Spearman v. Commissioner of Correction
138 A.3d 378
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- On Oct. 23, 1996, a three‑family house at 16 Clover Place in New Haven was set on fire; investigators found evidence of gasoline and multiple ignition points. The petitioner, Rufus Spearman, was convicted of first‑degree arson and conspiracy based largely on eyewitness Katherine Hutchings’ testimony and was sentenced; conviction affirmed on direct appeal.
- Petitioner filed a three‑count habeas petition (filed 2010): (1) Brady claim for nondisclosure of Hutchings’ relationship with police; (2) ineffective assistance for failure to obtain that impeachment material; (3) ineffective assistance for failure to present alibi witnesses.
- At the habeas trial the petitioner presented testimony from trial counsel (Dolan), four family alibi witnesses (Jashon, Stacey, Shane Hawkins, Yvalesse Nelson), and the petitioner; Dolan testified he investigated but elected not to call family alibi witnesses and instead attacked Hutchings’ credibility at trial.
- Habeas court granted the respondent’s oral motion to dismiss counts one and two (reports excluded as irrelevant) and denied relief on count three, finding counsel’s choice to forgo calling alibi witnesses was a reasonable strategic decision and, alternatively, that the proffered alibi testimony would not have produced prejudice under Strickland.
- Petitioner appealed, arguing (A) Dolan’s failure to call available alibi witnesses was constitutionally deficient; and (B) the court erred in excluding police reports (exhibits) and dismissing counts one and two.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dolan’s failure to call family alibi witnesses was deficient performance under Strickland | Dolan knew of credible alibi witnesses and unreasonably failed to call them, weakening petitioner’s alibi defense | Dolan made a reasonable strategic choice: cross‑examination of Hutchings and avoiding exposure of biased, inconsistent family testimony that would not firmly place petitioner away from the scene | Court held no deficient performance: counsel’s choice was strategic and reasonable given witness inconsistencies, proximity to fire, and potential impeachment risks |
| Whether failure to call alibi witnesses prejudiced the defense (Strickland prejudice prong) | Presence of family witnesses would have created reasonable doubt and changed verdict | Testimony was incomplete/inconsistent, would not have negated petitioner’s opportunity to be involved; other inculpatory evidence (threats, false name at arrest) remained | Court held petitioner failed to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome; no prejudice demonstrated |
| Whether police reports about Hutchings’ past interactions with police were relevant/impeaching (Brady claim) | Reports showed Hutchings received leniency/consideration and were material impeachment evidence that should have been disclosed | Reports concerned unrelated incidents, often without convictions or proof of favorable agreements; relevance was tenuous and hearsay/extrinsic impeachment barred | Court held reports were properly excluded as irrelevant; dismissal of Brady/count two affirmed because materiality not shown |
| Whether exclusion of reports deprived petitioner of a prima facie case on counts one and two | If admissible, reports would support Brady/impeachment and show counsel’s failure to obtain them | Excluded reports would not have produced material impeachment; no showing of suppression or materiality | Court held dismissal of counts one and two proper because the reports lacked sufficient probative link to materiality under Brady |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance: performance and prejudice)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (courts must avoid hindsight and may not invent post hoc justifications for counsel’s choices)
- Bryant v. Commissioner of Correction, 290 Conn. 502 (2009) (failure to call neutral witnesses who would have provided a credible third‑party culpability/alibi can be deficient and prejudicial)
- Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction, 306 Conn. 664 (2012) (criteria when not to second‑guess counsel’s tactical decisions about calling witnesses)
- Sanchez v. Commissioner of Correction, 314 Conn. 585 (2014) (analysis of prejudice where omitted witnesses’ testimony was cumulative or not compelling)
- Vazquez v. Commissioner of Correction, 107 Conn. App. 181 (2008) (failure to present credible alibi witnesses may show deficient performance when counsel’s inaction lacks tactical justification)
- State v. McKnight, 191 Conn. 564 (1983) (alibi as a means to raise reasonable doubt; jury instruction principles)