Sperl v. Henry
92 N.E.3d 573
Ill. App. Ct.2017Background
- On April 1, 2004 a tractor-trailer driven by DeAn Henry struck multiple vehicles, causing two deaths and serious injuries; Henry admitted negligence at trial. Henry leased her tractor to Toad L. Dragonfly Express, Inc. (Dragonfly); C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. (CHR) acted as broker for the load.
- Plaintiffs obtained jury verdicts totaling ~$23.225 million (after a post-trial reduction) entered jointly and severally against Henry, Dragonfly, and CHR; appellate court affirmed that Henry was CHR’s agent and CHR was vicariously liable under respondeat superior.
- CHR paid the full judgments plus accrued postjudgment interest and filed a cross-claim seeking contribution from Dragonfly under the Illinois Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (the Act).
- Trial court (after bench determination using trial record) found CHR and Dragonfly equally at fault and awarded CHR contribution equal to 50% of the judgments plus half of the accrued interest.
- On appeal Dragonfly argued (1) the Act requires comparative fault and here both CHR and Dragonfly were only vicariously liable (blameless principals), so contribution is unavailable, (2) CHR’s post-judgment satisfactions were settlements barring contribution under section 2(e), and (3) postjudgment interest is not recoverable under the Act. CHR cross-appealed seeking 100% contribution or a larger allocation.
Issues
| Issue | CHR's Argument | Dragonfly's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Availability of contribution under the Act | CHR: contribution is available; Dragonfly made admissions and precedent (Equistar) allows contribution from a vicariously liable principal | Dragonfly: Act permits contribution only where relative culpability can be compared; both CHR and Dragonfly are blameless principals vicariously liable for the same agent, so no apportionable fault | Reversed: contribution unavailable where two principals are each vicariously liable for the same agent who is the sole tortfeasor and there is no evidence either principal was at fault in fact |
| Effect of CHR’s post-judgment payments (settlement bar under §2(e)) | CHR: payments were satisfactions of judgment, not settlements; §2(e) does not bar contribution | Dragonfly: CHR’s satisfactions functioned as settlements without releasing Dragonfly, so §2(e) bars contribution | Held CHR did not settle; payments were satisfactions, so §2(e) did not bar contribution (court did not need to decide because contribution was reversed on other grounds) |
| Recoverability of postjudgment interest in contribution | CHR: entitled to recover postjudgment interest it paid as part of the judgment amount | Dragonfly: interest is statutory on judgment, not tort liability, therefore not a "common liability" under the Act | Court: would have allowed recovery of postjudgment interest as part of judgment payment if contribution were otherwise available; issue not reached on merits because contribution reversed |
| CHR cross-appeal for larger award (100% or share of uncollectable Henry portion) | CHR: Dragonfly admitted fault and federal lease regulations make Dragonfly directly liable; if Henry’s share is uncollectable, Dragonfly should absorb it | Dragonfly: no admission of independent fault; federal regs create vicarious (not direct) liability; Henry’s share is not a separate collectible obligation | Held: CHR not entitled to larger award; Dragonfly did not admit independent fault and federal rules do not convert vicarious liability into direct fault; Henry’s obligation was not an "uncollectable" separate share for contribution purposes |
Key Cases Cited
- American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Med. Ctr., 154 Ill. 2d 347 (Ill. 1992) (principal vicariously liable is blameless for purposes of Contribution Act; Act addresses relative culpability of tortfeasors at fault in fact)
- Heinrich v. Peabody Int’l Corp., 99 Ill. 2d 344 (Ill. 1984) (pro rata shares determined by relative culpability; Act allocates liability among those at fault in fact)
- Equistar Chem., L.P. v. BMW Constructors, Inc., 353 Ill. App. 3d 593 (Ill. App. 2004) (permitting contribution in context of distinct negligent acts and Workers’ Compensation interplay; limited to its facts)
- Bristow v. Griffitts Constr. Co., 140 Ill. App. 3d 191 (Ill. App. 1986) (settlement with agent extinguishes principal’s vicarious liability in quasi‑contract context)
- Bean v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 171 Ill. App. 3d 620 (Ill. App. 1988) (principal not a tortfeasor for Contribution Act where liability is purely vicarious)