the victim. By the time we got down therе, he had let go and starting walking away.
THE STATE: When you got down there, who let go and started walking away?
OFFICER FARLEY: The defendant, I mean, yeah, the defendant let go of the victim and starting walking away from us.
THE STATE: And what happened to Mr. Mack?
OFFICER FARLEY: He was there. I had approached him and my partner went towards the defendant. I had approached Mr. Mack and I observed—
THE STATE: Was he standing, sitting, laying down, how was he?
OFFICER FARLEY: He was standing. He was holding his hand when I approached him.
THE STATE: And, what, if anything, did you see with his hand?
*247 OFFICER FARLEY: I saw blood all over his hand.
******
THE STATE: Okay. Now, when you saw the defendant, did you see the defendant walk away?
OFFICER FARLEY: Yes, sir.
******
THE STATE: And so what did you do? Did you leave Mr. Mack and continue on—
OFFICER FARLEY: After I called the ambulance, I left Mr. Mack to go with my partner.
THE STATE: And where did your partner go, if you know?
OFFICER FARLEY: He was walking eastbound down on 30th.
THE STATE: Your partner was walking?
OFFICER FARLEY: Well, he was walking right behind the defendant. The dеfendant was walking very fast.
THE STATE: And where did the defendant go, if you know?
OFFICER FARLEY: When we were going down, he attempted to go through an alley which was a dead end, and then he came back out and tried to go back down the street and that is where we got him.
******
THE STATE: So when [Grier] came out of the alley, what, if anything, did he do next?
OFFICER FARLEY: He walked down, continued eastbound on 30th, and it looked like he had thrown something, I didn’t know what happened at that time, onto a porch there, and at that time we got him and put him on the ground and then got him into custody.
THE STATE: And did anyone go back up to the porch?
OFFICER FARLEY: Yes sir, my partner did.
THE STATE: You didn’t go up there?
OFFICER FARLEY: No.
*248 THE STATE: Did the defendant offer any explanation as to what this was about ?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
THE STATE: Your Honor, may we approach?
THE COURT: Yes.
(Counsel and the defendant approached the bench and the following ensued:)
THE STATE: Judge, I believe that the questiоn does not elicit any hearsay.
THE COURT: What does it elicit?
THE STATE: Just whether he offered an explanation or not.
THE COURT: It’s as well a leading question.
THE STATE: Well, I will rephrase it.
THE COURT: Do you expect him to give you an answer about what explanation was offered?
THE STATE: No.
THE COURT: You expect him to say no explanation?
THE STATE: Uh-huh.
THE COURT: Oh, okay. Well, you have to ask it right.
* * * * *
THE STATE: Officer, what, if any, explanation did the defendant offer to you ever why he was or why this was taking place?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection Your Honor.
THE COURT: You may answer, sir.
OFFICER FARLEY: He didn’t offer any.
THE COURT: The Court does overrule the objection.
Grier elected not to testify at trial. He was convicted and sentenced to the Department of Corrections for twelve years for the attempted armed robbery with a deadly weapon and *249 fifteen years for the statutory maiming, to be served concurrently.
Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, contending that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his pоst-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt. The Court of Special Appeals held that Petitioner’s “general objection was insufficient to preserve the post-arrest silence issue” for review and affirmed.
Grier v. State,
Md. Rule 5-103(a)(l) provides that the erroneous admission of evidence is not preserved for appellate review by a general objection when a specific ground is required by the applicable rule. Before the bench conference concluded, appellant’s trial counsel was well aware that the fair and accurate answer to the “explanation” question would generate (1) admissible evidеnce of appellant’s pre-arrest silence, and (2) inadmissible evidence of appellant’s post-arrest silence. Under these circumstances, Md. Rule 5-105 required that appellant’s trial counsel make a specific request that Judge Hubbard restrict the answer to its proper scope. The general objection was insufficient to preserve the post-arrest silence issue for our review.
Grier,
1. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that a general objection was insufficient to preserve for appellate review the question of whether or not the trial court had erred in admitting evidence of Petitioner’s post-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt?
2. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that admission of evidence of Petitioner’s post-arrest silence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?
*250 II.
We address first whether counsel’s general objection was sufficient to preserve for appellate review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of Petitioner’s silence. Petitioner argues that thеre was no reason for defense counsel to anticipate that the “explanation” question would generate any admissible evidence. Therefore, his general objection to the admissibility of evidence of Petitioner’s post-arrest silence was sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. The State argues that the questioning at issue generated both admissible and inadmissible evidence. Thus, Petitioner was required to object specifically to that portion of the evidence that was inadmissible. We conclude, contrary to the Court of Special Appeals, that the questioning as to defendant’s silenсe elicited no admissible evidence, and therefore, a general objection properly sustained the issue for appellate review.
A.
Maryland Rule 2-517(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he grounds for [an] objection need not be stated unless the court, at the request of a party or on its own initiative, so directs.” Rule 5-103(a)(1) similarly provides:
Rule 5-103. Rulings on evidence
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling that admits or excludes evidence unless the party is prejudiced by the ruling, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was requested by the court or required by rule[.]
If neither the court nor a rule requires otherwise, a general objection is sufficient to preserve all grounds of objection which may exist.
See Ali v. State,
The State contends, and the Court of Special Appeals agreed, that Maryland Rule 5-105 required defense counsel to *251 limit his objection to evidence of Defendant’s post-arrest silence. Rule 5-105 provides:
Rule 5-105. Limited Admissibility.
When evidence is admitted that is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scоpe and instruct the jury accordingly.
As a threshold matter, we note that Rule 5-105 is inapplicable to the issue in this case. Rule 5-105 addresses the situation in which evidence is admissible only for a limited purpose. Even under the State’s analysis, i.e., that the question asked of the police officer generated admissible evidence of pre-arrest silence and inadmissible evidence of post-arrest silence, Rule 5-105 is inapplicable.
Rule 5-105 applies when evidence is admissible for a limited purpose. For example, Rule 5-105 is implicated when “other crimes” evidence is admitted for the limited purpose of proving defendant’s intent or motive, and nоt for the purpose of proving propensity for criminal conduct. See Rule 5-404. In that circumstance, a court, upon defendant’s request, should instruct the jury that the evidence should be used only for the limited purpose of proving intent or motive.
Whether a specific objection is required when a question elicits both inadmissible and admissible evidence is not addressed by the Maryland Rules of Evidence. Because we conclude that the question in this case elicited no admissible evidence, we need not address this issue. When a question elicits no admissible evidence, a general objection is sufficient to preserve the question of admissibility for appеal.
See Ali v. State,
B.
Both the State and Petitioner agree that the question— “What, if any explanation did the defendant offer to you ever why he was or why this was taking place?”—elicited evidence *252 of Petitioner’s post-arrest silence. They disagree as to whether the questioning also elicited admissible evidence of Petitioner’s pre-arrest silence. The State argues that there was a period of initial questioning and detention of Grier that generated admissible evidence of Grier’s pre-arrest silence. The State maintains that “[a]fter Grier exited the dead-end alley and began to go back down the street, he was stopped for questioning by Officеrs Farley and Purtell.”
Officer Farley’s testimony contradicts this characterization of the events. Officers Farley and Purtell never stopped Grier for a period of initial questioning. After Grier came out of the dead-end alley, the officers immediately arrested him. The officers pursued Grier, “got” him, and put him on the ground. Once Petitioner was on the ground and in the custody and control of the police officers, he was certainly under arrest.
See Bouldin v. State,
Because there was no initial investigatory detention, any evidence of “pre-arrest silеnce” necessarily would have occurred during the time that the police officers pursued Petitioner. Although Petitioner was technically “silent” during this period, this pre-arrest silence was not admissible as substantive evidence of guilt.
Evidence of a person’s silence is generally inadmissible because “[i]n most circumstances silence is so ambiguous that it is of little probative force.”
United States v. Hale,
In the instant case, however, there is no tacit admission because, quite simply, there was no accusation to deny. Before Petitioner was taken into custody, Officers Purtell and Farley did not accuse Petitioner of any criminal conduct, nor did they question Petitioner as to what had happened. They were at least twenty feet behind Petitioner as they pursued him. 2
The State argues that even in the absence of an accusation, Petitioner’s failure to come forward and tell the officers his version of events constitutes pre-arrest silence. According to the State, the natural response of an innocent person in Grier’s shoes would be to speak out and tell the police his story at the time of the crime. 3 Thus, the State seeks to expand the notion of admissible “pre-arrest silence” beyond tacit admissions to include a defendant’s mere failure to tell the police his version of the events in question.
We reject the notion that a person’s failure to come forward and tell the police his or her version of events constitutes pre-arrest silence such that it is admissible as substantive evidence of guilt. Such evidence carries little or no probative value. Further, any minimal amount of proba *254 tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Silence under these circumstances differs significantly from a tacit admission, which this Court has found in some situations to be probative evidence of guilt. To qualify as a tacit admission, pre-arrest silence first must meet the threshold requirements set out by the Court in
Henry v. State,
In order for the other’s statement to be considered the party’s tacit admission, the following prerequisite must be satisfied: (1) the party heard and understood the other person’s statement; (2) at the time, the party had an opportunity to respond; (3) under the circumstances, a reasonable person in the party’s position, who disagreed with the statement, would have voiced that disagreement. The party must have had first-hand knowledge of the matter addressed in the statement.
(quoting L. Mclain, Maryland Evidence, § 801(4).3, at 312-13 (1987)). We noted in Key-El that these prerequisites ensure to some extent that a defendant’s pre-arrest silence is probative of guilt before admitted into evidence.
The premise underlying the tacit admission rule is that silence in the face of an accusation is probative of guilt, because a false accusation “ “would naturally rouse the accused to speak in his or her defense.’ ”
Key-El v. State,
Jenkins v. Anderson,
Unlike the instant case,
Jenkins
involved the use of prearrest silence for the purpose of impeachment—to call into question the veracity of the defendant’s testimony that he had acted in self-defense. The defendant had elected to testify and thereby placed his credibility at issue.
Id.
at 238,
*257 In this case, the State did not use evidence of Grier’s silence as impeachment evidence. Instead, the State used the evidence as substantive evidence of guilt. At trial, Grier exercised his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and elected not to testify, and therefore, evidence of his failure to come forward with his version of the incident lacked probative value. We hold that, with the exception of circumstances constituting a “tacit admission,” ordinarily a defendant’s failure to approach the police with his or her account prior to arrest lacks probative value, and is inadmissible evidence in the State’s case-in-chief. 5
In summary, the questioning at issue generated no admissible evidence of pre-arrest silence. There was no preliminary detention during which Petitioner was questioned about the events. Further, Petitioner could not naturally be expected to assert his innocence as police pursued him, and as a result, Petitioner’s silence at that time was not a tacit admission. Finally, we soundly reject the State’s argument that Petitioner’s failure to come forward and tell the police his version of events was admissible as substantive evidence of guilt.
III.
We now turn to the State’s claim that evidence of Petitioner’s post-arrest silence was properly admitted, or at least “not prejudicial,” as fair response to defense allegations of an improper police investigation.
*258
Evidence of post-arrest silence, after
Miranda
warnings are given, is inadmissible for any purpose, including impeachment.
See Doyle v. Ohio,
The Supreme Court has held that the use of post-arrest,
pre-Miranda
silence to impeach does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
Fletcher v. Weir,
[Sjince “[sjilence may be motivated by many factors other than a sense of guilt or lack of an exculpatory story,” McCormick, Evidence, § 270 at 800 (1984 ed.), it carries little, if any, probative value.
But “[n]ot only is evidence of silence at the time of arrest generally not very probative of a defendant’s credibility, ... it also has a significant potential for unfair prejudice.” Hale,422 U.S. at 180 ,95 S.Ct. at 2138 ,45 L.Ed.2d at 107 . *259 See also Younie v. State,272 Md. 233 , 241-42,322 A.2d 211 (1974).
Wills v. State,
Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has addressed the related question of whether the use of post-arrest, pre Miranda silence is admissible as substantive evidence of guilt in the State’s case-in-chief. 6 In the case before us, however, the State does not contend that there was a period of time, post-arrest but pre-Miranda, when Defendant’s silence was admissible as a tacit admission of guilt. 7 The State pursues a different argument. The State contends that any evidence of post-arrest silence, without reference to Miranda warnings, was admissible as “fair response” to the defense strategy in *260 the case. According to the State, the theory of Grier’s defense was that the police considered only the victim’s version of events and failed to consider Grier’s version or account. 8 The State argues that reference to Petitioner’s failure to tell his version of events to police was admissible as “fair response” to this defense argument.
In opening statement, defense counsel stated:
Now, you will hear through these witnesses what they did, at least the police officers, what they did by way of investigation, what they didn’t do by way of investigation, and you will also find testimony from these witnesses to be lacking. You will find the physical evidence to be lacking.
After opening statements, the State presented its first witness, Officer Farley, who testified to Petitioner’s silence. The State argues that under the “fair response” rule articulated in
United States v. Robinson,
Under the “opening the door” doctrine, otherwise irrelevant evidence may be admitted when the opposing party has “opened the door” to such evidence.
See Conyers v. State,
The State argues that the evidence was admissible under the Supreme Court’s “fair response” rule. Reasoning that the prosecution’s comment on the defendant’s refusal to testify is a penalty imposed upon the defendant for exercising a constitutional privilege, the Supreme Court held in
Griffin v. California,
[T]he Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal Government, and in its bearing on the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.
In
United States v. Robinson,
It is one thing to hold, as we did in Griffin, that the prosecutor may not treat a defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent at trial as substantive evidence of guilt; it is quite another to urge, as defendant does here, that the same reasoning would prohibit the prosecutor from fairly responding to an argument of the defendant by adverting to that silence . . . . [W]e decline to expand Griffin to preclude a fair response by the prosecutor in situations such as the present one.
Id.
at 34,
We consider the evidence in context to determine whether the State’s comments constituted a fair response to а defense argument. At the time the State introduced evidence of post-arrest silence, Petitioner had said nothing to generate a response by the State. Petitioner merely asked the jurors to pay close attention to the police officers’ investigation. Defense counsel’s comments cannot be construed as justification for the State’s evidence. We conclude that evidence of post-arrest silence was not admissible under the doctrine of fair response.
IV.
We now examine whether the trial court’s failure to sustain the objection was harmless error. The State points to testimony of Mack’s injuries, Grier’s flight from thе scene, and Grier’s attempted disposal of a knife. The fact that Grier never offered an explanation to the police, the State concludes, was inconsequential. Petitioner contends that the prosecution’s vigorous pursuit of that line of questioning, and the *263 prosecution’s reliance upon it in closing, prejudiced the defense.
In its initial closing argument, the State commented:
Officer Farley, did you at any time receive—or what, if any, explanation did the defendant offer you in regard to this incident? Officer Farley, he had nothing to say.
In rebuttal closing, the State argued:
And when he was caught, he offered no reason, nothing. He had nothing to say to the police, nothing to say at all. Not yeah, yeah, that guy attaсked me. There was nothing. There was nothing. And all he had to do was give an explanation like Mr. Mack did over what happened and the details of what happened and let them jive with what the police saw.
The State improperly used Petitioner’s failure to explain his version of events as substantive evidence of guilt. An error is not harmless unless, upon an independent review of the record, a reviewing court is able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in no way influenced the verdict.
Dorsey v. State,
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AND REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE *264 COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.
Notes
. Defendant was arrested on October 26, 1995, tried on July 24-25, 1996, and sentenced on September 5, 1996. Article 27, § 385 was *246 repealed by Acts of 1996, ch. 632, § 1, effective October 1, 1996. See Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1997 Supp.) Art. 27, § 12 et seq.
. According to Officer Farley's testimony, Petitioner "started walking away” when police arrived on the scene and was "walking very fast.” Petitioner’s "flight” from the scene was before the jury and was admitted to show consciousness of guilt.
Briggeman v. Albert,
. During oral argument, the State argued:
I think that it would be reasonable for a person to say, get him; he tried to steal my goods, leave me alone or some comment, but the fact that he didn’t is the pre-arrest [silence].
. This Court addressed a related question in
Davis v. State,
*257 The threshold fact to be established, by way of foundation, is that the natural response оf the witness, assuming the witness was in possession of exculpatory evidence, would have been to disclose that information to the proper authorities. From that fact, the inconsistency between his or her pretrial silence and his or her trial testimony may be inferred. If that burden is not satisfied "proof of silence lacks any significant probative value and must therefore be excluded.” Hale,422 U.S. at 176 ,95 S.Ct. at 2136 ,45 L.Ed.2d at 104 .
Id.
at 338,
. We do not address the question of whether a defendant’s failure to come forward with his account may be used to impeach the defendant’s testimony at trial.
. Other states have addressed this issue. Some states have excluded this evidence by construing their state сonstitutions as providing criminal defendants with greater protection than the federal constitution.
See, e.g., State v. Davis,
Several states have recognized a policy basis to reject the position that only
post-Miranda
silence is inadmissible. Those states reason that if a defendant’s silence prior to
Miranda
warnings were admissible to imply guilt, it would encourage police to delay reading
Miranda
warnings to preserve the opportunity to use the defendant’s silence against him at trial, only later giving the suspect
Miranda
warnings to secure a statement.
See, e.g., Morris v. State,
. We decline to address this issue today on our own initiative. This issue was not raised in either the petition for certiorari or the briefs of the parties. Nor was it raised in the trial court or the Court of Special Appeals. Md. Rule 8-131.
Further, we can not determine from the record before us whether there was a period of time when Petitioner was arrested and had not received Miranda warnings or whether Petitioner was advised at any time of his Miranda rights. Because we can not determine whether this period existed, we can not tell whether Petitioner demonstrated any silence during such a time period that would rise to the level of a tacit admission.
. The State did not object to the admissibility of this evidence on relevancy grounds and we express no opinion on that issue.