Spencer v. State
149 A.3d 610
| Md. | 2016Background
- On June 20, 2013, Spencer (21, intoxicated) led police on a high-speed 12‑mile pursuit; his Kia left the roadway and struck cyclist Andrew Kinn, causing serious injuries. Spencer was arrested and charged with attempted second‑degree murder, assaults, and property/traffic offenses.
- During voir dire defense counsel used multiple peremptory strikes against white veniremembers; the State raised a Batson challenge and the trial judge required counsel to state race‑neutral reasons for the strikes (age, occupation: farmer/mechanic/self‑employed).
- The trial judge rejected some of counsel’s proffered neutral reasons, citing a perceived pattern of counsel striking white jurors (including reliance on the judge’s recollection of counsel’s prior trials), and reseated three jurors. Jury convicted Spencer on multiple counts; he was sentenced to 58 years.
- On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. This Court granted certiorari to decide (1) whether the Batson determination was proper and (2) whether evidence supported attempted second‑degree murder (specific intent to kill).
- The Court (majority) held the trial judge’s Batson ruling was improper because the judge relied on undocumented impressions of counsel’s past practice (outside the record) and there was no record evidence to support a finding of pretext; it also held the evidence insufficient to prove specific intent to kill for attempted second‑degree murder.
- Remedy: reverse the Court of Special Appeals; reverse attempted second‑degree murder conviction (no retrial on that count) and remand for new trial on remaining counts due to the Batson error.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Spencer) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court erred in finding defense counsel’s peremptory strikes were a pretext for race discrimination under Batson | Trial judge relied on undocumented impressions of counsel’s past practice and made factual conclusions not reflected in the record; counsel’s stated reasons were valid, race‑neutral trial strategy | Judge permissibly considered counsel’s in‑court explanations plus context (including perceived pattern and local venire demographics); credibility determinations entitled to deference | Reversed: judge’s Batson finding was unsupported by the record; reliance on undocumented past practices prevented appellate review; reseating jurors was improper; remand for new trial on remaining counts |
| Whether evidence was sufficient to prove attempted second‑degree murder (specific intent to kill) | Spencer’s conduct was explained by intent to flee police, chaotic/short notice of cyclist’s presence, and lack of evidence he saw Kinn or intended to kill | Circumstantial evidence permitted inference Spencer saw Kinn (officers saw him), could have avoided collision, and passengers warned him; hitting Kinn could have been intended to aid escape | Reversed conviction for attempted second‑degree murder: evidence insufficient to prove specific intent to kill; conviction vacated without retrial on that count |
Key Cases Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (U.S. 1986) (establishes three‑step test prohibiting race‑based peremptory strikes)
- Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (U.S. 1995) (proffered reason need not be persuasive; must be race neutral)
- Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (U.S. 1991) (race‑neutrality inquiry and deference to trial court credibility findings)
- Miller‑El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (U.S. 2003) (context and credibility factors; relevance of evidence beyond the four corners of a trial)
- Miller‑El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (U.S. 2005) (use of systemic evidence to prove pretext and discriminatory patterns)
- Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (U.S. 2008) (distinguishes demeanor‑based findings from contextual comparisons on review)
- Gilchrist v. State, 340 Md. 606 (Md. 1995) (Maryland application of Batson three‑step framework)
- Edmonds v. State, 372 Md. 314 (Md. 2002) (trial court must make record findings at step three; remand where record inadequate)
- Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50 (Md. 1988) (factors for inferring discrimination include past patterns; appellate deference explained)
- Ray‑Simmons v. State, 446 Md. 429 (Md. 2016) (appellate review of Batson steps and contextual analysis)
- Earp v. State, 319 Md. 156 (Md. 1990) (attempt requires specific intent; attempted murder requires specific intent to kill)
- Smallwood v. State, 343 Md. 97 (Md. 1996) (circumstantial evidence insufficient to infer specific intent to kill where conduct is explained by other criminal objectives)