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Spangler v. McQuitty
36 A.3d 928
Md.
2012
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Background

  • McQuitty v. Spangler concerns informed consent duty and damages after the Maryland Court of Appeals’ McQuitty I decision.
  • Plaintiffs Dylan McQuitty and his parents sued Dr. Donald Spangler for failure to obtain informed consent, resulting in birth injuries in 1995.
  • Franklin Square Hospital settled early as to liability/damages; its joint-tortfeasor status was disputed by later releases.
  • Dylan died before remittitur proceedings were resolved; post-trial motions sought reduction of future medical expenses and due-process relief.
  • Trial court remitted under statutory caps and joint-tortfeasor provisions; Spangler sought further relief including post-judgment adjustments and interest.
  • Appellate court held no due-process violation, affirmed finality of the future medical expense award, and addressed joint-tortfeasor and post-judgment-interest issues.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Did McQuitty I change Maryland informed consent law? McQuitty I changed the doctrine. McQuitty I overruled prior law; required retrial. McQuitty I did not substantively alter the law.
Should Dylan's death reduce future medical expenses after post-trial relief? Death should not extinguish future medical damages, preserving finality. Equity demands reducing to actual expenses. Finality governs; no reduction absent a statute or annuity; no reversal for death.
Is Franklin Square Hospital a joint tortfeasor under the Uniform Act? Hospital was a joint tortfeasor; its settlement should reduce Spangler’s liability. Hospital was not a joint tortfeasor due to release terms and lack of adjudication. Hospital was not a joint tortfeasor; no offset reduction against Spangler.
Can a settling defendant’s release reduce the nonsettling defendant’s judgment under the Uniform Act? Release should operate to reduce damages via contribution. Release terms prevent offset against nonsettling tortfeasor. Release did not compel reduction against nonsettling tortfeasor.
From what date should post-judgment interest accrue? Interest accrues from the original judgment date. Interest accrues from a later post-remittitur judgment date. Interest accrues from the original judgment date.

Key Cases Cited

  • McQuitty v. Spangler, 410 Md. 1 (Md. 2009) (McQuitty I; clarified informed consent without battery requirement)
  • Davis v. Jellico Community Hospital, Inc., 912 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1990) (finality favored; post-trial damages not reopened for death)
  • Boyd v. Bulala, 672 F. Supp. 915 (W.D.Va. 1987) (finality of judgment; avoid relief due to premature death)
  • Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452 (Md. 1998) (joint tort-feasor status; release and contribution rules)
  • Jacobs v. Flynn, 131 Md. App. 342 (Md. App. 2000) (settlement admissions create joint-tortfeasor status under Uniform Act)
  • Garrett v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 343 Md. 500 (Md. 1996) (settling party status and contribution limitations)
  • Swigert v. Welk, 213 Md. 613 (Md. 1957) (Uniform Contribution Act background on tort-feasor status)
  • Collier v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 86 Md. App. 38 (Md. App. 1991) (principles on settlement offsets and joint liability)
  • Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226 (Md. 1993) (informed consent doctrine historically linked to negligence)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: Spangler v. McQuitty
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Date Published: Jan 27, 2012
Citation: 36 A.3d 928
Docket Number: No. 23
Court Abbreviation: Md.