Speed v. United States
97 Fed. Cl. 58
Fed. Cl.2011Background
- Ms. Speed and USPS entered a Settlement Agreement to settle a Title VII claim, with a lump-sum payment in exchange for dismissal.
- The Agreement required three reinstatement prerequisites including Fitness for Duty, training, and qualifying weapon scores.
- Six months post-agreement, USPS advised Speed she would no longer be reinstated upon failure to meet prerequisites.
- Speed received the lump-sum but did not complete the prerequisites; USPS informed her she would not be reinstated.
- Speed later sought damages and equitable relief for breach, arguing she was entitled to reinstatement or monetary remedies under the Agreement.
- The government moved to dismiss/transfer, arguing lack of Tucker Act jurisdiction and lack of entitlement to the requested relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tucker Act jurisdiction allows money damages for a contract with the government | Speed contends damages are the default remedy for breach of a government contract | Government says contract claims require explicit money-mandating language or separate statutory basis | Yes, for actual, presently due money damages from the United States |
| Whether the court may order specific performance under the Tucker Act | Speed seeks specific performance to compel reinstatement | Remand Act limits equitable relief; specific performance not generally available | Limited equitable relief denied; specific performance not granted |
| Whether Speed may recover back/front pay or reinstatement under the Agreement | Requests back pay/front pay or reinstatement due to breach | Speed was never appointed/reinstated; relief not available as a matter of law | Claims for reinstatement and back/front pay dismissed; amendment to plead damages for breach of the “reasonable opportunity” may be allowed |
| Whether amendment to pleadings should be allowed | amendment necessary to state damages for breach of the “reasonable opportunity” | court may require a precise damages theory | Leave to amend granted to plead damages for breach of the “reasonable opportunity” provision |
Key Cases Cited
- King v. United States, 395 U.S. 1 (1969) (monetary relief requirement for Tucker Act claims)
- Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002 (Ct.Cl.1967) (money-mandating doctrine; contract claims excluded)
- Testan v. United States, 424 U.S. 392 (1976) (money-damages entitlement; contract exclusion acknowledged)
- United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (clarifies source of substantive right for Tucker Act claims)
- United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003) (money-mandating analysis; contracts treated separately)
- Rick's Mushroom Service, Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir.2008) (contract claims generally not required to plead explicit money-mandating language)