Spencer Riley v. Victor Calloway, 882 F.3d 738

On Oct. 30, 2007 Cedric Hudson was shot multiple times; Riley was charged with six counts of first-degree murder and one count of being an armed habitual criminal (AHC). The AHC count was severed at the State’s request with defense agreement.
At the murder jury trial, eyewitness testimony was inconsistent; the jury acquitted Riley of first‑degree murder and answered a special interrogatory that the State had not proven Riley personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused death.
Riley was tried at a subsequent bench trial on the AHC count (stipulating to the prior convictions), where largely the same witnesses again testified and the judge found Riley guilty of unlawfully possessing a gun; Riley was sentenced to 15 years.
On direct appeal Riley argued collateral estoppel under Ashe v. Swenson based on his murder acquittal; the Illinois appellate court (reviewing for plain error) rejected the claim, reasoning the murder acquittal did not necessarily decide gun possession.
Riley filed a § 2254 habeas petition arguing the State was precluded from relitigating the identity/gun-possession issue; the district court denied relief, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding the state court’s application of Ashe was not unreasonable under § 2254(d).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether collateral estoppel (Ashe) bars prosecution of AHC charge after murder acquittal	Riley: jury conclusively resolved murderer’s identity (and thus gun-possession) in his favor, so State could not relitigate same issue	State: acquittal only found he did not personally discharge the fatal shot; it did not decide whether he possessed a gun that night	Court: Affirmed—Ashe not triggered because the murder verdict did not necessarily decide gun possession; §2254(d) deference applies

Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (establishing collateral estoppel principle in criminal cases)
Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 352 (2016) (discussing scope of issue preclusion and Ashe)
White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697 (2014) (§2254(d) requires objectively unreasonable application of federal law)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (§2254(d) imposes a high bar to habeas relief)
Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2002) (state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent for §2254(d) deference)
Lee v. Avila, 871 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 2017) (standards for §2254(d) review in this circuit)
Hicks v. Hepp, 871 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2017) (discussion of §2254(d) and unreasonableness standard)